Parker Jensen, Barbara and Daren Jensen v. Kari Cunningham, Richard Anderson, Lars M Wagner, Karen H. Albritton, and Susan Eisenman : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2009
Parker Jensen, Barbara and Daren Jensen v. Kari
Cunningham, Richard Anderson, Lars M Wagner,
Karen H. Albritton, and Susan Eisenman : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bridget K. Romano; assistant attorney general; Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; attorneys for
appellees.
Roger P. Christensen, Karra J. Porter, Sarah E. Spencer; Christensen and Jensen; attorneys for
appellants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Jensen v. Cunningham, No. 20090277.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2916
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PARKER JENSEN, a minor, by and 
through his parents and natural guardians, 
BARBARA and DAREN JENSEN; 
BARBARA JENSEN, individually; and 
DAREN JENSEN, individually, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
KARI CUNNINGHAM, in her individual 
capacity; RICHARD ANDERSON, in his 
individual and official capacities; LARS M. 
WAGNER, in his individual capacity; 
KAREN H. ALBRITTON, in her 
individual capacity; SUSAN EISENMAN, 
in her individual capacity, 
Appellees. 
Case No. 20090277-SC 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
HON. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Roger P. Christensen, 0648 
Karra J. Porter, 5223 
Sarah E. Spencer, 11141 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Appellants 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COUR; •, 
AUG 2 8 2009 
David G. Williams 
Andrew M. Morse 
Richard A. Vazquez 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P O Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Attorneys for Appellees Lars M. Wagner and Karen H. Albritton 
Scott D. Cheney 
Bridget Romano 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P O Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Attorneys for Appellee Anderson, Cunningham, and Eisenman 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PARKER JENSEN, a minor, by and 
through his parents and natural guardians, 
BARBARA and DAREN JENSEN; 
BARBARA JENSEN, individually; and 
DAREN JENSEN, individually, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
KARI CUNNINGHAM, in her individual 
capacity; RICHARD ANDERSON, in his 
individual and official capacities; LARS M. 
WAGNER, in his individual capacity; 
KAREN H. ALBRITTON, in her 
individual capacity; SUSAN EISENMAN, 
in her individual capacity, 
Appellees. 
CaseNo.20090277-SC 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
HON. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Roger P. Christensen, 0648 
Karra J. Porter, 5223 
Sarah E. Spencer, 11141 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Appellants 
David G. Williams 
Andrew M. Morse 
Richard A. Vazquez 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P O Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Attorneys for Appellees Lars M. Wagner and Karen H. Albritton 
Scott D. Cheney 
Bridget Romano 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P O Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Attorneys for Appellee Anderson, Cunningham, and Eisenman 
LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
All interested parties are identified in the caption on appeal. 
When the case was initially filed, Intermountain Health Care (IHC) was a named 
defendant. However, upon stipulation of the parties that none of the defendants was an IHC 
employee, IHC was voluntarily dismissed from the case, and is not part of the case or this 
appeal. Three other original defendants, the State of Utah, Dr. Cheryl Coffin, and Dr. 
David Corwin, were dismissed from the proceeding by U. S. District Court Judge Paul 
Cassell. That dismissal has not been challenged by the Jensens, and those parties are not 
part of the case or this appeal. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND 
RULES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 2 
Statement of Facts 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 35 
ARGUMENT 37 
I. THE UTAH CONSTITUTION CONFERS BROADER 
PROTECTION THAN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 37 
A. State constitutional analysis in general 37 
B. "Legislative" history and intent of the Framers 
generally 39 
1. Article I, § 1 (right to enjoy and defend lives and 
liberty) 44 
a. Misrepresentations and omissions 46 
b. Refusal to allow parents to choose between licensed 
physicians or to seek reasonably requested testing 47 
c. Failure to investigate 48 
2. Article I, § 7 (due process) 48 
a. Misrepresentations and omissions 50 
b. Refusal to allow the Jensens to choose their own 
physician or to conduct reasonably requested tests 50 
c. Failure to investigate 56 
i 
3. Article I, Section 14 (search and seizure) 57 
II. RES JUDICATA IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE JENSENS' STATE 
CLAIMS FOR ADDITIONAL REASONS 62 
A. Claim preclusion does not apply 63 
1. There was no earlier action 63 
2. There was no "final judgment on the merits" on the 
Jensens' state law claims 64 
3. The Jensens' state claims are separate and distinct 
from the claims ruled upon by the federal court 64 
4. The policy justifications behind the doctrine of claim 
preclusion are not present in this case 65 
B. Issue preclusion 65 
1. The issues presented for review in this action are not 
identical to the issues decided by the federal court 66 
2. The "prior action" was not "finally adjudicated on 
the merits." 69 
3. Policy considerations militate against applying the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel 69 
CONCLUSION 70 
ADDENDUM 
Memorandum Decision, February 18,2009 
Final Judgment and Order, March 11,2009 
Memorandum Decision (Judge Ted Stewart), September 22,2008 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114S.Ct. 807(1994) 59 
American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 2006 UT 40 50, 55 
Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, 108 P.3d 701 42 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, 52 P.3d 1158 48 
Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 22 (1904) 45 
Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, 110 P.3d 678 61 
Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, 99 P.3d 842 68 
Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2006) 65 
Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir.2003) 60 
Chicago B. & O.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) 42 
Custody of a Minor, 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978) 53 
Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d4 (Tex. 1992) 38 
Deseretlrr. Co. v. Mclntyre, 16 Utah 398, 52 P. 628 (1898) 50 
Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856 (5th Cir.1999) 60 
Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217 (3rd Cir.1998) 61 
Gitlowv. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925) 42 
Goldingv. Schubach Optical Co., 93 Utah 32, 70 P.2d 871 (1937) 45,46 
Hughes v. United States, 4 Wall. 232, 71 U.S. 232, 18 L.Ed. 303 (1866) 63 
IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Management, Inc., 196 P.3d 588, 2008 UT 73 66 
Ilott v. University of Utah, 2000 UT App 286,12 P.3d 1011 66 
In reB.R., etal, 2006 UT App 354, 144 P.3d 231 52 
In reBurrus, 136 U.S. 586, 10 S.Ct. 850 (1890) 42 
In re CFB, 497 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. App. 1973) 53 
In reJ.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982) 47 
In re McKee, 19 Utah 231, 57 P. 23 (1899) 48 
In re Tony Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 561 (Pa. Q. 1912) 53 
Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988) 44 
Jones v. Moore, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191 (1923) 48 
Kennedy v. Burbidge, 54 Utah 497, 183 P. 325 (1919) 49 
Lovell v. House of the Good Shepherd, 9 Wash. 419, 37 P. 660 (1894) 51 
Lysenko v. Sawaya, 7 P.3d 783, 2000 UT 58 66 
Mackv. Utah StateDept. of Comm., 2009 UT 47, — P.3d— 1 
Malik v. Arapahoe County Dep't. of Social Services, 191 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 1999).... 46 
Massey v. Board of Trustees ofOgden Area Community Action Comm., 
2004 UT App 27, 86 P.3d 120 62 
Mcllravy v. Kerr-McGee Coal Corp., 204 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 2000) 62 
Merchants'Nat. Bank of Kansas City v. Robison, 8 Utah 256, 30 P. 985 (1892) 46 
Meyer v. Board of County Commissioners of Harper County, 482 F.3d 1232 
(10th Cir. 2007) 46 
in 
Millv. Brown, 88 P. 609, 613 (Utah 1907) 51, 52 
Murdockv. Springville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39, 982 P.2d65 61 
Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938 (2nd Cir. 1997) 60 
North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co., 
14 Utah 155, 46 P. 824 (1896) 43 
P.I.E. Employees Federal Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1988) 51 
P.J. ex rel Jensen v. State of Utah, etal, 2006 WL 1702585 (J. Cassell, 2006) 46 
Park Lake Res. Ltd Liab. Co. v. USDA, 378 F .3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2004) 63 
Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 1998) 62 
Peltv. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. (Utah) 2008) 62 
Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004) 46,49 
Plotner v. AT&T Corp., 224 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2000) 64 
Salt Lake City v. Christensen Co., 34 Utah 38, 95 P. 523, 526 (1908) 51 
Sassower v. City of White Plains, 992 F.Supp. 652 (S.D.N.Y.1998) 61 
Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 114 S.Ct. 783, 127 L.Ed.2d47 (1994) 64 
Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma v. National Indian Gaming Com'n, 
327 F.3d 1019 (10th Cir. 2003) 68 
Shields v. Toronto, 16 Utah 2d 61, 395 P.2d 829 (1964) 43 
Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1990) 46 
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, 73 P.3d 325 1, 63 
Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993) 39,40, 42, 57 
Sojourner v. New Jersey Dept. of Human Services, 177 N.J. 318, 
828 A.2d 306 (2003) 45 
State v.Briggs, 199 P.3d 935,2008 UT 83 49 
State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, 996 P.2d 546 54, 56 
State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) 37 
State v. Eldredge, 27 Utah 477, 76 P. 337 (1904) 42 
State v. Gunwall, 720 P.3d 808 (Wash. 1986) 37 
State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 N.J. 338 (1982) 38 
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985) 37 
State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 1,432 P.2d 64 (1964) 45 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 56 
State v. Norman, 16 Utah 457, 52 P. 986 (1898) 39,42 
State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d751 (N.J. 1962) 53 
State v. Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106, 2007 UT 49 69 
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988) 38 
State v. JFbnwod, 164P.3d397,2007UT47 69 
Thurnwald v. A.E., 2007 UT 38, 163 P.3d 623 46,48 
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993) 61 
Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90, 128 (1878) 55 
Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 690 (Utah 1981) 49 
Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984) 47,48 
West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994) 39,42, 50 
IV 
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985) 66 
Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) 42 
fFo^en v. Buckley, 926 P.2d 853 (Utah 1996) 55 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-201(l) (2003) 50 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-409(l)(a) (2003) 56 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) 1 
Laws 1851 to 1870, Chapter XVII 51 
Rev. Stat. 1898, Title 3 51 
Other Authorities 
1 Bernard Schwartz, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 319, 762-65, 840; 
Bruce Kempkes, "The Natural Rights Clause of the Iowa Constitution: When the Law 
Sits Too Tight," 42 DRAKE L. REV. 593, 605.) 44 
16A C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 737 44 
Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention (1898) 39-40, 51 
Andrew L. Neff, History of Utah (1940) 58 
C. Albert Bowers, "Divining the Framers' Intentions: The Immunity Standard for 
Criminal Proceedings under the State Constitution," 2000 UTAH L. REV. 135.... 39, 54, 56 
Carrie Hillyard, "The History of Suffrage and Equal Rights Provisions in State 
Constitutions," 10 BYU J. PUB. L. 117 (1996) 50 
Hubert Howe Bancroft, HISTORY OF UTAH 1540-1886 (1889) 58 
John J. Flynn, "Federalism and Viable State Government-The History of Utah's 
Constitution," 1966 UTAH L. REV. 311 39 
John W. Shaw, "Principled Interpretations of State Constitutional Law-Why Don't the 
Primacy States Practice What They Preach," 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1019 (1993) 38 
Larry E. Dahl and Donald Q. Cannon, ed., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JOSEPH SMITH'S 
TEACHINGS 41 
v 
Martha S. Bradley, '"Hide and Seek': Children on the Underground," 51 UTAH 
HISTORICAL QUARTERLY (1953) 54 
Paul Wake, Comment, "Fundamental Principles, Individual Rights, and Free 
Government: Do Utahns Remember How to Be Free?" 1996 UTAH L. REV. 661 39 
Whitney, HISTORY OF UTAH, Vol. 1, pp. 228-30; The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints, HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS (Deseret 
News: 1932) 58 
Constitutional Provisions 
1849 Constitution of the State of Deseret 44 
Article I 36,43,44,45,47, 56, 60, 65 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 1 1,36,44-48 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 7 36, 48-57 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 14 36, 57-62 
vi 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in ruling that there is no historical or textual basis for 
interpreting the Utah Constitution differently than the federal constitution? Interpretation of 
the Utah Constitution is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Snyder v. Murray City 
Corp,, 2003 UT 13, % 17, 73 P.3d 325. This issue was preserved in the Jensens' opposition 
to the defendants' motions for summary judgment. (R. 1271.) 
2. Did the trial court otherwise err in ruling that the federal court's ruling was 
res judicata as to the Jensens' state law claims? Whether res judicata bars an action presents 
a question of law reviewed for correctness. Mack v. Utah State Dept ofComm., 2009 UT 
47, TJ 26, — P.3d —. This issue was preserved in the Jensens' opposition to the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment. (R. 1271.) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 1 - "All men have the inherent and inalienable right to 
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to 
worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest 
against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right." 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 7 - "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 14 - "The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall 
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized." 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
On July 18, 2005, the Jensens filed an action asserting violations of the Utah and 
United States constitutions, wrongful initiation of process, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. (R. 1-70.) The defendants removed the action to federal court based 
upon the presence of the federal constitutional claims. (R. 106-108.) 
On September 22, 2008, U. S. District Court Judge Ted Stewart granted summary 
judgment to all remaining defendants on the federal constitutional claims. (See Add. Exh. 
3 (Memorandum Decision); see also R. 117-188.) That ruling is currently on appeal. 
The federal court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Jensens' state law 
claims, stating that "as [the Jensens'] Utah constitutional claims present important 
questions of state law, the Court declines to further exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over the state law claims and will remand them to the Third Judicial District Court for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, from which this case was removed." Id,, p. 62. 
On remand, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment on varying 
grounds. (R. 281, 947, 1012, 1089.) The trial court granted summary judgment to all 
defendants on the grounds that the federal court's dismissal of the federal claims was res 
judicata as to all of the Jensens' state law claims. (R. 4199; see Addendum Exhs. 1 and 
2.) The Jensens timely appealed. (R. 4211.) 
2 
Statement of Facts1 
The record includes the following evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom: 
On April 30, 2003, Barbara Jensen of Sandy, Utah, took her son Parker to an oral 
surgeon to remove a small growth under Parker's tongue that the family dentist had 
diagnosed as a clogged saliva duct ten months earlier. (R. 2332-2334, 3278-79, 3283.) 
The oral surgeon also diagnosed the growth as a clogged saliva duct, but sent a 
sample to LabCorp for testing per standard procedure. (R. 1711-12, 3275-76.) He 
subsequently received a call from a LabCorp doctor who said the sample was malignant, 
but he was "not sure of the cell type." (R. 1713-14, 3287.) LabCorp later issued a report 
stating a diagnosis of "poorly differentiated small round blue cell tumor." (R. 3285-86.) 
That diagnosis could encompass up to 40 different tumor types, for which treatments 
vary. (R. 1756, 2688-89, 2737, 2791, 3192.) It is critical to make an accurate diagnosis 
of a patient's cancer type, both for treatment and prognosis. (R. 2738, 3199, 3210.) 
The oral surgeon told the Jensens about the call, and said he had arranged for them 
to see an ear, nose & throat specialist (Dr. Muntz) at Primary Children's Medical Center. 
(R. 2334-35, 1715.) Dr. Muntz noted that the tumor type was unknown, writing: "The 
unusual presentation and slow growth of this makes me less concerned re: 
rhabdomyosarcoma but such tumors as alveolar soft part sarcoma and leiomyosarcoma, 
etc are possibilities." (R. 2335, 3320.) He referred the Jensens to the oncology 
In the federal court, the defendants' statements of fact totalled 194 pages; the Jensens 
submitted an additional 139 pages. Accordingly, this summary is significantly truncated. 
A full chronology is at R. 1130-1270. 
3 
department, where they met with defendant Lars Wagner, an assistant professor of 
pediatrics at the University of Utah. (R. 2336, 3147-48.) Wagner said he couldn't really 
do anything until he had his own facility's pathology report. (R. 2122, 3212-13.) 
The pathologist on the case, Dr. Lowichik, began receiving unusually frequent 
phone calls from Wagner about Parker's case. (R. 2801-07.) Lowichik was not prepared 
to state definitely that the tumor was Ewing's, but she "did [her] best" to put it into a 
category. (R. 2793-95.) On May 20, 2003, she wrote that, from her examination, the 
results "suggested] a diagnosis of Ewing's Sarcoma." (R. 2793-94,2804, 3352-53.) 
A number of factors militated against a finding of Ewing's, including: 
• Only about 1 percent of all cancers are pediatric, of which Ewing's comprises 
only 3-5 percent. (R. 3269-70.) 
• 80-90 percent of Ewing's patients have primary tumors in the bone, not soft 
tissue, and of the latter, most are in the deep soft tissue. (R. 2079-85, 3270.) 
Parker's growth was in the superficial soft tissue. (R. 2079-80, 2776, 3112.) 
Ewing's in the mouth would be even rarer. (R. 1520-21, 1790-91, 2078-79, 
2808, 3259.) 
• Ewing's is aggressive and fast-growing; Parker's was slow growing. (R. 1516, 
1795, 2706-07, 3062, 3074, 3077.) 
Lowichik's May 20 report stated: "DIAGNOSIS: SOFT TISSUE UNDER TONGUE, 
BIOPSY; EWING SARCOMA / PERIPHERAL PRIMITIVE NEUROECTODERMAL TUMOR (SEE 
COMMENT)." (Ewing's is often referred to as Primitive Neuroectodermal Tumor 
("PNET") when located in the soft tissue. (R. 1521, 1751-52, 2047-48, 2092-2093.)) 
The "Comment" said, "In the event of excision of additional lesional tissue from this site, 
cytogenetic studies and freezing of tissue for possible molecular ancillary studies may be 
informative." (R 3352-53.) 
4 
The Jensens were informed that Parker had Ewing's Sarcoma. A "margin" 
(removal of remaining malignant tissue with a margin of clean cells) was scheduled, but 
later canceled. (R. 2123-24, 2340, 2383-84.) The Jensens were told that chemotherapy 
would begin the following Tuesday (R. 2125), and began preparing for the upcoming 
ordeal. Barbara's brother moved in from Idaho to tend the other children, and they 
planned structural changes to their house. (R. 2125, 2296, 2307-08, 2611-12, 3278-79.) 
Wagner said that Parker needed to begin chemotherapy immediately, that "we had 
two weeks because it was so aggressive." (R. 2166-67, 2340, 2415-16, 2650-51.) The 
Jensens asked if there were any other tests that would help confirm the diagnosis of 
Ewing's. Wagner said no. (R. 2150.) That statement was false. Wagner knew that: 
• Cytogenetic and molecular testing, which had not been done, were reliable 
diagnostic tests for Ewing's (R. 1501-02, 3360), were routinely performed at 
PCMC in cases of suspected Ewing's (R. 1500, 1758-60, 2730-33, 2798, 3167-68, 
3208, 3170, 3210-11), and were inexpensive. (R. 1792, 2799.)2 
• The only testing that had been done (immunohistochemical) cannot definitively 
diagnose Ewing's, as markers indicative of Ewing's can also manifest with other 
things, including healthy tissue. (R. 1752, 2058, 2807, 3203-4, 3153, 3166.) 
Immunohistochemical testing also cannot detect an 11;22 translocation. (R. 2060.) 
Wagner later testified that he declined to request genetic or molecular testing 
because it was not necessary and was not technically required by a Clinical Trial 
(AEWS0031) of which Wagner was a co-investigator. (R. 3164-65, 3180.) Although the 
Cytogenetic/molecular testing looks for a chromosomal translocation in which a specific 
gene (FLU) within chromosome 11 has moved to chromosome 22, and a specific gene 
(EWS) within chromosome 22 has moved to chromosome 11. This "11;22 translocation" 
is found in 85-95 percent of Ewing's patients. (R. 2668, 3207, 3374.) 
5 
Clinical Trial says it "should NOT be used to direct the practice of medicine by any 
person or to provide individualized medical care, treatment, or advice to any patient or 
study subject" (emphasis in original), Wagner says that his handling of Parker's case was 
pursuant to the AEWS0031 protocol. (R. 3180-3184; Case No. 2:05-cv-00739, Doc. 18 
(Wagner Mem. Supp. Motion to Dismiss, November 22, 2005, p. 15 Tf 38).) 
The AEWS0031 Clinical Trial was for patients with newly diagnosed Ewing's that 
had not metastasized (spread). (R. 3372.) Very few patients present with newly 
diagnosed, localized Ewing's. (R. 1485, 2734-35, 2738, 3262.) If Wagner wanted to 
enroll Parker in the AEWS0031 Trial, he had to do so within 30 days of the "diagnostic 
biopsy." (R. 0515, Ex. 65, p. 17.) Wagner calendared the date of biopsy as May 2. (R. 
3378-79, 3382.) However, a medical article cited by Wagner measured the deadline from 
the date of diagnosis, which would have been May 20. (R. 3386.) 
The AEWS0031 Trial "strongly recommended" molecular testing to confirm 
Ewing's. (R. 3375.) Genetic/molecular testing was a reasonable request, and would have 
been performed had Wagner requested it. (R. 1537-40, 2781-82, 2815.) Defendant 
Albritton is unaware of anyone at PCMC ever refusing such testing. (R. 1539-40.) 
Wagner claims that a pathologist, Cheryl Coffin, told him that genetic/molecular 
testing was not necessary. However, Coffin testified that she considers such testing 
"incredibly useful," would not have been opposed if it had been requested, does not know 
why genetic/molecular testing was not done on Parker's tissue, and is not aware of 
anyone who was opposed to such testing. (R. 1774-75, 1770, 1793.) 
Removing additional tissue from Parker's mouth (an "oncologic" excision) to 
6 
obtain a new sample would also have alleviated a concern of Albritton's, which was that 
there were still tumor cells in Parker's mouth. Wagner falsely told Albritton that he had 
recommended an oncologic procedure to the Jensens. (R. 1503-1506.) However, when 
the Jensens asked about the originally scheduled margin, Wagner told them that, rather 
than removing the remaining tumor from Parker's mouth immediately, a second surgery 
would not be performed until after twelve weeks of chemotherapy (which was a 
requirement of the AEWS0031 Clinical Trial protocol). (R. 2135-36, 2353-54.) 
The Jensens were confused. They had read that the first thing to do with cancer is 
get all of the cancerous material out. (R. 2645-46.) Dr. Albritton testified that it is 
important to get all of the tumor out as soon as possible; she cannot think of any good 
reason to leave part of it in. (R. 1528-29.) 
Barbara Jensen again asked Wagner if there was any other test that would help 
confirm the diagnosis of Ewing's, and he said no. (R. 2154-55.) At this point, all other 
tests (x-rays, CT and bone scans, blood tests, MRI) had come back normal. (R. 0515 (Ex. 
12, pp. 49-61), 2131,2376-78, 3275-76, 3278-79, 3318-20, 3325.) 
Another of Barbara's brothers referred the Jensens to a cancer specialist he knew 
in Oklahoma. This doctor told the Jensens that the staging process for Ewing's would 
include blood tests, x-rays, bone, CT, and PET scans, MRIs, and other tests like genetic 
tests. (R. 2125-26, 2152-53, 2342-43, 2345, 2482, 2645-46.) The Jensens told Wagner 
they wanted all the tests that this doctor mentioned and that they saw on the National 
Cancer Institute and other websites, which included genetic testing. (R. 2361-62.) 
Wagner now claims that he did not know that the Jensens were questioning the 
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diagnosis, or he would have requested genetic/molecular testing. (R. 3237-38.) 
However, on May 21, 2003, the Jensens had asked Wagner to send a "blind" sample to 
Harvard University for testing, which Wagner admits was because they had a question 
about the diagnosis. (R. 2306, 2365-67, 3239.) 
Wagner sent Parker's slides to a pathologist at Harvard who was a fellow 
investigator for the AEWS0031 Clinical Trial (R. 3373, 3239). Instead of the blind 
second opinion the Jensens requested, however, Wagner sent an e-mail denigrating their 
request for a second opinion, and urging the pathologist to agree with the "confident" 
diagnosis by his "expert" pathologist as quickly as possible. He alerted his co-
investigator that "the child was now 19 days post resection." (R. 3427-28.) Wagner also 
said that he did not want to "slow things down" by submitting a claim to the Jensens' 
insurer, and that the Jensens had agreed to pay for the testing personally. (R. 3428.) 
Upon learning that Wagner had not honored their request for a blind second 
opinion, the Jensens decided to have the testing performed elsewhere. They did not have 
confidence that Wagner would obtain a truly independent opinion. (R. 2370-71, 2626.) 
The Jensens had believed the initial testing, but were starting to wonder both about the 
diagnosis and Wagner's insistence on immediate chemotherapy. Some red flags: 
• The Jensens could find no reported cases of Ewing's in the mouth (R. 2164); 
• The survival rates quoted by Wagner kept changing as he urged them to start 
chemotherapy (70, then 85, then 90 percent) (R. 2239-40, 2356, 2392-93, 2605-
06), and Wagner seemed irritated by legitimate questions, such as why Parker 
would need 45 weeks of chemotherapy if another biopsy at twelve weeks came 
back negative (R. 2357-58); 
• Wagner had given them the names of the chemotherapy drugs that would be used 
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by writing them on a napkin (R. 2400); 
• A margin had been scheduled and then canceled, which seemed inconsistent with 
application of a standard procedure (R. 2124); 
• Leaving a deadly tumor in Parker's mouth for another three months seemed 
counterintuitive (R. 2645-46); 
• Wagner insisted that Parker must be experiencing eating and sleeping difficulties 
and losing weight, which the Jensens told him was not happening (R. 2378-79); 
• The Jensens asked Wagner about Lowichik's comment that "cytogenetic" testing 
might be informative, but Wagner said it was unnecessary and did not explain why 
(R. 2372-75, 2395-96). 
On May 28, 2003, the Jensens consulted with Dr. Judith Moore, a family doctor at 
the Modem Health Clinic in Bountiful that had successfully treated Barbara's father for 
prostate cancer. (R. 2225-26.) The Jensens told Moore that, if they had an objective 
confirmation of Parker's diagnosis, they would agree to chemotherapy. (R. 2960-61.) 
From Parker's records and the length of time involved, Moore told the Jensens that she 
was not convinced that Parker had Ewing's. (R. 1695, 2486, 2952-56,2961.) 
The Clinic's treatment of Barbara's father had been with a form of chemotherapy 
called Insulin Potentiation Therapy (IPT). (R. 2165, 2225-26.) The Jensens asked 
whether IPT might be a potential treatment if Parker had Ewing's, and requested 
information to take to their oncologist. (R. 1691, 1693-94, 1700-01.) At a May 29, 2003, 
meeting, the Jensens asked Wagner to "look into" IPT. (R. 2139-41, 3395.) 
At the meeting, Barbara said, "There's got to be another test that can narrow it 
down more than just maybe or invisible." Wagner said there was not. (R. 2150, 2183-
85.) Moore had recommended a PET scan, which Wagner admits are positive in most 
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patients with Ewing's, but Wagner refused the request. (R. 2380-81, 2947-48, 3218-20.)3 
Daren expressed concern that treatment would not be effective unless the cancer 
were definitively identified, and said it seemed odd that the exact same treatment would 
be given to Parker as to someone with a large tumor in his leg. (R. 3395.) Daren's 
instincts were correct. Several years earlier, superficial soft tissue Ewing's had been 
identified as a prognostically favorable subset in which chemotherapy is not always 
administered. (R. 2080-83.) Parker's growth was superficial and in the squamous 
epithelium (the tissue beneath the tongue, essentially a form of skin). (R. 2049-50., 2063-
65.) 
Since the LabCorp and PCMC reports did not state the same diagnosis, the Jensens 
asked Wagner to test another sample from Parker's mouth, but Wagner refused. (R. 
2401-02.) His response "floored" the Jensens, who thought, "why wouldn't you do 
additional testing, even if it was just as a safety point[?]" (R. 2577-78.) Daren explained 
that he was "just trying to get enough information so I can determine how to proceed with 
Parker." Wagner interrupted, "You don't have the decision on how we treat Parker. You 
can be a part of the decision." (R. 2402-03.) 
Wagner told pathologist Lowichik that the Jensens had given him an article about 
IPT in which a Ewing's patient had gotten better. Rather than show her the article, 
Wagner told her that the article was quite old and that immunohistochemistry had not 
Moore then prescribed the PET scan, the results of which were normal. (R. 2947-48, 
3525.) The PET scan did not show cancer in Parker's mouth, where the cancer cells 
supposedly were located. (R. 2965-66.) 
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been performed. He asked Lowichik to speculate, without reading it, on whether the 
patient in the article might not have had Ewing's. (R. 2801.) 
On June 2, 2003, a social worker working with Wagner called defendant Kari 
Cunningham, a DCFS case worker, with a "heads up" that DCFS might become involved. 
(R. 1873.) On June 5, Wagner called Daren, who was out of town, and demanded that he 
come in. Wagner said that if he did not, Wagner would "take his child" in "three days." 
(R. 2405-06.) A meeting was scheduled for June 9. (R. 0515 (Ex. 15, p. 20); 2410-11.) 
At the meeting, the Jensens again asked if a new sample could be taken and tested, 
but the request was refused. (R. 2417, 2422-23.) According to Wagner's notes, the 
Jensens were asked about their plans regarding IPT, and "[fjather indicated that he was 
still reviewing this information." (R. 2644, 3408.) The Jensens complained that PCMC 
was jumping into treatment when they were still asking about the diagnosis. (R. 2161.) 
A PCMC risk management employee in attendance then "leaned forward in her 
chair like she was picking up a card off the table and showed it to us like this." She said 
she didn't want to, but "I have a card to play." She said she could report the Jensens to 
DCFS and "have your child in three days." The Jensens replied, "We're going to go find 
another hospital that will work with us. You're fired." (R. 2156-57, 2162, 2412.) 
On June 12, Wagner went to DCFS liaison Dr. David Corwin, reporting, "patient 
with Ewing's sarcoma; family refusing conventional therapy and seeking unproven 
alternative treatment methods." (R. 3378-79, 3396, 1810-11.) Wagner did not disclose 
that the Jensens were seeking confirmation of Parker's diagnosis. Id. 
Dr. Corwin called Daren Jensen, who expressed concern about Wagner's refusal to 
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run additional tests before starting chemotherapy. Daren stated that the Jensens had not 
decided that IPT was a solution for Parker, and mentioned that they were planning a 
margin to remove the surrounding tissue. (R. 1815, 1825, 2426-28, 2639.) 
Daren agreed to another meeting. Dr. Corwin said he was going out of town for a 
few days, so a meeting was set for his return on Friday, which meeting it was believed Dr. 
Moore might attend. Corwin knew that the Jensens had confidence in Moore. (R. 1823-
24, 1829, 1833, 2429, 2440.) Corwin told Wagner about the meeting, but Wagner said 
they could not wait that long. Corwin asked, "How much difference does a few days 
make?" but Wagner said it was "urgent." (R. 1824-1830.) Corwin told Wagner that the 
Jensens were planning another resection of the tumor, which made sense to Corwin, but 
Wagner said no, it should be left in. (R. 1826-27.) Corwin assumed that, if other 
diagnostic tests were available that had not been run, Wagner would have told him. (R. 
1819-1820.) At Wagner's insistence, Corwin called Daren Jensen and canceled the 
meeting, stating that the Jensens would be reported to DCFS instead. (R. 2429.) 
Meanwhile, Wagner falsely told his supervisor that he had provided all 
information he could to the family regarding the diagnosis, and that the Jensens had not 
given him any material on IPT. (R. 2754-55, 2760.) Wagner further said that Daren 
Jensen had canceled the meeting, and that "there were no further opportunities to meet 
with the Jensens[.]" (R. 2758-59, 2763, 2765.) Wagner also claimed to have discussed 
numerous other things with the Jensens that he had not. (R. 2743-48,2751-53.) 
At a June 16, 2003, meeting, Wagner presented a "case summary" to DCFS that 
contained several material misrepresentations and omissions, including: 
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• that the May 20 biopsy results "confirmed" Ewing's, when Wagner knew that 
immunohistochemical staining cannot definitively diagnose Ewing's; 
• that "[t]he Jensens requested a second opinion of the sample from Dana Farber 
Clinic at Harvard University. Dr. Wagner agreed to this, and the sample was sent 
to Boston," omitting that the sample was never tested at Dana-Farber, that he had 
denied a blind test, and that he had attempted to influence the outcome of the test; 
• that "On May 21, 2003, Parker underwent a CT and bone scan," omitting that the 
results were normal; 
• that "On May 29,2003, Mr. and Ms. Jensen told Dr. Wagner that they wanted to 
use Insulin Potentiation Therapy as an alternative to chemotherapy," which was 
contrary to PCMC's own notes that the parents only asked Wagner to "look into" 
IPT, and also that "IPT therapy was listed on a website called Quackwatch," which 
he knew was untrue (R. 3395, 3398); 
• that at the June 9 meeting, Wagner "asked the family if any more information 
would be helpful. The family declined." when the Jensens had in fact asked for 
testing of a new sample and been refused; 
• that the Jensens had refused to meet again, when it was Wagner who refused. 
Based upon Wagner's report, a referral was made to DCFS on June 16, 2003, and 
assigned to defendant Kari Cunningham, whose office was in a hallway at PCMC. (R. 
1887-90, 2763-64, 3411). Cunningham did not want to be a social worker, and did not 
like doing investigations. (R. 1852, 1857-59.) She considered her workload too high, 
and the first thing she did with the Jensen case was unsuccessfully try to get another 
DCFS office to handle it. (R. 1859-60, 1865-68, 1899-1900.) 
Cunningham knew that it was her duty to investigate Wagner's allegation of 
medical neglect, and that the office of the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) would rely in part on 
her investigation. (R. 1557-58, 1560-61, 1862-64, 1869, 1960-62.) Instead, she simply 
assumed Wagner's allegations to be true and performed no investigation at all. (R. 1875-
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76, 1891, 1893-97, 1906-09, 1922-1927.) Although state law required Cunningham to 
contact the alleged victim's parents (R. 3431), she decided not to contact the Jensens, and 
instead to get their side of the story entirely from the person who was reporting them. (R. 
1903-05) Cunningham took the position that, if a doctor's complaint seemed reasonable 
to her, she would not investigate it. She never once ran a medical neglect allegation past 
another doctor. (R. 1863, 1870-71, 1874-75.) 
Cunningham never contacted Dr. Moore or considered letting the Jensens rely on 
her recommendations because Wagner said that Moore was not qualified to treat Parker. 
(R. 1883-84, 1913-14.) Wagner said it was an emergency, and that Cunningham needed 
to do something within days. (R. 1879-80.) He did not disclose that Parker's parents 
were questioning the diagnosis and had requested additional diagnostic tests, which 
Cunningham would have considered important. (R. 1879, 1881.) Wagner gave 
Cunningham the impression that he had done everything he could do diagnostically; he 
never mentioned the availability of genetic or molecular testing. (R. 1904-05, 1910-11.) 
On June 17, 2003, Cunningham signed under oath a Verified Petition and Motion 
to Transfer Custody and Guardianship. (R. 3435-39.) The verified petition contained 
several factual misrepresentations, e.g., that the Jensens had "indicated their intent to use 
IPT" when the Jensens had said they were reviewing the possibility; that "Dr. David 
Corwin was consulted for an independent assessment," when Cunningham knew that 
Corwin was a psychiatrist consulted in connection with reporting the Jensens to DCFS, 
not for an "independent assessment" of Parker's medical condition; and that "the father 
[Daren]" canceled the Friday meeting, when it was Wagner. (R. 3435-39.) The petition 
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also omitted material facts, including that she had not conducted any investigation; that 
the parents were questioning the diagnosis, that confirmatory tests had not been run, and 
that, if Parker did have Ewing's, it was a very unusual form. (R. 3435-39.) 
DCFS filed a Motion for Expedited Hearing, specifying a hearing date of June 20, 
2003. (R. 0515 (Ex. 10, pp. 0007-16).) The filings were dated June 17, but were not filed 
or served until June 18, id., so the "three days" Wagner had touted turned out to be two.4 
At about this time, Wagner e-mailed Cunningham a page from Principles and 
Practice of Pediatric Oncology by Pizzo and Poplack, "the primary pediatric solid tumor 
textbook," that discussed chemotherapy. (R. 2687, 2741-42, 3188-90.) Wagner omitted 
pages that said that "molecular diagnosis has become the gold standard" for diagnosing 
Ewing's, that an 11;22 translocation was definitive, and that repeatedly emphasized the 
superiority of genetic/molecular testing to confirm a Ewing's diagnosis. (R. 3358-63.) 
Meanwhile, the Jensens scrambled to find an attorney. (R. 2329a-30.) Eventually, 
they found Frank Mylar, a former Assistant A.G. who had served as general counsel to 
the Utah Department of Health and to the Department of Corrections. (R. 3505-06.) 
A friend told the Jensens that he had a connection with a cancer specialist in 
Vienna, Dr. Jeorg Birkmayer, whose resume said he had received a medical degree from 
4
 The timing of the two-day hearing might not be coincidental. If the enrollment deadline 
were measured from the date of diagnosis, as in the New England Journal of Medicine 
article, Day 30 would have been June 20, 2003, which might explain why Wagner told 
Corwin he could not wait three days to meet with the Jensens on June 20 even though 
Corwin wanted to; why the DCFS filings were backdated so that the "three day" hearing 
could be held on June 20; and why Wagner told Cunningham at the June 16 staffing that 
Parker could be dead in "five days." 
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the University of Munich, served as a visiting research fellow at several American 
universities and head of the Division of Tumor Oncology at the University of Munich, 
and was a member of the American Association of Cancer Research. (R. 3366.) 
The Jensens faxed Parker's medical records to Dr. Birkmayer, who told them he 
questioned whether Parker had cancer. (R. 2170-71, 2485.) Birkmayer agreed to perform 
an independent evaluation, including new tests on the slides. (R. 2603-04.) Anticipating 
the consultation, the Jensens applied for a passport for Parker. (R. 3278-79, 3678.) 
The Jensens also called the oral surgeon's office to schedule the margin. (R. 
2434.) The surgeon immediately called Dr. Muntz, who said he did not object to 
repeating a biopsy. Muntz said that the Jensens were refusing chemotherapy, and asked 
the surgeon to encourage them to begin treatment. (R. 1717-19,1721, 3288.) 
The oral surgeon understood that the Jensens wanted "an objective second 
opinion," which seemed reasonable to him. (R. 1735-36, 1718.) However, instead of 
honoring the Jensens' request for a blind second opinion, he called a close friend 
pathologist at the University of Washington, who agreed to "help out." (R. 1705-06, 
1724, 1740-44, 2117-18.) The surgeon mailed the new sample to his friend, underlining 
"Ewing's" as a reminder. (R. 1729, 3585.) 
Upon receiving the sample, the surgeon's friend called LabCorp to get their earlier 
results, ran a few tests that are facially inadequate to diagnose Ewing's, got a copy of Dr. 
Lowichik's report, wrote a report stating that a finding of a non-specific antigen (CD 99) 
"supported" the diagnosis (omitting the results of one key test that apparently turned out 
negative), signed her name and the name of another pathologist who had no involvement, 
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and sent the report to the surgeon. (R. 0515 (Ex. 38), 2066-2070, 2075, 3291-93.)5 
On June 19, the Jensens and their attorney consulted a doctor at LDS Hospital who 
told them that "he found no present evidence of Ewing's Sarcoma or any other cancer but 
that he was uncomfortable second-guessing the doctors at Primary." (R. 2494-95, 3508-
09.) He predicted that the second pathology review might change the diagnosis, but that 
it would still be in the same "category" as Ewing's. (R. 3073-74.) 
The Jensens appeared in juvenile court the next day. Representing DCFS was 
defendant Assistant A.G. Susan Eisenman (R. 1962-64), who assumed that Cunningham 
had performed the statutorily prescribed investigation. (R. 1960-62,2030.) At the June 
20 hearing, Mylar indicated that the Jensens were obtaining "further tests on the actual 
sample" (R. 0515, Ex. 33a, pp. 5-6). The juvenile court continued the case until July 10 
in the hope that the parties would reach a resolution. (R. 3454-55.) 
On June 23, 2003, Dr. Birkmayer sent Eisenman a letter stating that he had 
reviewed Parker's records and would be assuming care of Parker, giving a brief overview 
of his credentials and experience. (R. 3529.) Eisenman knew that Birkmayer's letter 
raised doubt about the diagnosis, and that the Jensens wanted confirmation of the 
diagnosis before beginning treatment. (R. 1994, 3459, 3506, 3509-10.) 
On June 25, 2003, Daren called the oral surgeon to ask about the test results from 
The UW pathologist later received a request from a hospital for the second sample, but 
did not release it. That same day, she removed the uninvolved doctor's name from her 
report. (R. 3084-85, 3099-3100, 3602-04.) A later effort by a Boise doctor to get the 
second sample from this pathologist also proved unfruitful. (R. 2713.) 
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UW. During the call, Christensen admitted that he had told the UW pathologist about the 
prior diagnosis, which frustrated Daren and Barbara. (R. 1740, 2119.) 
Upon reviewing the UW report, Dr. Birkmayer told the Jensens, "What is going on 
over there? CD 99 is not definitive of Ewing's Sarcoma." (R. 2116, 2450, 2633.) Dr. 
Moore likewise reaffirmed her doubt as to whether Parker had Ewing's. (R. 2633, 2944-
46, 2957-59, 2962.) However, Moore indicated that she was not interested in getting 
involved in a court case. (R. 2144-45, 2221-23, 2620-23, 2556-57.) 
On July 2, 2003, defendant Eisenman e-mailed Dr. Birkmayer, inquiring whether 
the Jensens were planning on traveling to Vienna, asking for the name of doctors with 
whom he usually consulted in the United States, and asking if he was certified to practice 
in the United States. Eisenman cited some studies associated with his clinic that she had 
found on the internet and asked if he intended to employ the same treatment for Parker. 
She stated that the American Academy of Pediatrics had established a standard of care for 
pediatric cancer patients in the United States, asked whether there was something similar 
in Austria, and requested a copy. She asked Birkmayer for information concerning his 
clinical experience and experience with child patients. (R. 1990, 3535.) 
Eisenman knew that the AAP guidelines, which did not come from Wagner or the 
guardian ad litem (GAL), actually said that they were intended to suggest "state-of-the-
art" care, and "do not indicate an exclusive course of treatment or serve as a standard of 
medical care." (R. 1982-83, 1991,3231-33.) 
In another letter dated July 9, Dr. Birkmayer said he was not convinced from the 
pathology reports that Parker had Ewing's, citing the lack of definitive testing, the slow 
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growth rate, and the location, and suggesting "more precise testing of the tissue prior to 
proceeding with a 45-week chemotherapy regimen." (R. 3479-80.) 
Eisenman recognized that Dr. Birkmayer had "questioned the diagnosis of Ewingfs 
sarcoma." (R. 3546-47.) However, she told Mylar that she would not allow the Jensens to 
use Birkmayer because he was not licensed in the United States. (R. 2455-56, 3507.) 
Eisenman knew that the State could not legally prohibit parents from taking their child to 
another country for medical treatment. (R. 1987-89.) 
Eisenman also began insisting to the Jensens' counsel that only a "board-certified 
pediatric oncologist" was qualified to treat Parker, and therefore she would not permit the 
Jensens to use any physician who was not so certified. (R. 3002-05, 3008-09, 3507-08, 
3029-31.) Eisenman knew that the law did not require the Jensens to use a board-certified 
pediatric oncologist (R. 1992, 2016). She also knew that Wagner - the doctor who had 
reported the Jensens in the first place - was not a board-certified pediatric oncologist. (R. 
1980-81.) (Neither was the head of pediatric oncology at PCMC. (R. 2728.)) 
Trying to find a pediatric oncologist that DCFS would accept, Nakamura called a 
pediatric radiologist he knew at the Children's Hospital of Los Angeles (CHLA). The 
radiologist said that Ewing's in oral tissue would be highly unusual, and it would be 
prudent to do additional testing to confirm that it was Ewing's. (R. 2972-75, 2983-84.) 
On July 10, 2003, the Jensens went back to juvenile court for a pre-trial 
conference. A stipulation was reached in which a Dr. Tishler at CHLA would conduct 
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independent testing, and then make recommendations. (R. 2911-12, 3555.)6 
After the conference, Eisenman e-mailed Cunningham that "I view today's hearing 
as a pretty strong indication from the Judge that he is not going to allow us to intervene 
with this family." (R. 1997, 3403.) Eisenman had an emotional tie to the case, telling 
Nakamura that she had had a personal situation in her family and she knew that the 
Jensens were just in denial. (R. 2993-96.) Eisenman knew, but never disclosed to the 
court, that genetic testing was usually done in Ewing's cases, and that other tests were 
available to confirm Parker's diagnosis. She admits that "the court might have been 
interested in that." (R. 1011 (Ex. 2, pp. 137-138).) 
The Jensens arrived at CHLA on July 21, 2003. (R. 3603-04.) Dr. Tishler had not 
reviewed Parker's records, and left the room during the meeting to see whether the 
samples had arrived yet. He said that no, he had not seen anything yet, which the Jensens 
assumed meant that the tissue was not there yet. (R. 2120-21, 2302, 2608-09.) 
Tishler admits that he indicated at this meeting that Parker needed chemotherapy 
based solely on the earlier pathology reports, not on evaluations by his own institution. 
He said that PCMC was a good hospital and he would be inclined to defer to it, even 
though he had not read all the documents yet. (R. 2193, 2232, 2464-66, 3088-89, 3098-
99.) The Jensens were dismayed. They understood that the July 10 stipulation required a 
fresh evaluation, not a deferral to PCMC. (R. 2234, 2499-2500.) Their attorney and the 
6
 Nakamura advised the court of one problem that could affect the testing: PCMC had 
lost Parker's tissue. (R. 3545.) The samples were missing for nearly two weeks until 
"eventually" they were found. (R. 1784, 1974-75, 2813, 2881-82, 3512.) 
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GAL had the same understanding. (R. 2885-86, 2911-12, 3015-16.) 
Although Tishler said he already had a recommendation based on PCMC's reports, 
he said he would have molecular testing done on Parker's tissue. (R. 3088-89, 3094-95, 
3113.) Eisenman, meanwhile, was moving forward with removing Parker from his 
parents' custody. Even before the Jensens arrived in Los Angeles, she had drafted a 
warrant to take custody. (R. 3412.) Defendant Wagner (who had moved to Ohio) signed 
a July 22, 2003, affidavit for that purpose, repeating the misrepresentations and omissions 
from his earlier reports to Corwin and DCFS. (R. 3156-57, 3607-09, see p. 12-13, supra) 
Because Tishler had already expressed an inclination to defer to PCMC, Daren 
called another doctor to whom they had been referred, Dr. Charles B. Simone. (R. 2456-
57, 2502.) From Simone's website, the Jensens concluded that he had served as a 
medical oncologist and tumor immunologist at the National Cancer Institute, helped 
organize the Office of Alternative Medicine of the National Institutes of Health, and had 
authored several books about cancer. (R. 3339-43.) 
Simone said he would accept Parker in his care. He said that chemotherapy was a 
possibility, but that until he performed a full examination, he could not recommend a 
treatment. (R. 2190-02, 2461, 2504-05, 2617.) From Lowichik's original report, Simone 
questioned whether Parker might have lymphoma, and recommended that the sample be 
sent to an expert at the National Cancer Institute. (R. 2507, 3063-64, 3612-13.) 
On July 24, 2003, Tishler at CHLA sent Daren Jensen an e-mail stating, "I have 
asked Dr. Gonzales to perform the specific genetic testing we discussed on Tuesday. 
After we complete testing here we can release the tissue block to an outside consultant, 
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either our colleagues or an institution of your selection." (R. 3617.) 
The day before a July 28, 2003, court conference, Dr. Simone told the Jensens and 
Nakamura that he was not willing to become involved in a court battle. (R. 2188-89, 
2618-19.) Before court the next day, the Jensens gave Simone's information to 
Eisenman. Because Simone only ruled out acting as Parker's primary physician if he 
were dragged into a court battle, the Jensens hoped that Eisenman would allow him as 
their physician because he was an oncologist. (R. 2246.) 
In the July 28 conference, Tishler was conferenced in by phone. (R. 3103-04.) He 
said that CHLA's testing was "being done right now," and that it would be completed 
after the tissue blocks came back from NCI. (R. 3558.) Tishler had not seen any 
pathology report from his institution, and knew that the lab was still working on the 
genetic studies. (R. 3104.) He stated, "We will be doing the comprehensive testing and 
[treatment] is to occur when we are finished." He estimated he would have the test 
results and be prepared to make a final recommendation in ten days. He confirmed that 
he would not be issuing a final recommendation until he had those test results. (R. 0515 
(Ex. 33c, pp. 23-24), 3481-82, 3560-62.) Based upon the prediction that CHLA's results 
and recommendations would be in within ten days, the juvenile court directed that 
chemotherapy was to begin by August 8. Id. 
When asked whether she could team up with Dr. Simone, defendant Albritton 
(Wagner's replacement in the case) stated, "My understanding of the fact is that he is not 
board certified in oncology, either pediatric or medical oncology." (R. 0515, Ex 33c, pp. 
50-51.) At that time, Albritton knew, and did not disclose, that defendant Wagner was 
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not a board-certified pediatric oncologist. (R. 1488, 1512, 1980-1981, 3246, 3263-65.) 
Cunningham testified that, had she known that Wagner was not a board-certified pediatric 
oncologist, she would have brought it to the court's attention at that time. (R. 1924-25, 
1931.) The court said that Simone could not be Parker's primary physician. (R. 3562.) 
The juvenile court indicated that CHLA's test results would be dispositive (R. 
3481-82), and set an evidentiary hearing for August 20 on DCFS's petition for custody. 
(R. 2896, 2986-87, 3481-83.) 
Tishler never notified anyone that the CHLA testing was complete. Between July 
28 and August 8, the GAL called and e-mailed Tishler directly, but Tishler did not report 
any test results to her. (R. 2862-63, 2883-84, 2887-88, 3101-02.) On August 4, 2003, Dr. 
Tishler sent Eisenman an e-mail, which did not mention any results. (R. 3101, 3616.) 
Daren contacted CHLA several times to ask about test results, with no success. (R. 2516, 
2607-08.) The Jensens never went back because "they never got back to us and told us 
that they had done the test and that he had [Ewing's]." (R. 2178, 3105.) 
On July 31, 2003, the National Cancer Institute doctor expert issued a report that 
said in part: "The site of presentation would be very unusual for PNET. Furthermore, 
FLI-1 protein expression is not specific as vascular tumors can also be positive. 
Molecular studies for the 11 ;22 translocation are being performed at Children's Hospital, 
and should be helpful in precise classification. However, the histological and 
immunophenotypic features are not those of lymphoma." (R. 3623.) 
Because Simone as a primary care physician was no longer an option and CHLA 
had already indicated an inclination to defer to PCMC, the Jensens continued to look for 
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someone who would perform the independent evaluation they wanted. (R. 2508, 2193.) 
They saw a story about a boy with a blastoma whose parents wanted to go to the 
Burzynski Clinic in Houston. (R. 2197.) From its website, it appeared that the Clinic had 
been studying and treating cancer since 1977, that its staff included a physician who was 
board-certified in internal medicine and hematology, and that it "work[ed] with other 
nearby medical providers to offer complete treatment for patients." (R. 3334, 3336-37.) 
Daren called the Clinic to ask if it had a board-certified pediatric oncologist, and 
was told yes. (R. 2204-05, 2480-81, 3129.) (Nakamura was also informed that the Clinic 
had a qualified physician on staff who treated cancer (R. 2981-82).) PNET was on the list 
of diseases that the Clinic treated (R. 3134-38). The Jensens faxed Parker's records to the 
Clinic (R. 2196), and an appointment was made to admit Parker for an evaluation to begin 
August 12. (R. 2202, 2247-2248, 2264, 2648, 2658-59.) 
The Jensens believed that, if Parker was not in chemotherapy by August 8, they 
would be permitted to explain why at the August 20 hearing. (R. 2194-95, 2259, 2288-
89, 2466-67, 2508-11, 2515, 2521-22, 2543.) The Jensens' attorney considered that a 
reasonable belief in light of the proceedings to date. (R. 2986-87.) The Jensens, their 
attorney, and the GAL all understood that, under the stipulation, the Jensens were not 
required to submit Parker to chemotherapy until an independent diagnosis had been 
rendered by CHLA based on the results of its testing (R. 2549-50, 2885-86, 2911-12, 
3015-16), which had not been issued yet. 
In anticipation of the upcoming tests in Houston, Parker suggested a get-together 
with extended family members, and a friend volunteered his cabin on the Idaho side of 
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Bear Lake. (R. 2268-2270, 2521, 2567.) On the morning of August 8, the Jensens left 
with their children and boat for the cabin, where they met other relatives. They planned 
to leave their other children with Barbara's parents in Idaho and leave for the Clinic in 
Houston on Sunday. (R. 2269-72, 2275, 2518-19, 2526, 2533, 2567.) 
Although Eisenman knew that the controlling test results from CHLA were not in 
yet, she proceeded with her plan to transfer custody of Parker. At 1 p.m. on August 8, she 
called a police officer, Travis Peterson, with whom she was acquainted and told him she 
would need help removing a child. (R. 1943-44, 2020-21, 3641.) 
Defendant Cunningham signed an affidavit that she admits presented only the 
State's side of the story and contained misleading information. (R. 1937, 3440-46.) For 
example, Cunningham admits that she knew by then that testing had not been conducted 
at Harvard, that Parker's CT and bone scans were normal, and that the Jensens were not 
pursuing IPT, all of which was contrary to statements in her affidavit. She never spoke 
with a pathologist, as her affidavit claimed. She said the Jensens had consulted "a man" 
in Vienna, rather than naming Birkmayer or identifying him as a doctor. (R. 1935-40.) 
She claimed that Tishler had said "Parker should commence chemotherapy," when she 
knew he had actually said that he would not be making final treatment recommendations 
until all of the testing was in, including genetic testing. See p. 22, supra.)1 
Eisenman and Cunningham took an order and warrant down to court, where an off-
Cunningham submitted another affidavit on August 18 to continue the custody warrant 
that repeated these misrepresentations. (R. 3440-46.) 
25 
the-record hearing occurred in chambers. (R. 2861, 3481-83.) The Jensens' attorney, 
Nakamura, was contacted by telephone, and told the court about the Jensens' 
arrangements with the Burzynski Clinic. (R. 2011, 2024.) 
Cunningham paged defendant Albritton, who represented that Burzynski was 
"NOT a board certified oncologist-hematologist and that his clinic is well known for 
providing extremely controversial therapy." (R. 1943, 2024-25) (emphasis in original).) 
Albritton did not disclose that another doctor at the clinic was board-certified. She also 
represented that the Clinic was only conducting clinical trials of nonapproved FDA 
treatments of cancer not involving chemotherapy (R. 2012, 2863-64, 3032-34), which was 
untrue. The Clinic offered chemotherapy, and FDA trials were only one of its 
departments. (R. 3121-22, 3125, 3132-34.) 
No one informed the court that the CHLA test results were not in yet. (R. 2863.) 
The judge signed Eisenman's order and warrant transferring custody of Parker to the 
State. (R. 2013, 2027, 3485-86.) Cunningham then went to the Jensens' house to execute 
the warrant. A neighbor said she thought they had gone water skiing, as they had taken 
their boat with them, and a note appeared to have had been left by another neighbor. It 
was evident that the Jensens "had been gone all day." (R. 2866-68, 3642.) 
At about 6 p.m., Daren was informed by Nakamura that a "pickup order" had been 
issued, and that Parker was to be placed in DCFS custody to start chemotherapy. (R. 
2273, 2529.) After consulting with an attorney in Idaho, the Jensens concluded that the 
best action would be to get the evaluation and then bring Parker back for the August 20 
evidentiary hearing. Otherwise, the State would take him and begin chemotherapy, and 
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they would never get the second opinion they wanted. (R. 2278-79, 2532, 2535-39.) 
The next day, Cunningham went back to the Jensens' home to execute the warrant, 
recording in her activity log that it was apparent that the Jensens had not returned home. 
(R. 3720.) Eisenman faxed a letter to the Burzynski Clinic prohibiting it from seeing 
Parker, and requesting that she be contacted immediately if the Jensens came there. (R. 
2014-15, 2891-92, 3732.) On August 13, she made another report to Officer Peterson, 
who opened up a new case file. (R. 3658-61) She also arranged for a meeting with the 
Salt Lake County District Attorney's office. (R. 0515 (Ex. 33d, p. 12), 1946, 2904-05.) 
Later that day, an unscheduled conference call took place with the juvenile court in 
which the August 20 evidentiary hearing was changed to a status/review hearing. (R. 
0515 (Ex. 33d, pp. 12, 14).) During that call, Eisenman misrepresented that the Jensens 
"have not responded to phone calls left on their cell phone or home phone" (R. 0515 (Ex. 
33d, p. 3)), when no such messages had been left. (R. 2545-47.) 
Eisenman subsequently realized that no order had ever been entered on the July 28 
hearing. (R. 2026.) (The minutes of the hearing had not been filed until August 11 (R. 
3735-36).) Someone arranged for an order to be signed on August 15, 2003. (R. 3702-
04.) That same day, the meeting Eisenman had arranged was held with Deputy D.A. 
Angela Micklos. (R. 2919, 3744.) Based upon a (mis)representation by Eisenman that 
the Jensens had fled the state after the August 8 order transferring custody was issued, 
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Micklos elevated the charges to felony child kidnapping. (R 2928-29.) Warrants on the 
felony charges were activated nationwide, and extradition was initiated. (R. 2917-18, 
2923-25, 3683, 3764-73, 3777, 3781.) 
Eisenman knew that the Jensens had not fled the state after issuance of the custody 
order. Among other things, she had Cunningham's logs (R. 1961), which said the Jensens 
had not been home all day when Cunningham arrived with the warrant. It also seems 
inherently improbable that two people fleeing the state would haul their boat with them 
and their other children, who could have remained at home with Barbara's brother. 
While still in Idaho, Barbara Jensen let Parker drive her Suburban down her 
parents' driveway to get the mail. He had an accident, and neighbors called the police. 
(R. 2280-83.) Daren Jensen was arrested on the child kidnapping warrant, and spent four 
days in jail until his father-in-law was able to post $5,000 bail. (R. 2569.) 
Barbara left for Houston with Parker, another son, and her mother. (R. 2318, 
2320.) Upon arrival, however, she received a message from the Clinic: Based upon 
Eisenman's letter, don't come here. (R. 2206-07.) Barbara and Parker could not return 
home; news reports flashed their photographs repeatedly and said they were the subject of 
a manhunt. (R. 2323-24.) 
The August 20, 2003, review hearing proceeded without the Jensens. At the 
Eisenman does not admit making the statement, but the only persons at the meeting with 
knowledge of the Jensens were Eisenman, Cunningham, and the GAL, and it was not the 
latter two. (R. 1946-48, 2905-08.) Around this same time, an assistant A.G. made the 
same statement to Attorney General Mark Shurtleff; Eisenman was the only AAG on the 
case, and she met with Shurtleff at about that time. (R. 2039, 3042-43, 3053-55.) 
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hearing, Eisenman made several factual misrepresentations, including: 
• "to this date I have never received anything from Dr. Birkmayer other than a 
letter," when she had received three letters, and had told the Jensens they could 
not use Birkmayer; 
• "From Dr. Simone I have never received anything other than a letter," failing to 
disclose her knowledge of a telephone call on July 30 from Simone to PCMC 
in which Simone stated a belief that he could convince the Jensens to have 
appropriate treatment for Parker. (R. 3620); 
• "From the L.A. Children's Hospital I have received nothing except for the 
telephone information that I solicited from Dr. Tishler," failing to disclose the 
August 4 e-mail she had received from Tishler; 
• "Ifm going to state for the record that I did contact the Birkmayer Clinic to ask 
them what kind of treatment they had for Parker. Mr. Mylar sent me a letter 
asking me not to contact them further and I never heard a response." (R. 0515 
(Ex. 33E, p. 22).) That was untrue. Mylar responded to all requests for 
information from Eisenman. (R. 3508.) 
The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for October 8-10, 2003. (R. 3569-70.) 
On August 22, 2003, defendant Cunningham issued a finding that the medical 
neglect allegations against the Jensens were substantiated. (R. 1949-50, 3344-45.) At 
that time, her records reflected total activity on the case of 3 hours and 46 minutes, of 
which one hour consisted of a meeting between Parker and the GAL (not Cunningham). 
(R. 1919, 1921.) Cunningham later went back and padded her logs with nine more hours, 
including non-existent activities {e.g., recording time for a hearing that she did not 
attend). (R. 1915-1920, 1945.) 
In September 2003, Eisenman left for a new job. (R. 2028-29.) At that time, she 
made a number of factual misrepresentations and omissions to her supervisor, including: 
• Failing to disclose that DCFS/Cunningham had not investigated the 
reporting doctor's allegations, which he would have recognized as 
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improper. 
• Failing to disclose that the Jensens had asked for genetic testing and been 
refused. 
• Misrepresenting that the Jensens had fled the state after the warrants were 
issued. 
• Misrepresenting that the Jensens had chosen not to use Dr. Birkmayer. 
• Misrepresenting that the Jensens had declined a second opinion from 
Harvard because their insurance would not pay for it. 
(R. 3038-39, 3042-43, 3045-49, 3053-55.) 
At the request of the Utah governor's office, DCFS director Richard Anderson 
flew to Idaho and met with Daren Jensen. (R. 1570-71, 2579-80, 3813-14.) Anderson 
told the Jensens that he would be running the case from then on. (R. 2583-84.) 
Anderson relied in part on a factual timeline provided by Eisenman (R. 1551, 
1972-73, 3813-14), which contained numerous misrepresentations and omissions. For 
example, Eisenman omitted the key fact that the Jensens were questioning the diagnosis, 
and instead represented that the Jensens were simply rejecting chemotherapy as a 
treatment. Eisenman's timeline also: 
• Falsely indicated that the Jensens were pursuing IPT as of July 10, when she 
had been informed by the Jensens' attorney a week earlier that the Jensens were 
not committed to IPT. (R. 3509, 3515-16.) 
• Misrepresented that a second opinion was not obtained from Harvard because 
the Jensens "declined to pay the consultation fee." (R. 2370-71, 2639.) 
• Misrepresented that the LDS Hospital doctor had performed "a PET scan and 
other tests," when he had performed no tests at all (R. 3076), and that 
Eisenman had no records of this consultation, when the Jensens' attorney had 
given her a copy of a letter from him. (R. 3509.) 
• Misrepresented that Wagner did not contact DCFS until after the June 9 
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meeting, when DCFS's own records showed contact on June 2. 
• Misrepresented that the Jensens had canceled the Friday meeting, when it was 
Wagner who canceled. 
• Misrepresented that PCMC oncologists did not know that a second excision 
was going to be performed on Parker's tissue, when Wagner was informed of it 
ahead of time, and the procedure itself was cleared with Dr. Muntz at PCMC. 
• Misrepresented that the Jensens voluntarily chose not to use Dr. Birkmayer, 
when she had told them they could not use Birkmayer. 
• Omitted the key fact that the Jensens were not required to begin treatment until 
CHLA completed genetic testing, the results of which had not been received by 
August 8 (which Eisenman knew, having received the most recent 
communication from Tishler on August 4, which did not mention any results); 
• Implied that it was the police, rather than she, who contacted the District 
Attorney's office to pursue criminal charges. 
At the meeting in Idaho, Anderson was impressed by the extent of the Jensens' 
research. (R. 1568, 1572, 1616, 3813-14.) He told Daren, "I understand you're a great 
parent. I can see that, but we can't let you go. We can't have it over. It's gone too far." 
He later reiterated to Barbara and Daren that he could tell they weren't neglectful parents, 
but that things had gone too far and he couldn't let them go. (R. 2293, 2581-82, 2585.) 
Anderson concluded that the events to date were consistent with DCFS policy, 
because Cunningham had been told that Parker could die in "five days" if chemotherapy 
did not begin, which triggered "emergency" procedures. (R. 1552-53, 1596, 1610-1611, 
1681-82.) But for that representation, Anderson says, the Jensens would have received a 
"thorough pre-removal investigation," including a meeting with the caseworker to discuss 
concerns and options. (R. 1556-58, 1614-15, 1671.) 
However, there is evidence that DCFS's custom and/or policy was not to 
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investigate medical neglect reports made by a PCMC doctor. (R. 1676-77.) Thus, for 
example, DCFS usually obtained second opinions from PCMC on reports from outside 
doctors, but the reverse was not true. (R. 2031-33, 2831-32, 2836; see also p. 12-13, 
supra) Furthermore, even under DCFS's emergency provisions, Cunningham was still 
required to, and did not, "meet with the parents, attempt to negotiate voluntary 
compliance with medical treatment pending or in lieu of court involvement, and assess 
and document the parents' reasons for refusal to treat." (R. 3431.) 
Defendant Anderson had the authority to (and eventually did) authorize the 
dismissal of DCFS's medical neglect allegations against the Jensens. (R. 1564, 3018-19.) 
However, he was unwilling to do so even if a licensed physician assumed care of Parker, 
because it was his position that, if there were conflicting opinions between a parent's 
physician and a physician upon whom DCFS was relying, the parents could not make the 
choice; instead, DCFS would require them to go to court and have the court decide "the 
more credible or the best treatment that is going to happen from the recommendation of 
the State or the parents." (R. 1565-67, 1678.) Anderson also refused to authorize a 
dismissal unless Parker was treated by a board-certified pediatric oncologist. Although he 
says his hands were tied by prior court orders, he admits that he had the authority to 
eliminate that requirement, and eventually did. (R. 1577-78.) 
At the August 29, 2003, meeting, Anderson "agreed . . . to go back and get the 
warrants lifted." (R. 1575, 1594.) Barbara and Parker were then able to rejoin their 
family in Idaho. Immediately after a September 3 hearing, however, new warrants were 
issued. (Docket in Criminal Case, 09-03-03 entry.) 
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By this time, the Jensens were struggling financially. Daren had lost his job after 
the neglect proceedings began, and his health insurance had lapsed. (R. 2587.) Anderson 
initially said that the State would pay for additional testing, but only if the Jensens agreed 
to place Parker in foster care. (R. 2587-88.) 
To meet Anderson's requirement of a board-certified pediatric oncologist, the 
Jensens agreed to have a Boise physician, Dr. Johnston, perform an independent 
evaluation, including new testing. (R. 0515 (Ex. 33h, p. 9).) Anderson understood that, 
under this September 5, 2003, stipulation, Johnston was not to make recommendations 
until the testing was completed. (R. 1586-87.) Contrary to the stipulation, however, 
Johnston informed Anderson that he had told the Jensens at their first meeting that he had 
a "strong inclination" and there was "every indication" that he was going to recommend 
chemotherapy. (R. 1588, 1598-99,2473-74,2669.) 
At that first meeting, Dr. Johnston informed the Jensens that he had learned from 
CHLA that its genetic testing had been unable to document an 11 ;22 translocation. (R. 
2474-75, 3090, 3303.) (This was the first time anyone heard any results from CHLA. (R. 
2473.)) Speculating that CHLA's negative result resulted from degradation of the 
sample's RNA, Johnston had the sample sent to Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane 
for molecular testing using DNA. (R. 3303.) Johnston then called Anderson and said that 
he was going to call the Jensens in two days and recommend chemotherapy, even though 
the genetic testing was not back yet. (R. 1601, 1604-06.) Anderson did not disclose that 
communication to the Jensens or the juvenile court. 
On September 26, 2003, Dr. Johnston announced, "I learned yesterday that the 
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cytogenetics lab at Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane has confirmed a t(ll;22) 
translocation in Parker's tumor cells, confirming the diagnosis of Ewing's sarcoma." (R. 
3807.) Johnston admits that this statement was not true. Sacred Heart reported "a" 
rearrangement involving the 22 chromosome, but could not confirm an 11;22 
translocation. (R.2060, 2676-78, 2701-03, 3817-22.) Rearrangements of the 22 
chromosome are not specific to Ewing's. (R. 2057-58, 2098-99, 3165-66, 3204-05.)9 
It was evident to Dr. Johnston that all of the pathologists prior to his involvement 
had been reluctant to call Parker's condition Ewing's. (R. 1791-92, 2699; also 2696-2701 
("suggestion" and "consistent with" indicate uncertainty). Johnston's pathologist was 
also hesitant because the immunohistochemical testing was equivocal. Therefore, he and 
Johnston decided to defer to the original PCMC pathologist and call it Ewing's. (R. 
1600, 2214-15, 2235-37, 2476, 2560-61, 2719-21, 3303, 3572-73, 3576-77.) 
The Jensens balked at Johnston's actions. Shortly afterward, defendant Anderson 
agreed to stop insisting on a board-certified pediatric oncologist, and allowed Parker to be 
treated by any licensed physician. He approved a motion to voluntarily dismiss the DCFS 
petition. (R. 1587-91.) 
Criminal charges in Utah were still pending, on which the Jensens had been 
booked and released in September. (R. 3760, 3784.) The child kidnapping charges 
carried a mandatory minimum sentence higher than that for first-degree murder, and 
Johnston says he does not know why he "misspoke," but admits that he became 
"wrapped up in this whole situation to the point that it became a bit of an obsession." (R. 
2692.) 
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going to trial would have cost the Jensens thousands of dollars. (R. 3022-23, 3025.) In 
exchange for a dismissal of the first-degree felony charges, the Jensens were required to 
enter into a plea in abeyance on the misdemeanor custodial interference charges. (R. 
3778-79, 3823-24.) The Jensens had to admit to factual elements necessary to support the 
prima facie elements of the misdemeanor offense, but were not required to disclaim the 
existence of defenses that could have been asserted at trial. (R. 2926-27.) The Jensens' 
pleas were not to be entered as a conviction. They would be held for 12 months, at the 
end of which they would be withdrawn, replaced with not-guilty pleas, and the case 
would be dismissed. (R. 2926-27, 3021-22.) 
On October 31, 2003, the GAL forwarded an e-mail to Eisenman from Dr. 
Johnston in which Johnston said that he "spoke to Dr. Moore, who is taking care of 
Parker now. She actually sounds pretty reasonable." (R. 3413.) In November 2003, the 
Jensens had a margin performed on Parker. (R. 2114-15, 2216.) A Stanford University 
pathologist examined the tissue removed and reported no sign of cancer. (R. 2942-43.) 
The Jensens took Parker to see Dr. Moore regularly, but eventually stopped 
because Moore said there was nothing to treat. (R. 2252, 2941-43.) Cunningham's 
neglect finding was changed from supported to unsupported, but the Jensens are still in 
the DCFS system. (R. 1679-80, 1916-17.) Six years later, Parker is alive and well. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's ruling that res judicata bars the Jensens' state law claims is 
erroneous for several reasons. The court first erred in deferring to the federal court's 
interpretation of the federal constitution without undertaking any independent assessment 
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of the Jensens' state law claims or the record. It is contrary to principles of state 
constitutional analysis to accept an interpretation of the federal constitution as the 
presumptive scope of state constitutional rights. 
The court further erred in ruling that the Utah Constitution did not afford the 
Jensens any protections against the type of conduct reflected in the record. The 
inalienable rights recognized and guaranteed by Article I, § 1, include the fundamental 
right to make decisions regarding one's family, including health matters. Interference 
with those rights is presumptively unconstitutional, unless a defendant can prove that his 
actions were narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. None of the types 
of alleged misconduct here (misrepresentation and omissions, forcing the Jensens to 
follow the recommendations of a state-preferred physician rather than the physician of 
their choice, reporting the Jensens to DCFS because they refused to start chemotherapy 
without reasonably requested diagnostic testing, and failing to investigate medical neglect 
allegations before making them) satisfies either criterion. 
Similarly, precedent form this Court and sister courts, clear and longstanding 
statutory prohibitions, and the background and intent of the Framers contradict the trial 
court's (implicit) ruling that the defendants' actions were not violative of the substantive 
and procedural due process rights guaranteed in Article I, § 7. 
With respect to Article I, § 14 (search and seizure), a state actor's making of material 
misrepresentations and omissions to a court and others to is inherently unreasonable. The 
Framers of the Utah Constitution had endured harsh consequences from the use of 
falsehoods by government actors, lending even greater force to the protections afforded by 
36 
this section. In light of those same experiences, the Framers also would have intended the 
protections of Section 14 to extend to both custodial and non-custodial seizures. 
Although its incorrect interpretation of the state constitution requires reversal in 
itself, the trial court's ruling is also erroneous because the defendants did not establish as a 
matter of law all of the elements of res judicata. There was no "earlier proceeding," the 
Jensens' state claims and issues were not finally adjudicated on the merits, and the state 
claims and issues are distinct from those decided by the federal court. Additionally, the 
policy considerations underlying res judicata are not present, reaffirmed by the federal 
court's declination to rule on state claims because of the "important" issues raised. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH CONSTITUTION CONFERS BROADER PROTECTION 
THAN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
As noted above, the trial court's application of res judicata was based upon its 
conclusion that the Utah Constitution did not afford the Jensens any broader protections 
than the United States Constitution (as interpreted by Judge Stewart). Because Judge 
Stewart ruled that the federal constitution did not protect the Jensens at all from the 
defendants' actions, if this Court concludes that the Utah Constitution does afford such 
protections, by necessity its protections are broader than those of its federal counterpart. 
A. State constitutional analysis in general. 
In earlier days, disposition of state constitutional claims typically began with an 
analysis of federal law, followed by an assessment of whether any reason existed to stray 
from whatever federal courts had opined at the time. This variation on the "lockstep" 
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theory (in which state constitutions are presumed to have the same scope as their federal 
counterpart) was initially endorsed by this Court. See, e.g., State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 
805-06 (Utah 1986) (recommending analytical process from State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 
233, 236-38 (Vt. 1985)); see also State v. Gunwall, 720 P.3d 808, 811-13 (Wash. 1986). 
Over time, state courts began to recognize the inappropriateness of deferring the 
construction of their own state's constitution to a court charged with construing a national 
constitution. See, e.g., Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 16 (Tex. 1992) ("Our Texas 
Forbears surely never contemplated that the fundamental state charter, crafted after years 
of rugged experience on the frontier and molded after reflection on the constitutions of 
other states, would itself veer in meaning each time the United States Supreme Court 
issued a new decision"); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) ("choosing 
to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different construction may prove to be an 
appropriate method for insulating this state's citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent 
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal courts"). 
A state court construing its own constitution "do[es] not share the strong 
limitations perceived by [the U. S. Supreme Court] in its ability to enforce constitutional 
protections aggressively. Those limitations arise from the structure of our federal system, 
the Court's role as final arbiter of at least the minimum scope of constitutional rights for a 
vastly diverse nation, and the Court's lack of familiarity with local conditions." State v. 
Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 91 N.J. 338 (1982); see also John W. Shaw, "Principled 
Interpretations of State Constitutional Law-Why Don't the Primacy States Practice What 
They Preach," 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1019, 1028 (1993) (primacy allows tailoring of state 
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constitutional protections to the values of state residents, "rather than enforcing the lowest 
common denominator of broadly shared national values"). 
Factors in state constitutional analysis include: "legislative" history, structural and 
textual differences between the state and federal constitutions; whether the subject matter 
is of local interest; state history, traditions, and public attitudes; sister state law; and "the 
common law, our state's particular . . . traditions, and the intent of our constitution's 
drafters." West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1013 (Utah 1994); Society of 
Separations ts, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 n. 6 (Utah 1993); Hunt, supra. 
B. "Legislative" history and intent of the Framers generally. 
Relatively little history is available regarding the Declaration of Rights in the 1895 
Utah Constitution. Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 929 ("There was little 
discussion or controversy regarding any of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights"). 
Those rights were so fundamental, so uncontroversial, that there was nothing to debate. 
Convention delegates knew that noncompliance with Congress's expectations 
would put a 40-year quest for statehood at risk. "It is natural, under such circumstances, 
for men to proceed with caution." State v. Norman, 16 Utah 457, 52 P. 986, 990 (1898). 
Accordingly, the Framers borrowed heavily from the constitutions of other states that had 
been approved by Congress. Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 928 (particularly 
Nevada, Washington, Illinois, and New York).10 
See also John J. Flynn, "Federalism and Viable State Government-The History of 
Utah's Constitution," 1966 UTAH L. REV. 311 (Illinois, New York, Nevada, Washington, 
and Iowa); Paul Wake, Comment, "Fundamental Principles, Individual Rights, and Free 
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From that fact, the suggestion has been made that it is difficult to say that the 1895 
Constitution was written by Utahns for Utah. See C. Albert Bowers, "Divining the 
Framers' Intentions: The Immunity Standard for Criminal Proceedings under the State 
Constitution," 2000 UTAH L. REV. 135, 148 (summarizing contention). That does an 
injustice to the Framers. Rather than simply copying verbatim from a single constitution, 
delegates carefully selected and rejected portions of various documents as suited their 
intent. See, e.g., 1 Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention 
("Proceedings") at 423 (1898) (B. H. Roberts, questioning adoption of Wyoming's 
provision on female suffrage rather than that of Virginia, New York, Ohio, or Indiana); 
483 (John Murdock: "I don't wish to refer to what older states have done; they have done 
as they pleased, and I hope the people of Utah will do as their best judgment will dictate 
to them, and I am not afraid of innovation"); 776 (David Evans: mentioning constitutions 
of Kentucky, North Dakota, Maine, Colorado, and California). 
Utah's Declaration of Rights is not identical to that in any of the other 44 state 
constitutions, copies of which had been provided to delegates. Choosing from among 
different options reflects intent, just as a court's choice of quotations from other cases is 
no less a statement of its own intent. Moreover, some Framers expressed a view that 
Utah was unlike any other state, and that their goal was to be more progressive than other 
states. See, e.g., id. at 433-34 (Andrew S. Anderson: urging delegates to "show to the 
Government: Do Utahns Remember How to Be Free?" 1996 UTAH L. REV. 661 
(Washington); Wallentine, supra (Nevada, Iowa, Illinois, New York and Washington). 
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world that Utah is in the advance march of progress and civilization, and in those life-
endearing principles of liberty and justice"); 545 (Andrew Kimball: "the people of Utah 
through their circumstances are different to any other people in the United States"). 
At the time of the 1895 Convention, nearly 90 percent of Utah's population, and 
three-quarters of Convention delegates, were members of the LDS Church. Richard D. 
Poll, ed., UTAH'S HISTORY (Brigham Young University Press, 1978), p. 393; Society of 
Separationists, 870 P.2d at 928. It is thus appropriate to discuss the background and 
views of church members at the time of the convention. See id. at 929 n. 31; P. Bobbit, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1984) at 9-11 (relevant history 
includes prevailing sentiment at time of adoption). 
LDS Church founder Joseph Smith had expressed concern about weak federal 
constitutional protections: 
The only fault I find with the Constitution is, it is not broad enough to cover the 
whole ground. . . . Its sentiments are good, but it provides no means of enforcing 
them. It has but this one fault. Under its provision, a man or a people who are 
able to protect themselves can get along well enough; but those who have the 
misfortune to be weak or unpopular are left to the merciless rage of popular fury. 
Larry E. Dahl and Donald Q. Cannon, ed., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JOSEPH SMITH'S 
TEACHINGS, p. 144 (quoting Sabbath address, Nauvoo, 15 October 1843). 
When it came to basic human liberty, the Framers were unwilling to sacrifice their 
principles even at the cost of the great prize. Including women's suffrage in the state 
constitution would "dig a grave for statehood," Representative B. H. Roberts warned. 1 
Proceedings at 425-28. Such concerns could "go to the dogs," delegates declared. "[I]f 
Utah is to be immolated for standing by her principles, for enlarging the borders of 
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liberty, let the sacrifice be made, let her be bound upon the altar, let the high priest of 
tyranny come forth and plunge the knife into her breast. She cannot perish in a nobler 
cause than that of freedom and equal rights." Id. at 738 (Orson F. Whitney); id. at 499 
(Alma Eldredge) ("[D]o I want statehood at the sacrifice of honor?"). 
The Framers of the state constitution did not see their months-long labor as 
makework, as it would be if construction of the federal Constitution were dispositive. 
They viewed and intended the state constitution to be the supreme, fundamental law of 
this state. See id. at 434 (Samuel Thurman); 479-80 (Charles Varian); 502 (Eldredge); 
561 (Karl G. Maeser); 572 (Charles Crane); 737 (Whitney); State v. Norman, 16 Utah 
457, 52 P. 986, 987 (1898); State v. Eldredge, 27 Utah 477, 76 P. 337, 339 (1904).11 
Consistent with that intent, this Court has repeatedly stated that the federal 
constitution sets the floor, but not the ceiling, of constitutional protections for Utahns. 
Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, \ 17, 108 P.3d 701; Society of Separationists, 
870 P.2d at 940; West, 872 P.2d at 1007 ("Above this floor, states may balance the need 
to redress injuries to reputation with guarantees of free expression in a distinct way, 
thereby accounting for the unique history, needs, and experiences of their residents"). 
For these reasons, the lower court should have reviewed the Jensens' state 
11
 The assumption that the state constitution would provide the primary basis of protection 
for Utah residents is reinforced by the fact that, at the time of the Convention, none of the 
protections of the Bill of Rights had been applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The first to be applied (takings) was in 1897. Chicago B. & O.R.R. v. 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). First Amendment protections, for example, were not held 
applicable to the states until 1925, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925); the Fourth 
Amendment not until 1949. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
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constitutional claims independently of their federal claims. See West, 872 P.2d at 1007 
(adopting "primacy" approach in free speech claim under state constitution). That is 
particularly true where the family and a state's judicial process are matters of local 
interest. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 10 S.Ct. 850 (1890); Hunt, 450 A.2d at 366. In any 
event, however, the trial court erred when it ruled that the Utah Constitution did not 
afford broader rights to the Jensens than the federal constitution. 
There is evidence in the record from which a jury could find that the defendants 
(1) made material misrepresentations and omissions in order to remove Parker from his 
parents' custody and force chemotherapy upon him; (2) refused to let the Jensens choose 
between conflicting recommendations of two licensed physicians {i.e., imposed a 
"comparative unfitness" standard) and reported the Jensens when they continued to 
request diagnostic testing that all witnesses concede was reasonable; (3) failed to 
investigate, by choice, custom, and/or policy, the medical neglect allegations, including 
corresponding failures to train and supervise. See Statement of Facts, supra. 
From the time of its ratification, this Court has held that the Utah Constitution "is 
not to be interpreted on narrow or technical principles, but liberally, and on broad, general 
lines, in order that it may accomplish the object of its establishment, and carry out the 
great principles of the government." North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. Utah & 
See, e.g., pp. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 (Wagner misrepresentations / omissions), 14, 
15, 25 (Cunningham), 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 (Eisenman), 22, 26 
(Albritton), 32-33 (imposition of comparative fitness standard by Anderson) 14 (same by 
Cunningham), 13, 14, 29, 31, 32 (Cunningham/Anderson's failure and/or policy not to 
investigate). 
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Salt Lake Canal Co., 14 Utah 155, 46 P. 824 (1896); Shields v. Toronto, 16 Utah 2d 61, 
395 P.2d 829, 830 (1964) (court must "give recognition in the highest possible degree to 
all of the rights assured by all of the Constitutional provisions"). In this case, the nature 
of the misconduct, the state's common law and legal precedent, the intent of the Framers, 
and the history and attitudes of the state, all compel a finding that these actions (if found 
by the jury) violated Article I, Sections 1, 7, and 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
1. Article I, § 1 (right to enjoy and defend lives and liberty). 
Article I, § 1 of the Utah Constitution provides: "All men have the inherent and 
inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and 
protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble 
peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate 
freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right." 
This "inalienable rights" provision has appeared in each version of the state 
constitution, beginning with the 1849 Constitution of the State of Deseret ("In Republican 
Governments, all men should be bom equally free and independent, and possess certain 
natural, essential, and inalienable rights; among which, are those of enjoying and 
defending their Life and Liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and of 
seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness."). 
There is no comparable provision in the U. S. Constitution. See 1 Bernard 
Schwartz, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 319, 762-65, 840; Bruce 
Kempkes, "The Natural Rights Clause of the Iowa Constitution: When the Law Sits Too 
Tight," 42 DRAKE L. REV. 593, 605.) The closest language is in the Fifth Amendment, 
44 
which states, "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . ," but does not mention "inherent and inalienable" rights, or the right 
to "defend . . . lives and liberties" recognized in Article I, § 1. 
The right to enjoy and defend lives and liberties as guaranteed by a state 
constitution "includes the right of privacy, the right to marital privacy and choice . . . 
[and] the right to protect one's health." 16A CJ.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 737 
(citations omitted); see also Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148-149 (Minn. 1988) 
(right to make decisions regarding one's health recognized in state constitution has been 
rooted in the law "for centuries"); Sojourner v. New Jersey Dept. of Human Services, 177 
N.J. 318, 828 A.2d 306, 330 (2003). As articulated by this Court, Article I, § 1 
forbids the abridgment by the state of the privileges and immunities of all 
citizens. Under its mandate no person can be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law, and every person is entitled to the equal 
protection of the laws, and may acquire property, possess and protect it, as 
well as defend his life and liberty. These are inherent and inalienable rights 
of citizens, and are constitutional guaranties. 
Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 22, 24 (1904); see also Golding v. Schubach 
Optical Co., 93 Utah 32, 70 P.2d 871, 875 (1937) ("The Constitution declares in Article I, 
§ 1, men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights among 
which are the pursuing and obtaining of happiness, and safety, and property."). 
"Liberty," as encompassed within Section 1, is "a term of comprehensive scope. It 
embraces not only freedom from servitude and from imprisonment and arbitrary restraint 
of person, but also all our religious, civil, political, and personal rights[.]" Block, supra, 
at 24-25. The right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and as a corresponding 
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and accompanying right, the right to privacy in his own home," is a "just claim, God 
given, or innate as a human." State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 1, 432 P.2d 64, 69 (1964). In this 
case, each type of alleged misconduct (misrepresentations and omissions, imposition of a 
comparative fitness standard / refusal to permit reasonably requested testing, and failure 
to investigate medical neglect allegations) are protected by Section 1. 
a. Misrepresentations and omissions 
It has long been recognized that interference with fundamental rights by a state 
actor employing material misrepresentations or omissions is wrongful. See, e.g., Meyer v. 
Board of County Commissioners of Harper County, 482 F.3d 1232, 1243 (10th Cir. 
2007); Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 691-692 (10th Cir. 1990); Malik v. Arapahoe 
County Dept of Social Services, 191 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 1999); Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 
F.3d 1279, 1292 (10th Cir. 2004), and cases cited; see also Merchants' Nat. Bank of 
Kansas City v. Robison, 8 Utah 256, 30 P. 985 (1892) (person who signs a certificate of 
stock containing false information is liable; "[t]hese views are so fundamental, and so 
consonant with honesty and fair dealing, that they need no authority in their support"). 
This proposition is self-evident, because interference with fundamental rights can 
be justified only if a state actor proves that his actions were narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling state interest. See, e.g., Thurnwald v. A.E., 2007 UT 38, ffi[ 28, 35, 163 P.3d 
623. There can never be a compelling need to intentionally or recklessly fabricate, omit, 
or distort evidence in order to take someone's child and force potentially unneeded 
medical treatment on him, or to obtain warrants or other judicial orders, nor can such 
conduct be "narrowly tailored." See, e.g., P.J. ex rel Jensen v. State of Utah, et al, 2006 
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WL 1702585 ** 10, 16, 19 (J. Cassell, 2006) (state actor may not "threaten the Jensens, 
refuse to perform confirmatory tests, or make false, incomplete, or misleading statements 
to Utah courts[.]"). 
b. Refusal to allow parents to choose between licensed 
physicians or to seek reasonably requested testing. 
Section 1 is implicated when a subject is prevented from exercising the rights 
guaranteed by it. See, e.g., Golding, 70 P.2d at 875 (Section 1 rights "are invaded when 
one is not at liberty to contract with others respecting the use to which he may subject his 
property (or use or employ his time or talents), or the manner in which he may enjoy it"). 
As noted above, the rights guaranteed by Section 1 include the right to make 
decisions regarding personal health or, in this case, to make decisions for one's child. 
Defendants Anderson and Cunningham interfered with these rights by requiring the 
Jensens to follow the recommendations of the reporting doctor, rather than a licensed 
physician of their own choice (who, incidentally, turned out to be right). Not only is there 
no compelling state interest in forcing a parent to use a particular doctor, but the 
unconstitutionality of such interference is widely recognized. (To avoid duplication, the 
discussion of comparative fitness at pp. 50-56, infra, is incorporated herein.) Similarly, 
Wagner, interfered with the Jensens' rights by refusing to perform reasonably requested 
diagnostic testing, and reporting the Jensens for medical neglect when they continued to 
insist on such testing before starting chemotherapy.13 
Whether Wagner felt that such testing was necessary is immaterial, as all witnesses in 
the case agree that it was a reasonable request by the parents. The federal court (J. 
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c. Failure / refusal to investigate 
Finally, Cunningham's (and Anderson's) failure to investigate medical neglect 
allegations also violates Section 1. With apologies for the double negative, there is no 
compelling state interest in not investigating allegations of parental neglect before 
curtailing a parent's liberty by making such allegations. Indeed, state statutes expressly 
required Cunningham to investigate - to at least ask the parents - even in a so-called 
emergency. Choosing not to do so violated Section 1 on its face. 
2. Article I, § 7 (due process) 
Article I, § 7 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law." This due process clause, the wording of which is similar to 
that in the federal constitution, affords two types of constitutional protections. First, it 
guarantees substantive due process rights, Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 
199, 204 (Utah 1984), including "the inherent and retained right of a parent to maintain 
parental ties to his or her child[.]" In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982); see also In the 
Matter of the Adoption ofB.B.D., 1999 UT 70, f 10, 984 P.2d 967. 
Interference with these rights is subject to strict scrutiny: a governmental actor 
must establish the means utilized are "narrowly tailored" to achieve "a compelling state 
interest." Wells, 681 P.2d at 206-07; Thurnwald, 2007 UT 38, ffl[ 28, 35. See also Jones 
Cassell) held that a refusal by a state actor to perform confirmatory tests reasonably 
requested by a parent states a claim for violation of the right to familial association and 
procedural and substantive due process. P. J. ex rel Jensen v. State of Utah, et al., 2006 
WL 1702585 **10, 16, 18-19, which would be particularly true if a jury found that 
Wagner did so in order to meet a timetable for a clinical trial. 
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v. Moore, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191 (1923) (recognizing similar right of children in 
familial association). 
Section 7 also affords procedural rights, "notably, notice and opportunity to be 
heard, which must be observed in order to have a valid proceeding affecting life, liberty, 
or property." Wells, 681 P.2d at 204 (citations omitted). "The general test for the validity 
of such rules, the test of procedural due process, is fairness." Id. 
Although this Court has construed the state and federal due process clauses as 
substantially the same in some contexts, see, e.g., Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,1} 11, 52 
P.3d 1158, that "does not indicate that this court moves in 'lockstep with the United 
States Supreme Court's due process analysis or foreclose our ability to decide in the 
future that our state constitutional provisions afford more rights than the federal 
Constitution." Id. Indeed, at the time of the Constitution's adoption, the Court observed 
that the two due process clauses are not co-extensive: 
The constitution of the United States cannot, as to the states, be held to be 
the sole unbending rule as to the method of procedure, when dealing with 
the life, liberty, and property of individuals in the several states. Such a 
rule would deprive the states of their right to regulate its procedure, laws, 
and rules of practice in their own courts, so as to protect life, liberty, and 
property by such due process of law as should be enacted with reference to 
the constitution of the United States which was framed for an undefined 
and expanding future, and for people gathered, and to be gathered, from 
many nations and many tongues. 
In re McKee, 19 Utah 231, 57 P. 23, 26-27 (1899); State v. Briggs, 199 P.3d 935, 2008 
UT 83, f 24 ("While the text of the two provisions is identical, we do not presume that 
federal court interpretations of federal Constitutional provisions control the meaning of 
identical provisions in the Utah Constitution. In fact, we have not hesitated to interpret 
49 
the provisions of the Utah Constitution to provide more expansive protections than 
similar federal provisions where appropriate.")(internal citations omitted). 
a* Misrepresentations and omissions. 
The making of misrepresentations and omissions by a state actor is a violation of 
both forms of due process. As this Court recognized in Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 
690 (Utah 1981), "[I]t is an accepted premise in American jurisprudence that any 
conviction obtained by the knowing use of false testimony is fundamentally unfair and 
totally incompatible with 'rudimentary demands of justice.'" That principle applies 
equally to the use of such tactics to interfere with the parent-child relationship. See also 
p. 46-47, supra.14 
b. Refusal to allow the Jensens to choose their own physician 
or to conduct reasonably requested tests. 
As noted above, defendant Anderson admits taking the position that, if a parent's 
licensed physician had a different medical opinion than a licensed physician consulted by 
the State, the parent did not get to choose. Defendant Cunningham admits this also, in a 
different way: She admits that she did not consider allowing the Jensens to rely on Dr. 
Moore's recommendations because the person accusing the Jensens of medical neglect 
told her that Dr. Moore was not qualified to care for Parker. By disqualifying a physician 
It is for this reason that collateral estoppel cannot be based upon rulings tainted by 
fraud. Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83, 107 (1926); Kennedy v. Burbidge, 54 
Utah 497, 183 P. 325, 327-28 (1919) (conviction procured through "perjury, fraud, or 
other undue means" is "worthless" to show probable cause in malicious prosecution suit); 
see also Pierce, supra, 359 F.3d at 1292 (prohibition against misrepresentations is known 
and obvious). 
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solely on the say-so of a reporting doctor, Cunningham de facto imposed her choice of 
physicians on the Jensens. 
Particularly when viewed in light of the common law, this Court's precedent, the 
history of the state and the intent of Convention delegates, these admitted actions of 
Anderson and Cunningham plainly violated the Jensens' state constitutional rights. 
Under the common law, no relationship was afforded greater protection than that of 
parent and child. A right that has "strong roots in the common law" suggests greater 
protection under the state constitution. West, 872 P.2d at 1013; see also Utah Code Ann. 
§ 62A-4a-201(l) (2003) ("The right of a fit, competent parent to raise his child has long 
been protected by the laws and Constitution of this state and of the United States."); 
American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 2006 UT 40, f 43, 48 (the 
Framers intended that the common law be employed to interpret the state constitution); 
Deseretlrr. Co. v. Mclntyre, 16 Utah 398, 52 P. 628, 629 (1898) (same). 
Unlike any other state in the West, "Utah was settled primarily by two-parent 
families . . . ." Carrie Hillyard, "The History of Suffrage and Equal Rights Provisions in 
State Constitutions," 10 BYU J. PUB. L. 117, 122 (1996). At the time of the constitution, 
Utah recognized a presumption that a parent will fulfill his duties 
by reason of the love and affection he holds for his offspring and out of regard 
for the child's future welfare. . . . Indeed, the common law based the right of 
the father to have custody and dominion over the person of his child upon the 
ground that he might better discharge the duty he owed the child and the state 
in respect to the care, nurture, and education of the child. Before the state can 
be substituted to the right of the parent it must affirmatively be made to appear 
that the parent has forfeited his natural and legal right to the custody and 
control of the child by reason of his failure, inability, neglect, or incompetency 
to discharge the duty and thus to enjoy the right. 
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Mill v. Brown, 88 P. 609, 613 (Utah 1907); see also 2 Proceedings at 450 (Richards: "In 
the brute world we find the mother's love for offspring more strong than the instinct for 
self preservation. This is an unfailing passion throughout the whole course of organic 
life, whether brute or human"). 
Prior to ratification of the constitution, a child could be removed from the home in 
Utah only upon a showing of his parent's "habitual intemperance, and vicious and brutal 
conduct, or from vicious, brutal and criminal conduct towards said minor child." Laws 
1851 to 1870, Chapter XVII, § 9. This standard was re-enacted by the first state 
legislature, Rev. Stat. 1898, Title 3, § 82, indicating that it was consistent with the 
Framers' intent. P.I.E. Employees Federal Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1147 
(Utah 1988) (noting that many of the first legislators were convention delegates); Salt 
Lake City v. Christensen Co., 34 Utah 38, 95 P. 523, 526 (1908) (reenactment of statute is 
evidence that framers intended the law to remain as it was). 
In Washington, to which the Framers looked when drafting the 1895 Constitution, 
the supreme court had reaffirmed a year earlier the principle that a child can be removed 
from a home only if the parents are affirmatively unfit, not merely because the state 
would prefer they make different choices. Lovell v. House of the Good Shepherd, 9 
Wash. 419, 37 P. 660, 661 (1894) ("courts must exercise great charity and forbearance for 
the opinions, methods, and practices of all different classes of society; and a case should 
be made out which is sufficiently extravagant and singular and wrong to meet the 
condemnation of all decent and law-abiding people, without regard to religious belief or 
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social standing, before a parent should be deprived of the comfort or custody of a child"). 
Consistent with common law and statutory history, this Court held long ago that, to 
be constitutional, removal of a child from his parent's custody requires an affirmative 
showing of unfitness. Mill, 88 P. at 613; Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83 (1926) 
("[T]he unfitness which deprives a parent of the right to the custody of the child must be 
positive and not merely comparative, or merely speculative"); In re B.R., et al, 2006 UT 
App 354, \ 87, 144 P.3d 231 (under Utah Constitution, "a parent is entitled to a showing 
of unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect before his or her parent rights are 
terminated"), rev'don other grounds, In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, 171 P.3d435. 
It is thus long settled that state actors cannot interfere with a parent's choice 
between licensed medical practitioners merely because they think one physician is 
"better" than the other, or because there is a conflict in medical opinion between the two. 
See, e.g., In the Matter ofHojbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1014 (1979) (The analysis of a 
parent's rights to direct medical care "cannot be posed in terms of whether the parent has 
made a 'right' or a 'wrong' decision, for the present state of the practice of medicine, 
despite its vast advances, very seldom permits such definitive conclusions. . . . Rather, in 
our view, the court's inquiry should be whether the parents, once having sought 
accredited medical assistance and having been made aware of the seriousness of their 
child's affliction and the possibility of cure if a certain mode of treatment is undertaken, 
have provided for their child a treatment which is recommended by their physician and 
which has not been totally rejected by all responsible medical authority."); State v. 
Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 (N.J. 1962) (parents rejecting for religious reasons unanimous 
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medical opinion as to need for blood transfusions; "[h]ad there been a relevant and 
substantial difference of medical opinion about the efficacy of the proposed treatment or 
if there were substantial evidence that the treatment itself posed a significant danger to 
the infant's life, a strong argument could be made in favor of appellants' position"); In re 
CFB, 497 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. App. 1973) (clinic's report of neglect for mother's 
withdrawal of child as patient was baseless; "Whether the mother's reasons for that 
dissatisfaction [with the clinic] were correct or incorrect is not the point. The mother had 
a right to choose between different doctors or institutions for the purpose of this type of 
care. So long as the mother was willing and intended to provide appropriate care in some 
manner, no finding can stand that she was guilty of neglecting the child"); In re Tony 
Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 561, *3 (Pa. Q. 1912) (court could not substitute its medical 
judgment for that of parents absent showing of unfitness; even if defective judgment were 
a basis for superseding parents' decision, neglect was not shown where "the science of 
medicine and surgery, notwithstanding its enormous advances, has not yet been able to 
insure an absolutely correct diagnosis in all cases, and still less an absolutely correct 
prognosis"). Cf. Custody of a Minor, 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1064 (Mass. 1978) ("no 
dispute" as to diagnosis and need for chemotherapy; emphasizing that parent's refusal 
"was not based on the parents' view that another medically effective form of treatment 
could be found," but merely upon 'hope' of child's recovery). 
Utah's constitutional framers would have been especially concerned about this 
aspect of Anderson and Cunningham's conduct. For decades, LDS Church members had 
experienced what they viewed as persecution by a government intent on imposing its own 
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values on the Mormon family structure, culminating in the famed polygamy prosecutions. 
See State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, f^ 32, 996 P.2d 546 (mentioning prosecutions in 
construing Section 7). 
"[M]any of Utah's constitutional convention delegates had either been pursued 
by federal authorities or were well acquainted with people who had. Because 
of widespread newspaper coverage, the vast majority of Utah's population was 
aware of the prosecutions, and the delegates to the constitutional convention 
had an intimate awareness of the problems posed by systematic oppression by 
the federal government. . . . Prior to becoming a state, the framers of the Utah 
Constitution suffered heavily at the hands of the federal government. These 
memories were fresh in the minds of the framers " 
Bowers, supra, 2000 UTAH L. REV. at 151, 169. 
The anti-polygamy campaign was directed at the disruption of families. Fathers, 
mothers, and sometimes children were imprisoned. Children were left without support 
when their parents were jailed or forced into hiding. Conditions were harsh for those 
targeted by the government. See Martha S. Bradley, "'Hide and Seek': Children on the 
Underground," 51 UTAH HISTORICAL QUARTERLY (1953), pp. 133-153. 
In 1882, as such deprivations were on the rise, a new provision was added to the 
state's draft constitution, declaring that "The blessings of free government can only be 
maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue, 
and frequent recurrence to fundamental principles." This language was restated in the 
1887 version. Significantly, when its inclusion was questioned in 1895, Heber Wells 
stated the committee's view that it was needed in light of abuses "in the past." 1 
Proceedings at 362. 
That the Framers would have been repulsed by a state actor forcing a specific 
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health care provider on a parent is further supported by the writings of the Hon. Thomas 
Cooley of the Michigan Supreme Court, considered "the foremost constitutional authority 
in the world, perhaps," by the drafters. 1 Proceedings at 447 (Richards), 464 (Roberts), II 
Proceedings at 1739 (Evans); American Bush, 2008 UT 40 at ffi[ 13, 49 n.16, 51. 
In Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90, 128 (1878), Judge Cooley had 
concurred in ordering a new trial regarding a patient whose family had committed her to 
an insane asylum, stating: "I cannot admit that because one is a practitioner of medicine, 
it is therefore proper or safe to suffer him to decide upon mental disease, and consign 
people to the asylum upon his judgment or certificate." If "differences of opinion among 
those who are called to give scientific evidence" exist, he wrote, it would be intolerable 
for the patient's fate to hinge on whether "one physician rather than another happened to 
be called in as the adviser." Id. at 132. 
Cunningham and Anderson's requirement that the Jensens follow the 
recommendations of Wagner (and, later, a board-certified pediatric oncologist in this 
country) instead of a licensed physician of their choosing thus violated Section 7 rights. 
Additionally, as discussed above, the Jensens had a right to request reasonable diagnostic 
testing, regardless of whether Dr. Wagner felt a need for it. Accordingly, Wagner's 
actions in reporting the Jensens to DCFS when they refused to commence chemotherapy 
without such testing violated their rights under Section 7. 
c. Failure to investigate 
The third type of state action evidenced by the record, Cunningham's failure to 
investigate medical neglect allegations (and Anderson's policy or practice permitting it) 
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also violated Section 7 rights. These rights require that the subject of a judicial or 
administrative proceeding receive an opportunity to be heard "in a meaningful way." 
Worthen v. Buckley, 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996). 
No argument is, or can be, made that the Jensens had any opportunity to be heard 
in the DCFS proceeding before DCFS accused the Jensens of medical neglect and sought 
custody of Parker. Cunningham cannot claim that she did not know how to give the 
Jensens this opportunity. Aside from common sense (pick up a phone), state statute 
spelled it out for her. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ U.C.A. § 62A-4a-409(l)(a) (2003) 
(requiring, inter alia, a "thorough investigation," UTAH ADMIN. R. 512-201-1 & -201-4 
(2003) (outlining required investigation). If Wagner indeed told her that it was an 
emergency, then Cunningham knew she had to at least ask the parents for their side of the 
story before seeking to remove their son from their custody. See p. 13-14, supra. 
Cunningham admits that none of this was done, by which the Jensens' Section 7 rights 
were violated as a matter of law. 
3. Article I, Section 14 (search and seizure) 
Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution states: "The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation . . . ." This right is "'the right to be let alone-the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men' that demands an 
independent and proper judicial determination." DeBooy, supra, 2000 UT 32, \ 32. 
On several occasions, this Court has found the protections afforded by Section 14 
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to be greater than those afforded by the similarly worded Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. See, e.g., id., J^ 12; State v. Larocco, 19 A P.2d 460 (Utah 
1990); see also Bowers, supra at 147 ("several unique facets of Utah's history" suggest 
that state constitutional requirements for testimonial immunity do not mirror the federal). 
"Mormon delegates likely viewed the territorial government-controlled by 
federally appointed non-Mormons-as oppressive. They had experienced the attempted 
control and suppression of their religious beliefs and practices by the federal government, 
often operating through territorial officials. . . . Both groups of delegates could claim that 
some form of authority, be it federal or local, had denied them freedom of conscience, 
and both were acutely aware of the threat government power presented to that freedom." 
Society of Separationsts, 870 P.2d at 935. 
The employment of falsehoods by government officials, as alleged here, would 
have been uniquely disturbing to Utah's Framers. From their perspective, LDS Church 
members had suffered extraordinary harm as the result of false testimony. In 1838, for 
example, Missouri governor Lilburn Boggs issued the notorious "extermination" order 
expelling Mormons from the state three days after the execution of a false affidavit by 
Thomas B. Marsh and Orson Hyde that claimed, among other things, that Joseph Smith 
intended to conquer the United States. Gary J. Bergera, "The Personal Cost of the 1838 
Mormon War in Missouri: One Mormon's Plea for Forgiveness," MORMON HISTORICAL 
STUDIES (Spring 2003), p. 139. A month later, Missouri officials used the affidavit as a 
basis to jail Smith for treason. Id. 
Seven years later, Smith was again pursued by government officials, this time in 
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Illinois. In reliance upon a promise of security by Governor Ford, Smith and other 
Mormon leaders voluntarily surrendered. Instead, Smith and his brother Hyrum were 
allowed to be murdered in their jail cell in Nauvoo. See Whitney, HISTORY OF UTAH, 
Vol. 1, pp. 228-30; The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, HISTORY OF THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS (Deseret News: 1932), Vol. VII, p. 
172 (Smith was arrested through "false pretense"). 
In 1857, William Drummond, an appointee to the territorial supreme court, falsely 
reported to the attorney general that Brigham Young had murdered territorial leaders, and 
that the Mormons had burned territorial records and committed treason. See Andrew L. 
Neff, History of Utah (ed. Leland H. Creer, Salt Lake City: Deseret News, 1940), Vol. 1, 
pp. 448-51. President Buchanan, with whom church leaders were already at strife, cited 
Drummond's assertions as evidence that the Mormons were in rebellion, and dispatched 
the Army to Utah to replace Young as governor by force. Id. 
Young issued a proclamation decrying, again, deception by government officials: 
"For the last twenty five years we have trusted officials of the Government, from 
Constables and Justices to Judges, Governors, and Presidents, only to be scorned, held in 
derision, insulted and betrayed." Proclamation, August 5, 1857; id. ("We know these 
aspersions are false, but that avails us nothing"). More than 30,000 Mormons evacuated 
northern Utah in anticipation of invading forces. Hubert Howe Bancroft, HISTORY OF 
UTAH 1540-1886 (San Francisco, The History Company: 1889), p. 535. 
In 1871, Brigham Young was indicted by territorial officials for an 1857 murder 
based upon the false affidavit of a man named William Hickman, who was "in collusion 
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with the crusading officials to bring trouble upon his former brethren." Whitney, 
HISTORY OF UTAH, pp. 629-640. Young was denied bail and spent four months under 
house arrest; two of his alleged co-conspirators spent six months in jail. Bancroft, pp. 
663-64. 
Apart from the Framers' intent, there is a more basic reason why Section 14 
protected the Jensens from the defendants' actions: By its plain language, Section 14 
prohibits "unreasonable" searches and seizures, and the issuance of warrants not based 
upon oath or affirmation. The use of material misrepresentations and omissions to 
effectuate a seizure is inherently unreasonable. Similarly, obtaining a warrant or court 
order through false oath or affirmation cannot satisfy the requirements of Section 14. 
The federal court rejected the Jensens' argument that non-custodial (non-physical) 
seizures are encompassed within the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution, but 
there is no question that Section 14's protections extend to such seizures. Indeed, if there 
is one state where that would be true, it is Utah. 
A custodial seizure is, as the term suggests, a physical restraint of liberty. Daren 
Jensen underwent a custodial seizure when he was arrested and incarcerated in Idaho in 
August 2003, and Barbara and Daren Jensen were both seized when they were booked 
and released in Utah in September 2003. 
A non-custodial seizure is one that results from state-imposed conditions that 
significantly, but not physically, restrict liberty. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 
278, 114 S.Ct. 807 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (a citizen may be subject to state 
imposed conditions that restrict liberty, including conditions of bail, mandatory court 
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appearances, restrictions on freedom to travel, diminishment of employment prospects, 
reputational harm, and "the financial and emotional strain of preparing a defense." See 
also id. at 307 (Justices Souter and Stevens concurring in Justice Ginsberg's view of 
continuing seizure). 
The Framers unquestionably had such seizures in mind when they adopted Article 
I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. Many members of the Church had been forced into 
hiding or to abandon their families during the 1880s, which was no less an infringement 
of their physical liberty than an arrest. (LDS Church President John Taylor had died 
while in hiding in 1887, less than a decade before the constitution was adopted.) The 
Framers were very aware that a deprivation of freedom by the government can take forms 
beyond physical restraint. 
In this case, the Jensens were unable to return to their home state without the 
threat of arrest and removal of their child. They were unable to take their child for an 
evaluation in Houston, or to other physicians of their choosing. They were subjected to 
mandatory court appearances. They were ordered to give up their passports. Daren 
Jensen lost his job, and was exposed to diminishment of other employment prospects, 
both because he was terminated from his previous job, and because he had to devote his 
time, finances, energy and efforts to attempting to protect his and his family's rights. The 
Jensens were held up to public ridicule and contempt, and subjected to media scrutiny. 
These facts rise to the level of a seizure under Article I, § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. See also Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 945 (2nd Cir. 1997) (post-
arraignment order prohibiting an arrestee from leaving the State of New York and 
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requiring that he attend court appointments amounted to a "seizure" under Fourth 
Amendment); Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 860-61 (5th Cir.1999) (overruled on other 
grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir.2003)) (holding that a plaintiff 
had alleged Fourth Amendment seizure where, in addition to being summoned to appear 
and answer to charges, plaintiff was forced to sign personal recognizance bond, and was 
required to report regularly to pretrial services and obtain permission before leaving the 
state); Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3rd Cir.1998) (finding seizure 
where plaintiff was required to post $10,000 bond, attend all court hearings, maintain 
weekly contact with pretrial services, and refrain from traveling outside New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania); Sassower v. City of White Plains, 992 F.Supp. 652, 656 (S.D.N.Y.1998). 
II. RES JUDICATA IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE JENSENS' 
STATE CLAIMS FOR ADDITIONAL REASONS, 
Res judicata is an affirmative defense, and thus the defendants bore the burden of 
proving that each of the elements was present as a matter of law. 77mm v. Dewsnup, 851 
P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1993). Apart from the trial court's error in concluding that the 
state constitution did not afford broader protections than the federal, addressed supra, the 
trial court's application of res judicata was error for additional reasons. 
"[R]es judicata has two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion." 
Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39, \ 15, 982 P.2d 65. In their motions 
below, the defendants argued that the Jensens' state claims were barred under both 
prongs. In ruling that "res judicata" applied, the trial court did not identify a particular 
branch; accordingly, both are addressed. 
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A. Claim preclusion does not apply. 
"In general terms, claim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent 
action a claim that has been fully litigated previously." Brigham Young University v. 
Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, 110 P.3d 678. When a party seeks the application 
of claim preclusion based upon a prior federal judgment, Utah courts apply federal res 
judicata law. See Massey v. Board of Trustees ofOgden Area Community Action Comm., 
2004 UT App 27, ffl[ 6-7, 86 P.3d 120. 
Under federal law, claim preclusion applies only if the party asserting the doctrine 
establishes three elements: "(1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier action; (2) 
identity of parties or privies in the two suits; and (3) identity of the cause of action in both 
suits." Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. (Utah) 2008). One or more of those 
elements is not present in this case. 
1. There was no earlier action. 
Claim preclusion looks to the causes of action that were filed in an earlier 
proceeding. Pelt, supra, at 1281; Oman, 2008 UT 70,1f 31. Here, there was no "earlier 
proceeding." All of the claims were filed in the same lawsuit in the same court at the 
same time. Defendants' removal of the case to federal court did not convert this single 
case into two cases. See Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 
1998) ("this situation does not involve two separate lawsuits, one in state court and 
another in federal court. Rather, it involves one suit that originated in state court and that 
was removed to federal court."); Mcllravy v. Kerr-McGee Coal Corp., 204 F.3d 1031 
(10th Cir. 2000) ("Res judicata does not speak to direct attacks in the same case, but 
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rather has application in subsequent actions.") 
2. There was no "final judgment on the merits" on the Jensens' 
state law claims. 
Res judicata does not apply if a court dismissed prior claims for want of 
jurisdiction, or other grounds not going to the merits. Hughes v. United States, 4 Wall. 
232, 71 U.S. 232, 18 L.Ed. 303 (1866); Park Lake Res. Ltd Liab. Co. v. USDA, 378 F .3d 
1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2004); Snyder v. Murray City Corporation, 73 P.3d 325, 2003 UT 
12, [^ 36 (where a federal court dismisses a plaintiffs state constitutional and common 
law claims without prejudice and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, neither 
claim or issue preclusion applies). In this case, the federal court went out of its way not 
to rule on the Jensens' state law claims, which it said included "important" state 
constitutional issues that should be decided by a state court. 
3, The Jensens' state claims are separate and distinct from the 
claims ruled upon by the federal court 
The appellees argued below that, because the Jensens rely on the same underlying 
facts to support their claims under the Utah Constitution as were relied upon in federal 
court, their state and federal claims must be identical, warranting the application of claim 
preclusion to the state claims. However, the Jensens have demonstrated how and why the 
lights afforded in the Utah Constitution protected them from the alleged misconduct, 
which necessarily distinguishes the claims from those under the federal constitution (as 
construed by Judge Stewart, who found no protection under the latter). See pp. 37-62, 
supra. (Additionally, the federal court did not purport to address the Jensens' state 
common law claims, which are inherently distinct from constitutional claims.) 
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4. The policy justifications behind the doctrine of claim preclusion 
are not present in this case. 
"The fundamental policies underlying the doctrine of res judicata (or claim 
preclusion) are finality, judicial economy, preventing repetitive litigation and forum-
shopping, and 'the interest in bringing litigation to an end.'" Plotner v. AT & TCorp., 224 
F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2000). These policies are not implicated in this case. First, any 
policy related to finality is not implicated by the procedural stance of this case, because 
the Jensens' state law claims have been pending since the inception of the case, and have 
never been ruled upon by any court. 
Nor is judicial economy at risk. The Jensens do not seek to waste judicial 
resources; they ask only for their day in court on their state law claims. No judicial 
energy was expended on the state law claims by the federal court, as the claims were not 
addressed. As to the policy of preventing repetitive litigation and forum shopping, the 
Jensens have filed only one action in one court. It was not the Jensens who removed this 
case to federal court (a tactic more akin to "forum shopping"), but the defendants. 
Finally, the policy related to "bringing litigation to an end" is inapplicable here, because 
the Jensens' state law claims have been pending since the inception of this case, and were 
never considered by the federal court. 
B. Issue preclusion 
Defendants also argued below that the second prong of res judicata, issue 
preclusion, barred the Jensens' state claims. "Collateral estoppel, or, in modern usage, 
issue preclusion, 'means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been 
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determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the 
same parties in any future lawsuit.'" Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232, 114 S.Ct. 783, 
127 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994). Again, however, this component of res judicata does not apply 
because there is no "future lawsuit"; it is the same case in which the claims were 
originally filed. 
The elements of issue preclusion would not be met in any event. As noted earlier, 
federal res judicata law applies if a party is attempting to bind a state court to a federal 
court ruling. Under Tenth Circuit law, a party arguing issue preclusion must establish 
four elements as a matter of law: 
(1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the 
action in question, (2) the prior action has been finally adjudicated on the 
merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or in 
privity with a party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against 
whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
issue in the prior action. 
Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2006). 
1. The issues presented for review in this action are not identical to 
the issues decided by the federal court. 
The legal issues before this Court are different than the legal issues considered and 
applied in the federal court proceeding. The federal court applied federal law of absolute 
immunity, qualified immunity, substantive and procedural due process under the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and malicious prosecution under 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Here, this Court is applying 
state law, including Article I, Sections 1, 7 and 14 of the Utah Constitution, and the 
common law of this state applicable to intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
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wrongful initiation of civil and criminal process. 
Furthermore, the factual issues that were considered by the federal court are not 
identical to the issues in the state claims. Factual issues are necessarily measured by 
reference to legal standards. In other words, without reference to a law or legal standard, 
it is impossible for a Court to determine whether a particular fact is material or not. (For 
example, a statement might be material to a claim for defamation, while immaterial to a 
claim for breach of contract.) When dealing with causes of action arising under a distinct 
legal theory and source of right, the factual issues implicated are likewise distinct. 
The trial court also should not defer to federal court rulings that would be 
impermissible in state court. Under Utah law, for example, a party's intent is generally 
regarded as an issue of fact. See, e.g., Lysenko v. Sawaya, 7 P.3d 783, 2000 UT 58, f 17; 
see also IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Management, Inc., 196 P.3d 588, 2008 UT 
73, \ 18 (Utah 2008) (citations omitted) (state court may not grant summary judgment "if 
the facts shown by the evidence on a summary judgment motion support more than one 
plausible but conflicting inference on a pivotal issue in the case . . . particularly if the 
issue turns on credibility or if the inferences depend upon subjective feelings or intent."). 
Thus, for example, the federal court's findings that misrepresentations by 
defendants Wagner and Cunningham were not made "deliberately" (see, e.g., Exh. 3 at 
38, 40, 46, 52, 55) would be impermissible on summary judgment in state court. (That 
finding also did not address the Jensens' alternative argument that the misrepresentations 
were made recklessly.) 
Similarly, the federal court's finding that one or more of the defendants acted 
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"reasonably" as a matter of law (see, e.g., Exh. 3 at 38, 42) is inconsistent with Utah law, 
under which "questions of reasonableness necessarily pose questions of fact which should 
be reserved for jury resolution." Ilott v. University of Utah, 2000 UT App 286, f^ 18, 12 
P.3d 1011, citing Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 727-28 (Utah 1985). 
The federal court's factual findings improperly resolved credibility issues in favor 
of the defendants, and construed evidence in favor of the moving party. For example, the 
district court made a finding of fact that "Dr. Corwin and Mr. Jensen unsuccessfully 
attempted to schedule a further meeting to discuss the situation" (Exh. 3 at 6), when both 
Dr. Corwin and Daren Jensen testified that they had scheduled a meeting, but that Dr. 
Wagner nixed it. See p. 12, supra. This finding is important because, not only does it 
imply that the Jensens were unwilling to have further discussions about PJ's situation, but 
this meeting would have been an opportunity for the Jensens to explain their position to 
the DCFS liaison (who was operating under an erroneous assumption that Wagner had 
run all available confirmatory testing), and potentially for Dr. Moore to explain her 
questions about the diagnosis. 
Another example of the federal court construing evidence in a light most favorable 
to the defendants is observed in its acknowledgement that fresh tissue was available in 
Parker's mouth for new testing, followed by: "However, this would have required further 
surgery to obtain a sample." (Exh. 3 at 4). This characterization reflects an effort to 
excuse Dr. Wagner's unprecedented refusal to seek such testing, ignores Dr. Albritton's 
testimony that removing the remaining tissue would have alleviated her concerns that the 
tumor might spread, exaggerates the minor outpatient procedure of snipping additional 
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tissue, and downplays the alternative that might be avoided (45 weeks of chemotherapy). 
See p. 8, supra. The federal court's ruling is replete with such defense-friendly 
characterizations, which would be improper in state court on summary judgment. 
2. The "prior action" was not "finally adjudicated on the merits." 
As discussed above, there was no "prior action" but rather a single case, so this 
threshold element of issue preclusion fails. Moreover, again there was no final 
adjudication on the merits, at least with respect to plaintiffs' state law claims, because the 
federal court never reached those claims. 
3. Policy considerations militate against applying the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel. 
The Tenth Circuit recognizes that in certain instances issue preclusion should not 
be applied, for example, where the application of issue preclusion "would 'do[ ] nothing 
to vindicate two primary policies behind the doctrine, conserving judicial resources and 
protecting parties from 'the expense and vexation' of relitigating issues that another party 
previously has litigated and lost."' Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma v. National Indian 
Gaming Com% 327 F.3d 1019, 1030 (10th Cir. 2003). 
In addition, this Court has recognized that "collateral estoppel can yield an unjust 
outcome if applied without reasonable consideration and due care." Buckner v. Kennard, 
2004 UT 78, TI 15, 99 P.3d 842. Accordingly, courts "must carefully consider whether 
granting preclusive effect to a prior decision is appropriate.... Collateral estoppel 'is not 
an inflexible, universally applicable principle[.] . . . Policy considerations may limit its 
use where . . . the underpinnings of the doctrine are outweighed by other factors.' " Id. 
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(alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
Such policy considerations are present in this case. The Utah Constitution is the 
"supreme law" of the state of Utah. Under the primacy approach, this Court typically 
examines state constitutional issues first, and considers federal law of no more persuasive 
weight than case law from a sister state. State v. Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106, 2007 UT 49 
If 33; State v. Worwood, 164 P.3d 397, 2007 UT 47, f 15. Deferring to a federal court is 
detrimental to, not consistent with, state policy. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs/appellants respectfully request the Court 
reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thispy ^ day of August, 2009. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
(foM 0 
Roger P. Christens 
Karra J. Porter 
Sarah E. Spencer 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
Memorandum Decision, February 18, 2009 
Final Judgment and Order, March 11,2009 
Memorandum Decision (Judge Ted Stewart), September 22,2008 
Exhibit 1 Memorandum Decision, February 18, 2009 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL pi$T 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
FEBW/W*B 
BARBARA JENSEN et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH; et al., 
Defendants. 
THIRD D&TWCT C G U ^ SALT LAKE DEPARTM^i 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 050912502 
Hon. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant Cunningham's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant 
Anderson's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants Wagner and 
Albritton's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendant Eiseman's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court heard oral argument with 
respect to the motions on January 26, 2009. Following the 
hearing, the matters were taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, 
arguments of counsel, as well as the decision of Judge Stewart, 
finds it clear that Plaintiffs have pled the same factual basis 
for their Causes of Action and further, that all the claims arise 
from a single set of operative events. Indeed, the factual 
events pled in the instant mirror those which supported 
Plaintiffs' federal claims. Moreover, Judge Stewart, after an 
extensive analysis of the facts, made findings and conclusions 
based on the issues underlying Plaintiffs' claims. 
. \ i s\ s\ 
JENSEN v. STATE OF UTAH Page 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The aforementioned in mind, the Utah Supreme Court in the 
similar case of Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist., 2008 UT 70, (Utah 2008) 
stated the following: 
The doctrine of res judicata embraces two 
distinct theories: claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion." Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, 
P 12, 99 P.3d 842. This appeal raises only 
the latter principle of issue preclusion. 
Issue preclusion, which is also known as 
collateral estoppel, "prevents parties or 
their privies from relitigating facts and 
issues in the second suit that were fully 
litigated in the first suit." Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The purposes of 
issue preclusion include "(1) preserving the 
integrity of the judicial system by 
preventing inconsistent judicial outcomes,-
(2) promoting judicial economy by preventing 
previously litigated issues from being 
relitigated; and (3) protecting litigants 
from harassment by vexatious litigation." Id. 
P 14. 
Id. at P28. 
The Oman court continued stating: 
Issue preclusion applies only when the 
following four elements are met: (I) the 
party against whom issue preclusion is 
asserted must have been a party to or in 
privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the 
prior adjudication must be identical to the 
one presented in the instant action; (iii) 
the issue in the first action must have been 
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and 
(iv) the first suit must have resulted in a 
final judgment on the merits. Collins v. 
Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, P 
12, 52 P.3d 1267 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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Id. at P29. 
Applying the aforementioned to the facts of this case, there 
can be no question each of the elements has been satisfied. 
While Plaintiffs argue there was no final adjudication on the 
merits because the federal court never reached the state law 
claims, a review of Plaintiffs' Complaint and the federal court's 
Memorandum Decision demonstrates that the factual contentions and 
issues supporting the state claims are identical to those 
underlying the federal claims and were necessary to Judge 
Stewart's decision. Indeed, in response to a similar argument by 
the plaintiff in Oman regarding his breach of contract claim, the 
Court stated: 
Underlying the § 1983 claim was the 
dispositive issue of whether the District 
breached the Classified Agreement when it 
fired Oman for cause. Indeed, when Oman filed 
his complaint in federal court, his basis for 
the § 1983 cause of action was twofold: (1) 
that the District's "pre-termination conduct 
deprived him of due process rights secured by 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution," and (2) that the 
District's "decision to suspend, and later 
terminate, his employment violated the terms 
of the Classified Agreement." Thus, a 
resolution of the § 1983 claim, as framed by 
Oman, required the federal court to resolve 
the underlying issue of whether the District 
violated the Classified Agreement when it 
fired Oman. The issue was squarely before the 
federal court, was litigated by the parties, 
and was necessary to the court's final 
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judgment on the § 1983 claim. Accordingly, 
the federal court made findings and 
conclusions regarding the alleged breach of 
contract--including the previously quoted 
conclusion that the District had a sufficient 
basis for firing Oman for cause under the 
Classified Agreement--and these findings and 
conclusions are binding in subsequent actions 
under the doctrine of issue preclusion. 
Although Oman's breach of contract claim was 
not litigated in the federal court, it is 
based upon the same underlying issue that was 
resolved by the federal court: whether the 
District had a sufficient basis for 
terminating Oman for cause under the 
Classified Agreement. The state district 
court was therefore bound by the federal 
court's conclusion that "[Oman] ' s 
representations to the District regarding his 
work hours provided a sufficient basis for 
termination for cause." Accordingly, even if 
Oman had argued to the district court that 
his conduct did not give the District a basis 
for terminating him for cause, the argument 
would have failed based on the federal 
court's prior ruling. 
Id. at P33. 
As noted, the issues in this case arise from a single, 
distinct set of events and as demonstrated by the Memorandum 
Decision of Judge Stewart, the factual contentions that underlie 
the Plaintiffs' state law claims against the Defendants have been 
conclusively decided. 
This said, Judge Stewart's legal conclusions bar Plaintiffs' 
claims under the Utah Constitution because there is no historical 
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or textual basis for interpreting Utah's Constitutional 
provisions in this case differently from the Federal 
Constitution. Moreover, no Utah appellate decision supports 
interpreting the Utah Constitution to provide broader or 
different rights in this case. 
In sum, the facts, the alleged harm, and the analysis of 
Plaintiffs' state law claims are the same as those already 
considered and dismissed by Judge Stewart and, there being no 
additional or different rights provided by the Utah Constitution, 
dismissal is appropriate in this forum as well. 
Defendant Cunningham's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Defendant Anderson's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants 
Wagner and Albritton's Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
Defendant Eiseman's Motion for Summary Judgment are^gr^nted. 
lis _/j_ DATED thi  A day of February, 2 009 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER JENSEN, a minor, by and through 
his parents and natural guardians, BARBARA 
and DAREN JENSEN; BARBARA JENSEN, 
individually; and DAREN JENSEN, ) FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
individually, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
v. ) Civil No.: 050912502 
STATE OF UTAH; INTERMOUNTAIN ) Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
HEALTH CARE, INC.; KARI ) 
CUNNINGHAM, in her individual capacity; ) 
RICHARD ANDERSON, in his individual and ) 
official capacities; LARS M. WAGNER, in his ) 
individual capacity; DAVID L. CORWIN, in ) 
his individual capacity; CHERYL M. COFFIN, ) 
in her individual capacity; KAREN H. ) 
ALBRITTON, in her individual capacity; ) 
SUSAN EISENMAN, in her individual ) 
capacity; and JANE and JOHN DOE, in their ) 
individual capacities, ) 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to the Court's Memorandum Decision issued on February 18, 2009, and for the 
reasons set forth in the defendants' moving papers addressing res judicata, defendants' motions 
for summary judgment are hereby granted and all claims against the defendants are hereby 
dismissed with prejudice on the merits, /j 
DATED this Q_ day of i e ^ ^ 2 0 0 9 . 
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Exhibit 3 Memorandum Decision (Judge Ted Stewart), 
September 22, 2008 
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
P J., a minor, by and through his parents and 




STATE OF UTAH, et al , 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND REMANDING 
STATE LAW CLAIMS 
CaseNo.2:05-CV-739TS 
This § 1983 case arises from a protracted dispute between Plaintiffs Daren and Barbara 
Jensen and the State of Utah regarding the proper medical care for their son, Plaintiff P.J. 
Currently before the Court are the summary judgment motions of Defendants Richard Anderson, 
Kari Cunningham, Susan Eisenman, Dr. Lars Wagner, and Dr. Karen Albritton. After carefully 
considering the parties' submissions and having heard oral argument, the Court will grant the 
summary judgment motions with regard to the Jensens' § 1983 claims for the reasons discussed 
below. As the Jensens' state law claims involve important issues of Utah law, the Court declines 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and will remand the state claims to the Utah court from 
which they were removed. 
1 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment is proper if the moving party can demonstrate that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 In considering whether 
genuine issues of material fact exist, the Court determines whether a reasonable jury could return 
a verdict for the nonmoving party in the face of all the evidence presented.2 The Court is 
required to construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.3 
II. FACTS 
The following is a summary of the factual background in this case, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the Jensens: On April 30, 2003, 12-year-old P.J. had a small growth removed 
from the floor of his mouth by an oral surgeon named Dr. Christensen. The tissue removed by 
Dr. Christensen was sent to Laboratory Corporation of America in Kent, Washington for 
analysis. LabCorp informed Dr. Christensen that the sample was malignant. Dr. Christensen 
then referred P.J. to Dr. Harlan Munz at Primary Children's Medical Center ("PCMC") in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
The Jensens met with Dr. Munz on May 9, 2003. After examining P.J., Dr. Munz 
referred him to PCMC's oncology department where he met with Dr. Wagner. Dr. Wagner first 
lSee Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
2See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Clifton v. Craig, 924 
F.2dl82, 183 (10th Cir. 1991). 
3See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); 
Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1991). 
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met with and examined PJ. that same day, but could not offer any diagnosis until after PCMC's 
pathology department completed its own testing. 
Upon PCMC's request, LabCorp sent P.J.'s tissue sample to PCMC's pathology 
department. On May 20, 2003, Dr. Lowichik completed the pathology report on P.J.'s tissue, 
diagnosing the growth as "EWING SARCOMA/PERIPHERAL PRIMITIVE 
NEUROECTODERMAL TUMOR"4 (i.e., Ewing's Sarcoma). This diagnosis was rendered 
based on immunohistochemical staining and the appearance of the tumor cells. The pathology 
report indicates that P.J.'s "case was reviewed by [fellow pathologist] [Dr. Coffin] who concurs 
with this interpretation."5 The deposition testimony of the pathologists likewise indicates that 
both of them reviewed the testing and were confident in the diagnosis. Dr. Lowichik estimated 
her confidence in the diagnosis to be "in the high 90 percent."6 Dr. Coffin reviewed the testing 
and was also very confident that the tumor was Ewing's Sarcoma. In fact, Dr. Coffin testified 
that the diagnosis was rendered with near certainty. 
In addition to immunohistochemical staining, Ewing's Sarcoma may be diagnosed 
through cytogenetic and molecular genetic testing. Ewing's cells often manifest a chromosomal 
translocation (an "11;22 translocation"), which may be detected through these tests. The 
presence of an 11;22 translocation indicates that a specimen is Ewing's Sarcoma. Cytogenetic 
testing may be performed only on fresh or frozen tissue. Where a tissue sample is placed in 
'Docket No. 345, Ex. 32. 
5Id. 
6Docket No. 334, Ex. 4, at 31. 
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formalin or paraffin, cytogenetic testing is not possible. Although not optimal, molecular testing 
can be performed on tissues samples that have been placed in formalin or paraffin. 
In 2003, PCMC would commonly attempt to conduct cytogenetic testing on sarcoma 
tissue samples that were excised at PCMC where "there was adequate sample left over after the 
standard pathology examination."7 Molecular testing was available through an affiliated 
institution. In 2003, it would not have been unusual for a PCMC pathologist to send samples out 
for molecular testing to provide further diagnostic information. 
Because the tissue removed from P.J.'s mouth by Dr. Christensen was placed in formalin 
or paraffin, cytogenetic testing could not be performed on that specimen. There were still tumor 
cells in P.J.'s mouth, which could have been extracted for this purpose. However, this would 
have required further surgery to obtain a sample. In contrast, molecular testing could have been 
performed on the tissue sample obtained by Dr. Christensen. 
Dr. Wagner discussed the diagnosis of P.J.'s tissue sample with Dr. Coffin. She told him 
that she was confident in the diagnosis and that no further testing was needed. According to Dr. 
Coffin, where the cell appearance and immunohistochemical staining fit "the criteria for the 
diagnosis of Ewing's sarcoma," it is not necessary to perform cytogenetic or molecular testing to 
establish the diagnosis.8 
On May 21, 2003, Dr. Wagner met with the Jensens for more than an hour. Dr. Wagner 
expressed his confidence in the Ewing's Sarcoma diagnosis and explained the need for 
chemotherapy to begin right away. Dr. Wagner further explained the difference between 
7Docket No. 345, Ex. 15, at 23. 
8Docket No. 334, Ex. 3, at 43-44. 
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localized and non-localized Ewing's Sarcoma. Specifically, Dr. Wagner informed the Jensens 
that the cure rate for localized disease—where there is no evidence of cancer in places other than 
where it was discovered—was approximately 70% when treated with the recommended 
chemotherapy, but that the cure rate for non-localized (metastatic) disease was as low as 20%. 
Thus, Dr. Wagner explained the necessity of beginning treatment right away to prevent the 
cancer from spreading throughout PJ.'s body. 
That same day, radiographic examinations were performed on PJ.'s neck, thorax, chest, 
and skull to determine whether the cancer had spread beyond the floor of PJ.'s mouth. Each of 
these tests returned negative. Ms. Jensen testified that at this point they asked Dr. Wagner "if 
there was any other test he could run to help confirm that it was Ewing's and he said no."9 "He 
was sure it was Ewing's."10 
During the May 21, 2003 visit, the Jensens asked Dr. Wagner to have PJ.'s tissue sample 
sent to the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute at Harvard University for a second opinion. Dr. Wagner 
informed the Jensens that insurance companies often would not pay for a second opinion and 
encouraged them to contact their insurance provider. Nonetheless, Dr. Wagner agreed to the 
second opinion and sent the tissue sample to Dana-Farber as requested. The Jensens ultimately 
cancelled the Dana-Farber consultation. 
The Jensens met with Dr. Wagner again on May 29, 2003. At this meeting the Jensens 
asked Dr. Wagner to order a Positron Emission Tomography ("PET") scan. Dr. Wagner refused 
to order a PET scan, explaining that it would not be useful in PJ.'s situation because there was 
'Docket No. 345, Ex. 12, at 127. 
10Id. at 134. 
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no other evidence of metastatic disease. Dr. Wagner further explained to the Jensens that a 
negative PET scan would not change the need for chemotherapy. The Jensens again asked Dr. 
Wagner if there were other tests to confirm the E wing's diagnosis. Dr. Wagner said no. 
By early June 2003, the Jensens and Dr. Wagner differed significantly in their views 
regarding P.J.'s medical care. Accordingly, a meeting between the Jensens, Dr. Wagner, Dr. 
Lemons (head of the oncology department), a PCMC social worker, and PCMC's head of quality 
assurance was scheduled for June 9, 2003, at PCMC. Dr. Wagner again emphasized the need to 
begin treating P.J. with chemotherapy right away in order to prevent the cancer from spreading. 
The Jensens' statements during the meeting are disputed. The Jensens contend that they refused 
to consent to the proposed chemotherapy based on their desire for further confirmatory tests. Dr. 
Wagner contends that they refused chemotherapy because they wanted to pursue an alternative 
treatment called Insulin Potentiation Therapy. Regardless, the parties were unable to resolve the 
impasse. During the meeting, the PCMC head of quality assurance told the Jensens that a 
referral to the Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS") might be necessary. The Jensens 
left the meeting, telling the PCMC representatives, "You're fired."11 
At some point, Dr. Corwin of Safe and Healthy Families—a division of PCMC with the 
responsibility of ensuring that patients are not left untreated—became involved in P.J.'s case. 
Around June 12, 2003, Dr. Corwin attempted to make contact with the Jensens. Dr. Corwin and 
Mr. Jensen had a lengthy telephone conversation on June 15, 2003, but were unable to reach an 
agreement as to P.J.'s medical care. Dr. Corwin and Mr. Jensen unsuccessfully attempted to 
schedule a further meeting to discuss the situation. At that point, the decision was made to refer 
"A/., Ex. 13, at 181. 
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P.J.'s case to DCFS for medical neglect in refusing what the doctors believed was medically 
necessary treatment. 
On June 16, 2003, a regularly-scheduled meeting was held at PCMC with representatives 
from DCFS, PCMC, and other community organizations in the child welfare system. Dr. 
Wagner and Dr. Corwin were also present. At this meeting, and in a case summary submitted to 
DCFS, Dr. Wagner summarized his interaction with the Jensens. A formal referral to DCFS was 
made that same day. The parties dispute whether it was Dr. Corwin or Dr. Wagner who actually 
submitted the referral. For purposes of the summary judgment motions, the Court must presume 
the latter. 
DCFS assigned P.J.'s case to Ms. Cunningham, a DCFS social worker. Dr. Wagner and 
Dr. Corwin provided Ms. Cunningham with information regarding their understanding of P.J.'s 
situation, both orally and by written case summaries. Ms. Cunningham was also present at the 
June 16, 2003 meeting at PCMC. Based on communications with Dr. Wagner, Ms. Cunningham 
was under the impression that P.J.'s situation was a medical emergency and that something 
needed to be done within a matter of hours or days. 
On June 18, 2003, Ms. Cunningham, through Assistant Attorney General Lund, filed a 
Verified Petition and Motion to Transfer Custody and Guardianship (the "Verified Petition") in 
the Third District Juvenile Court for Salt Lake County, Utah (the "Juvenile Court"). Ms. 
Cunningham filed the Verified Petition based entirely on the information provided to her by Drs. 
Wagner and Corwin. She did not do any independent investigation of P.J.'s referral. 
On June 20, 2008, the Jensens first appeared before the Juvenile Court. Ms. Eisenman 
represented DCFS in place of Ms. Lund and became the primary Assistant Attorney General on 
P.J.'s case. At that hearing, the Jensens' attorney, Mr. Frank Mylar, represented that the Jensens 
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were interested in obtaining further tests of the tissue sample excised by Dr. Christensen. The 
Court continued the hearing until July 10, 2003, as the parties indicated that a stipulation 
regarding P.J.'s treatment was possible. 
Around this time, the Jensens sought out Dr. Birkmayer, who practiced in Vienna, 
Austria. After reviewing P.J.'s medical records, Dr. Birkmayer indicated to the Jensens that he 
was not "totally convinced" that PJ. had Ewing's Sarcoma and that chemotherapy was not 
necessary.12 The Jensens expressed their desire to have Dr. Birkmayer supervise P.J.'s treatment. 
On July 2, 2003, Ms. Eisenman sent an email to Dr. Birkmayer in which she asked questions 
regarding, among other things, Dr. Birkmayer's qualifications and licensure and whether Austria 
had a standard of care similar to that used by the American Academy of Pediatrics. After 
receiving Ms. Eisenman's email from Dr. Birkmayer, Mr. Mylar instructed Ms. Eisenman not to 
contact Dr. Birkmayer directly, but to direct inquiries regarding Dr. Birkmayer to Mr. Mylar. 
According to Mr. Jensen, the Jensens abandoned their desire to have Dr. Birkmayer treat P.J. at 
that time because DCFS was requiring that P.J.'s medical care be provided by a board-certified 
pediatric oncologist. 
In late June 2003, Dr. Wagner left Utah to pursue a new job in Ohio. He informed Ms. 
Eisenman that he was leaving and that she could contact Dr. Lemons or Dr. Albritton if she 
needed anything. In preparation for the July 10, 2003 hearing, Ms. Eisenman disclosed to the 
Juvenile Court that she intended to prove her case using three medical experts: Drs. Coffin, 
Wagner, and Albritton. In preparation for the hearing, Ms. Eisenman provided Dr. Albritton 
12Docket No. 345, Ex. 48. Notably, Plaintiffs represent that they submit Dr. Birkmayer's 
statements only to illustrate the effect they had on the Jensens' mental state and not for the truth 
of the matter asserted. 
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with materials related to the case, including Dr. Wagner's case summary and a list of questions 
that might be asked. Mr. Mylar objected to the introduction of testimony at the July 10, 2003 
hearing because the hearing was set for a pre-trial conference and not an evidentiary hearing. 
The Juvenile Court affirmed the objection and Drs. Albritton and Coffin did not testify at that 
time. 
At the July 10, 2003 hearing, the Jensens again raised the issue of whether P.J. really had 
Ewing's Sarcoma. The parties stipulated that the Jensens would have P.J. examined by doctors 
at the Children's Hospital of Los Angeles ("CHLA") and that the Jensens would abide by their 
treatment recommendations. The Juvenile Court set another pretrial conference for July 28, 
2003. Per the stipulation, the Jensens traveled to Los Angeles, where P.J. met with Dr. Tishler 
on July 21, 2003. At this meeting, Dr. Tishler informed the Jensens that he was recommending 
chemotherapy based on the prior pathology tests, but that CHLA would do its own pathology 
analysis and genetic testing to confirm the Ewing's Sarcoma diagnosis. The Jensens were 
unhappy with this result as they believed that Dr. Tishler was not performing an independent 
evaluation, but was merely deferring to the PCMC doctors. 
Based on this dissatisfaction, the Jensens did not return again to CHLA, but instead 
sought medical care from Dr. Charles Simone. Dr. Simone initially agreed to treat P.J. 
However, upon learning of the legal battle in which the Jensens were entrenched, Dr. Simone 
declined involvement. Nonetheless, the Jensens believed that Dr. Simone would still agree to 
treat P.J. if the Juvenile Court would permit it. 
At the hearing on July 28, 2003, the Juvenile Court received a report from Dr. Tishler via 
telephone regarding P.J.'s evaluation at CHLA. Dr. Tishler indicated that to his knowledge the 
CHLA testing was not yet complete. However, he also stated that there was no question that P.J. 
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had a malignant tumor that would require chemotherapy right away and that the remaining 
pathological and radiological tests would serve only to clarify what type of tumor he had for 
purposes of tailoring the chemotherapy to P.J.'s needs. The Jensens' new attorney, Mr. Blake 
Nakamura, advocated the Jensens' concern that not all of the testing had been completed. 
Nonetheless, based on Dr. Tishler's testimony, the Juvenile Court ordered that PJ. commence 
chemotherapy before August 8, 2003, without regard to the CHLA test results. The Juvenile 
Court also provided that should the test results indicate that chemotherapy was not needed, the 
Jensens were free to bring that fact to the Juvenile Court's attention. 
Mr. Nakamura also represented to the Juvenile Court at the July 28 hearing that the 
Jensens were not comfortable with Dr. Tishler and would prefer that PJ. be treated by Dr. 
Simone. During the hearing, the Juvenile Court asked Dr. Albritton whether Dr. Simone could 
be the primary treating physician. Dr. Albritton answered: 
No, we wouldn't make him the primary oncologist. My understanding, in fact, is 
that he is not board certified in oncology, either pediatric or medical oncology. 
He's - from what little I know, he's a specialist in complimentary and alternative 
medicine. So the gist I get is that he would be asking someone either in Utah or 
L.A. to be prescribing the chemotherapy and then he would be suggesting the 
complimentary approaches that might diminish side effects and so on. I do not 
think there will be an oncologist in Utah or L.A. who would let him prescribe the 
chemotherapy from New Jersey.13 
The Juvenile Court also asked Dr. Tishler whether P.J.'s primary treating physician 
needed to be a board certified oncologist. Dr. Tishler answered: "Definitely. There's no other 
physician that could lead the care and provide the care."14 Based on this, the Juvenile Court 
ordered that P.J.'s primary treating physician be a board certified pediatric oncologist or 
13DocketNo. 334, Ex. 33-C, 50-51. 
l4Id. at 53-54. 
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hematologist, but that Dr. Simone was authorized to work with P.J.'s other treating physicians. 
The Court also scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the Verified Petition for August 20, 2003, in 
the event P J.'s situation was not yet resolved. 
The Jensens never returned to CHLA or PCMC to receive the ordered chemotherapy for 
P.J. Instead, they sought evaluation at the Burzynski Clinic in Houston, Texas. Around August 
6, 2003, the Jensens contacted the Burzynski Clinic to inquiry whether it could treat P.J. On 
August 7, 2003, an employee of the Burzynski Clinic called the Jensens to indicate that the 
Clinic was willing to see him. Accordingly, an appointment was set for August 12, 2003. 
At this point, the Jensens apparently believed that they did not have to comply with the 
Juvenile Court's order to begin chemotherapy by August 8, 2003, and that this would only result 
in the Juvenile Court's holding the August 20, 2003 evidentiary hearing on the Verified Petition. 
Thus, on August 8, 2003, the Jensens took P.J. and the rest of their children to Bear Lake in 
Idaho to go boating. From Idaho, they planned to travel to Houston for P.J. to be evaluated at the 
Burzynski Clinic on August 12. 
Having not received confirmation that P.J.'s chemotherapy was underway, Ms. Eisenman 
sought a hearing with the Juvenile Court on August 8, 2003, for the purpose of seeking 
authorization to take PJ. into protective custody. Ms. Eisenman called Mr. Nakamura to notify 
him of her intent to obtain a protective custody order. Present at the August 8, 2003 hearing 
were Ms. Eisenman, Ms. Cunningham, P.J.'s guardian ad litem, and Mr. Nakamura. Mr. 
Nakamura participated in the August 8 hearing by telephone. Mr. Nakamura indicated that P.J. 
was not receiving chemotherapy, that the Jensens did not want to initiate chemotherapy, and that 
they were taking P.J. to the Burzynski Clinic for evaluation. In response to the disclosure of the 
Jensens' intent to seek evaluation at the Burzynski Clinic, Ms. Cunningham paged Dr. Albritton, 
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who then participated in the hearing by telephone. The Juvenile Court and counsel asked Dr. 
Albritton whether the Burzynski Clinic was qualified to provide P.J.'s treatment. Dr. Albritton 
indicated that Dr. Burzynski was not a board certified oncologist-hematologist and that his clinic 
is known for providing extremely controversial therapy. Dr. Albritton further indicated that she 
was unaware of any pediatric oncologists at the Burzynski Clinic, but would need more time to 
confirm that fact. Finally, Dr. Albritton testified that the Burzynski Clinic was not an 
appropriate option for a newly-diagnosed cancer patient who had not exhausted standard 
treatment options. 
Ms. Eisenman then filed an Application to Take a Child Into Protective Custody. This 
application was supported by an affidavit signed by Ms. Cunningham on August 8, 2003. 
Attached to Ms. Cunningham's affidavit was an affidavit executed by Dr. Wagner on July 22, 
2003. The Juvenile Court signed an order authorizing DCFS to take P.J. into protective custody, 
finding that it was in P.J.'s best interest. Ms. Eisenman enlisted the help of Sandy City Police 
Officer Peterson, whom she had contacted earlier that day, to help serve the warrant. Officer 
Peterson was unable to serve the warrant because the Jensens had already left for Bear Lake 
earlier that day. 
Mr. Nakamura informed the Jensens that the Juvenile Court had signed a "pickup order" 
and that P.J. was to be placed in DCFS custody to begin chemotherapy. Despite this, the Jensens 
decided to stay in Idaho and seek an independent opinion of P.J.'s condition in preparation for 
the evidentiary hearing scheduled for August 20, 2003. 
On August 13,2003, P.J.'s guardian ad litem filed a motion for an order to show cause. 
After hearing the motion that same day, the Juvenile Court entered a bench warrant for the 
Jensens' arrest and ordered them to appear and present P.J. However, a Juvenile Court clerk told 
12 
Ms. Eisenman and PJ.'s guardian ad litem that a Juvenile Court warrant would not be placed on 
a national database, which would require an adult warrant. Perhaps recognizing this, Ms. 
Eisenman announced to the Jensens' attorneys and PJ.'s guardian ad litem that if the Jensens did 
not cooperate with the Juvenile Court orders, she would have to go to local and federal law 
enforcement authorities. 
Based on information provided by Ms. Eisenman to Officer Peterson, the Salt Lake 
County District Attorney's Office agreed to screen the Jensen matter for criminal charges on 
August 15, 2003. Ms. Eisenman, Ms. Cunningham, and PJ.'s guardian ad litem attended the 
August 15 screening. That same day, the District Attorney's Office filed criminal charges 
against the Jensens, including one count of custodial interference and one count of kidnaping. 
On August 16,2003, Mr. Jensen was arrested in Idaho where he spent four days in jail 
before he was released on bail. Upon Mr. Jensen's arrest, Ms. Jensen left Idaho and took P J. to 
Houston in an attempt to meet with the Burzynski Clinic. However, the Burzynski Clinic refused 
to see P.J. because Ms. Eisenman and PJ.'s guardian ad litem informed the clinic that the State 
had been granted protective custody over P.J. and did not consent to his treatment. 
The Juvenile Court held a non-evidentiary hearing on August 20, 2003. In that hearing, 
Mr. Nakamura read a letter written by Mr. Jensen and explained that the Jensens wished to have 
an opportunity to present evidence. The Juvenile Court agreed to set an evidentiary hearing, but 
refused to lift the warrants. 
Shortly after this hearing, Ms. Eisenman assumed a new position in the Attorney 
General's Office and no longer participated in PJ.'s case. Additionally, Mr. Anderson, Director 
of DCFS, was asked by a representative of Utah's Governor to personally assist in negotiating a 
13 
resolution to P.J.'s case. Accordingly, on August 27, 2003, Mr. Anderson flew to Idaho to meet 
with the Jensens where negotiations continued for several days. 
On September 5, 2003, the parties entered into a stipulation in which the Jensens agreed 
to submit P.J. to the care of Dr. Johnston—a board-certified pediatric oncologist—of St. Luke's 
Hospital in Boise, Idaho, and to abide by his treatment recommendations. DCFS agreed to ask 
the Juvenile Court to return full custody of P.J. to the Jensens and to vacate the warrants. After 
receiving assurances that the Jensens would submit to chemotherapy if Dr. Johnston 
recommended it, the Juvenile Court approved the stipulation. 
After performing his evaluation, Dr. Johnston concluded that P.J. needed chemotherapy. 
The Jensens again refused to submit P.J. to chemotherapy, claiming that Dr. Johnston was 
merely rubber-stamping the diagnosis of the PCMC doctors. Mr. Jensen told Dr. Johnston that if 
P.J. ever did receive chemotherapy at St. Luke's, he would "make sure it's a hellish experience 
for everybody involved."15 
Another hearing was held in the Juvenile Court on October 8,2003. At the October 8 
hearing, Dr. Johnston testified that he had confirmed P.J. had Ewing's Sarcoma and that the 
Jensens had rejected his recommendation that P.J. undergo chemotherapy. Assistant Attorney 
General Mark May, who replaced Ms. Eisenman on P.J.'s case, indicated that the parties would 
attempt to reach a settlement. 
Having determined that the Jensens would not submit P.J. to chemotherapy under any 
circumstances, DCFS filed a Motion to Dismiss Verified Petition on October 22, 2003. In its 
Motion, DCFS stated that its decision to dismiss the Verified Petition was made with full 
15Docket No. 344, Ex. 11, at 700-01. 
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recognition that without chemotherapy P.J.'s chances of survival would fall dramatically. 
Nonetheless, DCFS concluded that it was simply unworkable to attempt to force a 13-year-old 
boy to undergo chemotherapy unwillingly. 
On October 2, 2003, the Jensens entered a plea agreement with the State on the criminal 
charges. The Jensens agreed to enter a guilty plea and abeyance on the custodial interference 
charge in exchange for the State's promise to dismiss the kidnaping charge. 
III. DISCUSSION 
In July 2005, the Jensens filed a Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt 
Lake County, Utah, against the State of Utah, Intermountain Health Care, Inc., Ms. Cunningham, 
Mr. Anderson, Dr. Wagner, Dr. Corwin, Dr. Coffin, Dr. Albritton, and Ms. Eisenman. In their 
Complaint, the Jensens allege the following causes of action: (1) § 1983 - violation of the 
substantive due process right to direct medical care (2) § 1983 - violation of the substantive due 
process right to familial association;16 (3) § 1983 - malicious prosecution under the Fourth 
16In their Complaint, the Jensens allege that Defendants violated their right to familial 
association under both the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. However, in the Tenth Circuit "the familial right of association is properly based 
on the 'concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Griffen v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 
1547 (10th Cir. 1993). The Court recognizes that the Tenth Circuit has, in dictum, recognized a 
First Amendment right "to enter into and maintain certain intimate or private relationships." 
Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 358 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(dealing with expressive association). Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit has consistently analyzed 
familial association claims within the substantive due process framework, even in cases decided 
subsequent to the Grace United Methodist Church case. See Estate of Herring v. City of 
Colorado Springs, 233 Fed. Appx. 854, 856 (10th Cir. May 18, 2007) (recognizing that "the 
familial right of association is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment concept of liberty") 
(unpublished decision); Suasnavas v. Stover, 196 Fed. Appx. 647, 654 (10th Cir. Aug. 25, 2006) 
("The right of familial association is a substantive due process r ight . . . .") (unpublished 
decision); Chatwin v. Barlow, 2008 WL 501109, at *4 (D. Utah Feb. 20, 2008) ("The Tenth 
Circuit has recognized that the freedom of familial association is a substantive right guaranteed 
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (unpublished decision). Based on the 
long line of cases employing the standards set forth in Griffen, the Court finds that the Jensens' 
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Amendment; (4) § 1983 - violation of the Ninth Amendment; (5) violation of article I, section 1 
of the Utah Constitution; (6) violation of article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution; (7) 
violation of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution; (8) violation of article I, section 25 of 
the Utah Constitution; (9) wrongful initiation; and (10) intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 
After removing the case to this Court, the Defendants filed motions to dismiss. In an 
Order dated June 16, 2006, the Court dismissed the State of Utah on the basis of sovereign 
immunity and Drs. Corwin and Coffin on the basis of absolute immunity. The Court also 
dismissed the fourth and eighth causes of action in their entirety and the first and third causes of 
action to the extent they were asserted by P.J. IHC has since been voluntarily dismissed. 
After the close of discovery on the issue of liability, Mr. Anderson, Ms. Cunningham, 
Ms. Eisenman, Dr. Wagner, and Dr. Albritton filed the motions presently before the Court, 
arguing that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' federal claims based on the 
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, absolute immunity, and qualified immunity. 
A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 
"Rooker-Feldman precludes federal district courts from effectively exercising appellate 
jurisdiction over claims "actually decided by a state court' and claims 'inextricably intertwined' 
with a prior state-court judgment."17 The doctrine arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), which allows 
familial association claims arise from and are appropriately analyzed under Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
11
 Mo's Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1237 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Kenmen 
Eng'g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 473 (10th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
16 
review of state-court judgments by the United States Supreme Court and, by negative inference, 
precludes lower federal courts from exercising such jurisdiction.18 
Noting that the doctrine had, at times, been applied by lower courts far beyond its original 
contours, the Supreme Court declared in the case of Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries 
Corp.,19 that application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is limited to "cases brought by state-
court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district 
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 
judgments."20 The Tenth Circuit summarized the Exxon Mobil holding as follows: 
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Exxon Mobil, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
does not apply "simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a 
matter previously litigated in state court." To the contrary, a party may lose in 
state court and then raise precisely the same legal issues in federal court, so long 
as the relief sought in the federal action would not reverse or undo the relief 
granted by the state court: "if a federal plaintiff 'presents] some independent 
claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a 
case to which he was a party . . . , then there is jurisdiction . . . .'"21 
Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman applies only where the relief sought in the federal case would 
"reverse or undo the state court judgment."22 
Rooker-Feldman has been applied to constitutional claims arising from child custody 
proceedings in state courts. For example, in Warnick v. Briggs,23 this Court applied the doctrine 
nid. 
19544 U.S. 280 (2005). 
20Mat284. 
2XMo 's Express, 441 F.3d at 1237 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292-94). 
22Id. 
232007 WL 3231609 (D. Utah Oct. 30, 2007). 
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to a § 1983 claim alleging various constitutional violations against several state actors, seeking 
review of the circumstances surrounding the removal of the plaintiffs child by the state without 
a pre-removal hearing.24 The Court found that "if it adjudicated Plaintiffs' claims relating to [the 
child's] removal, [it] would effectively act as an appellate court in reviewing the juvenile court's 
disposition."25 Applying Rooker-Feldman in that situation made sense as the juvenile court 
heard and decided the issue of whether the circumstances justified the child's removal, and the 
plaintiff did not challenge the "integrity of the evidence" before the juvenile court.26 
However, where a plaintiffs federal cause of action is for injury sustained as a result of 
actions taken during the course of the custody proceedings that are separate from the judgments 
of the state court, Rooker-Feldman does not apply. The case of Brokaw v. Weaver*1 of the 
Seventh Circuit is particularly persuasive on this point and is closely analogous to the Jensens' 
case. In Brokaw, the plaintiff was removed from her parents and placed in state custody by order 
of a state court after a social worker and others fabricated a charge of child neglect.28 
Subsequently, another state court found no continuing basis to hold the plaintiff in state custody 
and released her to her parents.29 Years later, after reaching the age of majority, the plaintiff 
brought suit in federal court against the social worker and the others who made up the neglect 
24M at*9-10. 
25Id. at* 10. 
26Id 




charges, alleging violations of her right to familial relations under substantive due process, 
violation of the Fourth Amendment in her removal, and violation of procedural due process.30 
The district court dismissed the case based on application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 
The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the actions of the defendants "violated her 
constitutional rights, independently of the state court decision."31 The court recognized that the 
plaintiffs injuries would not have happened without the state court's order directing her removal 
and placing her in state custody. Nonetheless, the court found that the plaintiffs claims were 
independent of the state court judgments, emphasizing that even if the plaintiff "would not have 
suffered any damages absent the state order . . . her claim for damages [was] based on an alleged 
independent violation of her constitutional rights. It was this separate constitutional violation 
which caused the adverse state court decision."32 Thus, the true cause of the plaintiffs injuries 
was the defendant's actions, even though the injuries would not have occurred absent the state 
court's order.33 
In this case, the Court finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to the 
Jensens' claims, as they seek relief independent from any judgements rendered by the state 
courts. The Jensens do not seek to reverse or undo any judgments of the state courts. After all, 
the Verified Petition was ultimately dismissed and full custody of P.J. returned to the Jensens. 
3lId. at 665. 
32Id. at 667; see also Holloway v. Borsh, 220 F.3d 767, 778-79 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding § 
1983 suit against caseworker independent of state custody proceedings based on actions taken by 
the caseworker during the course of the state proceedings). 
335rofaw,305F.3dat667. 
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Rather, the Jensens' claims are based on the separate conduct of the Defendants previous to and 
during the course of the proceedings in the state courts. Although the Juvenile Court was surely 
called upon to balance the parental rights of the Jensens with the State's interest in protecting 
PJ. 's welfare, nothing in the record indicates that either the Juvenile Court or the state criminal 
court heard and ruled on claims that the Defendants deliberately misrepresented and omitted 
material facts to the state courts, to each other, to the District Attorney's Office, or others 
involved in the events surrounding PJ.'s medical care in 2003. 
Thus, the Jensens allege independent claims similar to those in the Brokaw case. 
Although much of the injury alleged by the Jensens would not have resulted in the absence of the 
Juvenile Court's orders, the Jensens argue that the underlying cause of those orders was the 
Defendants' factual misrepresentations and omissions. The Jensens' claims are different from 
those in the Warnick case, where the state court entered specific findings of fact on the very 
events complained of by the plaintiffs and where there was no challenge to the integrity of the 
evidence. It is true that granting relief to the Jensens in this case might require the Court to enter 
findings that contradict issues decided by the state court. However, this does not, of itself, 
invoke the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.34 Thus, the constitutional injury alleged by the Jensens is 
separate and independent from any orders of the state courts, precluding application of the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 
It must be noted, however, that the Jensens' claims are properly before this Court only to 
the extent that they allege the Defendants engaged in conduct that was not brought before the 
Juvenile Court or conduct that materially affected the integrity of the evidence on which the 
34Mo's Express, 441 F.3d at 1237. 
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Juvenile Court relied. It is not for this Court to decide whether P.J. actually had Ewing's 
Sarcoma or whether the Juvenile Court properly balanced the State's interest in protecting 
children and the Jensens' constitutional rights. Those issues, and other similar matters, were 
squarely ruled on by the Juvenile Court and could only be properly challenged by the Jensens 
through an appeal. 
B. Absolute Immunity 
"The Supreme Court has recognized the defense of absolute immunity from civil rights 
suits in several well-established contexts involving the judicial process."35 "[S]tate attorneys and 
agency officials who perform functions analogous to those of a prosecutor in initiating and 
pursuing civil and administrative enforcement proceedings are absolutely immune from suit 
under section 1983 concerning activities intimately associated with the judicial... process."36 
The Tenth Circuit has recognized that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when they 
meet this criteria.37 
The Court applies a "functional approach" to determine whether activities are sufficiently 
connected with the judicial process to merit absolute immunity.38 A prosecutor is entitled to 
absolute prosecutorial immunity "when performing the traditional functions of an advocate."39 
Thus, a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity even when he or she is accused of making 
lsSnell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 686 (10th Cir. 1990). 
26
 Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 908 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins. 
Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1490 (10th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
37Snell, 920 F.2d at 687-91 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,430 (1976)). 
™Id. at 686. 
39Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997). 
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misrepresentations to the court, as long as the actions were taken in the role of an advocate.40 
"However, absolute immunity does not extend to actions 'that are primarily investigative or 
administrative in nature,' though it 'may attach even to such administrative or investigative 
activities when these functions are necessary so that a prosecutor may fulfill his function as an 
officer of the court.'"41 
As a general rule, witnesses who testify in a judicial proceeding, whether during trial or 
before, are likewise entitled to absolute immunity from suit arising from their testimony.42 
However, absolute witness immunity is not available to "complaining witnesses"—"the person 
(or persons) who actively instigated or encouraged the prosecution of the plaintiff—for 
testimony "that is relevant to the manner in which the complaining witness initiated or 
perpetuated the prosecution."43 
As explained below, the Court finds that Ms. Eisenman and Dr. Albritton are absolutely 
immune from all of the Jensens' § 1983 claims. Ms. Cunningham is likewise entitled to absolute 
immunity with regard to her decision to file the Verified Petition, but is not so entitled with 
regard to the rest of the conduct alleged in the Jensens' Complaint. 
Ms. Eisenman. Ms. Eisenman argues that she is absolutely immune from the Jensens' 
claims arising from functions performed in her role as an advocate or in fulfillment of her duties 
as an officer of the Juvenile Court. The Jensens claim that Ms. Eisenman engaged in a number 
"Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31 & n.34. 
41
 Scott, 216 F.3d at 908 (quoting Pfeiffer, 929 F.2d at 1490) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
42
'Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395, 1400 (10th Cir. 1992). 
43Id. at 1399 n.2, 1402. 
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of harmful activities outside the scope of her advocate role, which are grouped as follows for 
purposes of analysis: (1) factual misrepresentations and omissions made to the Juvenile Court; 
(2) misrepresentations to Ms. Cunningham, Mr. Anderson, and Utah Attorney General 
Shurtleff;44 (3) factual misrepresentations and omissions made to the District Attorney's Office; 
and (4) other investigative activities. Additionally, although not discussed by the Jensens, Ms. 
Eisenman contends that she is immune from claims arising from the August 2003 letter to the 
Burzynski Clinic in which Ms. Eisenman informed the Clinic of the custody order and forbade 
the clinic from providing any treatment to PJ. The Court finds that Ms. Eisenman is entitled to 
absolute immunity with respect to all of the Jensens § 1983 claims. 
Ms. Eisenman is absolutely immune with regard to the first group—misrepresentations 
made to the Juvenile Court. Even assuming that Ms. Eisenman intentionally misrepresented 
facts to the Juvenile Court, those misrepresentations were made in her role as an advocate. There 
is no evidence that any of the alleged misrepresentations were made under oath or as a witness. 
The Court likewise finds that Ms. Eisenman is entitled to absolute immunity with regard 
to the second group—misrepresentations to others involved in the Juvenile Court proceedings. 
Ms. Eisenman's communications with these persons were all directly related to the Juvenile 
Court proceedings. Ms. Cunningham and Mr. Anderson from DCFS were Ms. Eisenman's 
clients. Attorney General Shurtleff was Ms. Eisenman's co-prosecutor, whose name was on the 
Juvenile Court pleadings. The parties have not cited, nor has additional research uncovered, any 
cases dealing with the question of whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for 
communications with her clients and co-counsel. Nonetheless, these communications are 
44The Jensens also claim that a misrepresentation was made to the Guardian ad Litem, but 
offer no citation to evidence that would support this assertion. 
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directly related to a prosecutor's ability to present the State's case, satisfying the guiding 
principle of prosecutorial immunity—proximity to the "judicial process and the initiation and 
presentation of the state's case."45 A prosecutor must be able to freely speak with her client—the 
very person for whom he is advocating—and the other prosecutors assigned to the case without 
fear that their communications may later form the basis of a civil suit. These communications 
likely include discussions of, among other things, trial preparation and strategy, discussion of 
applicable law, as well as plea and settlement opportunities. Allowing claims to proceed against 
a prosecutor based on information shared (or not shared) during the course of discussions with 
his client and/or his fellow prosecutor would interfere with the prosecutor's ability to present the 
State's case.46 Thus, the public policy behind the prosecutorial privilege—"to allow 
functionaries in the judicial system the latitude to perform their tasks absent the threat of 
retaliatory litigation"47—fully supports Ms. Eisenman's entitlement to absolute immunity with 
regard to her communications with Ms. Cunningham, Mr. Anderson, and Attorney General 
Shurtleff. 
The Court also finds that Ms. Eisenman is entitled to absolute immunity with regard to 
the third category—misrepresentations made to the District Attorney. The Jensens have 
submitted sufficient evidence to show that Ms. Eisenman provided the District Attorney's Office 
with factual information that led to the criminal charges against the Jensens. In the absence of 
other considerations, this would render Ms. Eisenman a complaining witness, absolving her of 
455cotf,216F.3dat908. 
"Id. 
41Snell, 920 F.2d at 686-87. 
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prosecutorial immunity with regard to the criminal case.4 However, the Juvenile Court had 
ordered that DCFS take protective custody of P.J. Despite being apprised by their attorney of the 
Juvenile Court's custody order, the Jensens refused to return to Utah and produce P.J. Seeking to 
effectuate the Juvenile Court's order, Ms. Eisenman provided information to the District 
Attorney's office which led to the initiation of criminal charges. It is clear to this Court that 
these actions were intimately connected with her duties to the Juvenile Court.49 For these same 
reasons, Ms. Eisenman's actions in drafting and sending the August 2003 letter to the Burzynski 
Clinic were also intimately connected with the Juvenile Court proceedings. Accordingly, the 
Court finds that Ms. Eisenman is entitled to absolute immunity with respect to the Jensens' 
claims related to her providing allegedly misleading information to the District Attorney's Office 
and to her drafting and sending the August 2003 letter to the Burzynski Clinic. 
With regard to the fourth grouping—investigative activities—the Jensens point to two 
examples of investigative activities engaged in by Ms. Eisenman: (1) providing documents to Dr. 
Albritton in advance of a July 10, 2003 hearing; and (2) sending an email to Dr. Birkmayer in 
which she made false representations regarding the standard of care for Ewing's Sarcoma 
treatment. Concerning the former, the Jensens do not show how providing documents to a 
witness in the course of preparing for a hearing is investigative. With respect to the latter, the 
Jensens offer the following evidence in support of their assertion that Ms. Eisenman discovered 
the standard mentioned in the email to Dr. Birkmayer through her own investigative efforts: (1) 
**Kalina, 522U.S. at 129-31. 
49Cf Burrows v. Cherokee County Sheriffs Office, 38 Fed. Appx. 504, 506 (10th Cir. 
Mar. 19, 2002) (granting immunity to prosecutor for his actions in seeking extradition order) 
(unpublished decision). 
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Ms. Eisenman testified that she could not remember where she got the document containing the 
referenced standard; (2) that Dr. Wagner testified that he did not give it to her; and (3) that P.J.'s 
guardian ad litem did not recognize the document. Even when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the Jensens, this testimony does not permit an inference that Ms. Eisenman obtained the 
document through her own investigative efforts. A number of doctors participated in DCFS's 
involvement with P.J.'s situation—including Drs. Lemons and Albritton, both pediatric 
oncologists—any one of whom might have provided this information to Ms. Eisenman. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that Ms. Eisenman is absolutely immune from these claims, 
which are directly related to Ms. Eisenman's efforts to marshal the evidence and prepare for 
witness examination. 
Dr. Albritton. The Jensens' claims against Dr. Albritton are based on the following 
allegations: (1) that Dr. Albritton stated to Ms. Eisenman, Ms. McDonald, and the Juvenile Court 
that only a board-certified pediatric oncologist was qualified to treat P.J.; (2) that Dr. Albritton 
misrepresented the qualifications and services of the Burzynski Clinic to the Juvenile Court; and 
(3) that Dr. Albritton failed to disclose to the Juvenile Court and others that genetic testing was 
routinely conducted at PCMC on cases of suspected Ewing's Sarcoma.50 Each of these 
allegations are directly tied to Dr. Albritton's role as an expert witness in which she opined as to 
the medical care required by P.J. and what doctors and facilities were capable of providing it. 
50In opposing absolute immunity, the Jensens also point to circumstantial evidence that 
they claims shows Dr. Albritton provided false information to Dr. Johnston. The Jensens argue 
that this makes Dr. Albritton a complaining witness. However, nowhere in their briefs do the 
Jensens rely on this evidence to support their constitutional claims. The Jensens make no effort 
to show how Dr. Albritton's alleged conversation with Dr. Johnston violated their constitutional 
rights. 
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This was precisely what Dr. Albritton was subpoenaed to testify about. Accordingly, the Court 
finds that Dr. Albritton is entitled to absolute immunity from the Jensens' § 1983 claims. 
Ms. Cunningham. The Jensens base their § 1983 claims against Ms. Cunningham on her 
failure to investigate P.J.'s referral before filing the Verified Petition and on the factual 
misrepresentations she allegedly made to the Juvenile Court. Ms. Cunningham contends that she 
is absolutely immune from each of the claims asserted by the Jensens because she performed 
only prosecutorial functions. 
The Court finds that Ms. Cunningham is entitled to absolute immunity, but only with 
regard to her decision to file the Verified Petition. The Verified Petition was filed with an 
accompanying "Verification" in which Ms. Cunningham swore under oath that the "matters 
stated [in the Petition] are true."51 Although Ms. Cunningham surely exercised prosecutorial 
discretion in electing to file the petition, she acted outside the scope of any prosecutorial function 
by attesting under oath to the allegations in the Verified Petition as a complaining witness.52 
Thus, although Ms. Cunningham is entitled to absolute immunity for her decision to file the 
Verified Petition, she is not immune from the Jensens' claims based their contention that the 
Verified Petition contained misrepresentations and omissions. For the same reasons, Ms. 
Cunningham is not immune from the Jensen's claims arising from the submission of her August 
2003 affidavits, which the Jensens claim contained factual misrepresentations and omissions. 
Finally, Ms. Cunningham is not absolutely immune from the Jensens' claims arising from 
her alleged failure to properly investigate P.J.'s referral because this duty did not sufficiently 
51Verified Petition, Docket No. 345, Ex. 43, at 6. 
52Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129-31. 
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relate to the judicial proceedings. Certainly, prosecutorial immunity may be had for actions in 
"obtaining, reviewing and evaluating evidence" prior to initiation of a criminal action.53 
However, this is because these investigative actions "are necessary so that a prosecutor may 
fulfill his function as an officer of the court."54 Although a judicial proceeding might result from 
its fulfillment, Ms. Cunningham's duty to investigate reports of child neglect is for the purpose 
of protecting the children who are the subject of those reports.55 Therefore, it cannot be said that 
fulfillment of this duty is intimately associated with the judicial process. Accordingly, the Court 
will deny Ms. Cunningham's request for summary judgment based on absolute immunity. 
C. Qualified Immunity 
Each of the Defendants also asserts qualified immunity with respect to the Jensens' § 
1983 claims. Where a state actor raises a qualified immunity defense in a motion for summary 
judgment, "the burden shifts to the plaintiff to satisfy a strict two-part test: first, the plaintiff must 
show that the defendant's actions violated a constitutional or statutory right; second, the plaintiff 
must show that this right was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue."56 "If, and 
only if, the plaintiff meets this two-part test does a defendant then bear the traditional burden of 
the movant for summary judgment—showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."57 
53Swe//,920F.2dat693. 
54Id 
55Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-409. 
56Clark v. Edmunds, 513 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Nelson v. McMullen, 
207 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2000). 
51Id 
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A right is clearly established where "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his 
conduct was unlawful in the situation."58 This determination must be made "in light of the 
specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition."59 That a right was clearly 
established can be shown by controlling case law in the Tenth Circuit or by the weight of 
authority in other circuits.60 Notably, though, the Supreme Court has held that "officials can still 
be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances."61 
In their § 1983 claims, the Jensens allege that Defendants violated their substantive due 
process rights and their rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
1. Substantive Due Process 
In their first and second causes of action, the Jensens62 claim that each of the Defendants 
engaged in substantive due process violations of the Jensens' rights to familial association and to 
direct P.J.'s medical care. 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not "deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law."63 In addition to procedural protections, the Due 
Process Clause also provides two forms of "substantive" protection: (1) protection against 
5%Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 
533 U.S. 194,202(2001)). 
59Id. (quoting Katz, 533 U.S. at 201). 
60M at 1114-15. 
6lId. at 1115 (quoting Hope v. Peizer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). 
62In its June 2006 Order, the Court dismissed P.J.'s claims for violation of his right to 
refuse unwanted treatment. Thus, P.J. proceeds only on his familial association claim. 
63U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1. 
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government action that "shocks the conscience" and (2) protection of fundamental liberty 
interests.64 In the case of Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, the Tenth Circuit recently clarified that 
these two "strands of the substantive due process doctrine" are not mutually exclusive.65 Rather, 
"by satisfying either the 'fundamental right' or the 'shocks the conscience' standards, a plaintiff 
states a valid substantive due process claim."66 The Seegmiller court admonished: "Courts 
should not unilaterally choose to consider only one or the other of the two strands. Both 
approaches may well be applied in any given case."67 
A substantive due process claim based on arbitrary and oppressive government action is 
established where the conduct in question is so egregious that it "shocks the conscience of 
federal judges."68 Mere negligence is clearly insufficient to meet this standard.69 For that matter, 
even an intentional or reckless abuse of power that causes the plaintiff injury does not, of itself, 
meet the "shocks the conscience" standard.70 Rather, there must be "a degree of outrageousness 
and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking."71 
"Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir. 2008). 
65Id at 767, 769. 
66Id. at 767. 
61
 Id. at 769. 
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*Ward v. Anderson, 494 F.3d 929, 938 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Moore v. Guthrie, 438 
F.3d 1036, 1040 (10th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
69Mat937. 
70M at 937-38. 
71Mat938. 
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A substantive due process plaintiff asserting a fundamental liberty interest must narrowly 
articulate its scope.72 The Court must then determine whether the asserted interest is 
"objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."73 Should 
both of these hurdles be cleared, the plaintiff must then show that the government actor's conduct 
infringed on the plaintiffs fundamental liberty interest and was "not narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest."74 
The Jensens claim that Defendants infringed on their right to direct P.J.'s medical care 
and their right to familial association. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Due Process 
Clause "protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, 
and control of their children."75 This "fundamental right" encompasses both of the liberty 
interests asserted by the Jensens, calling for application of the compelling interest/narrowly 
tailored standard. In Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc.,16 the Tenth Circuit reversed a district court for 
applying the "shocks the conscience" standard to the substantive due process claims of two 
parents against the state for infringing on their right to direct the medical care of their children.77 
72Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 769 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 
(1997)). 
73Id. (quoting Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775-76 (2003)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
"Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 767. 
15Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
76336 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 2003). 
77Id. at 1202-03. 
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Although it ultimately declined to delineate the applicable standard due to the scant record before 
it, the court included a parent's right to direct the medical care of his or her children among those 
fundamental rights for which a substantive due process claim may be stated without meeting the 
"shocks the conscience" standard.78 
Dr. Wagner contends that the Jensens have not narrowly articulated their right to direct 
P.J.'s medical care and, therefore, are not entitled to application of the compelling 
interest/narrowly tailored standard. More specifically, Dr. Wagner argues that the Jensens' claim 
to absolute autonomy in directing the medical care decisions of their son conflicts with the 
"'Constitution's notions of ordered liberty,' which have always protected a child's right to 
treatment whenever it has been unreasonably denied by a parent."79 The Court agrees with this 
general proposition. However, with a few notable exceptions that are discussed below, the Court 
does not read the Jensens' claimed right so broadly. The Jensens do not claim a right to direct 
P.J.'s medical care free of any State interference. Rather, they claim that the State cannot 
interfere with their right to direct P.J.'s medical care by making deliberate and material factual 
misrepresentations and omissions to state courts and other decision makers during the process by 
which that interference is accomplished. As the Court recognized in its June 2006 Order, when 
the Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s medical care is placed in this context, it is not only fundamental, 
but is also clearly established.80 
"Docket No. 381, at 2. 
80Docket No. 52, at 22, 34,41 (citing Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1297-99 (10th 
Cir. 2004); Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1202-03). 
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The proper standard for claims of familial association is more complicated. As a 
fundamental liberty interest,81 the right to familial association between a parent and his or her 
child would logically be governed by the same standard applicable to other fundamental rights. 
However, the Tenth Circuit has consistently applied a balancing test to claims for infringement 
of the familial association right.82 In Griffen v. Strong, the Tenth Circuit called for a balancing 
test to determine whether a state actor's conduct "constituted an undue burden" on a plaintiffs 
right to familial association.83 A court applying the undue burden test should balance the 
plaintiffs right to familial association against the relevant interests of the state, considering the 
"severity of the alleged infringement, the need for the defendant's conduct, and any possible 
alternatives."84 This standard clearly involves lower scrutiny than the compelling 
interest/narrowly tailored test applicable to other fundamental rights. Indeed, the Griffen test 
requires the plaintiff to show that the state actor directed his conduct at the familial relationship 
"with knowledge that the . . . conduct will adversely affect that relationship."85 
In its June 2006 Order, the Court opted to apply the Griffen standard as it remains good 
law in the Tenth Circuit, but noted the conflict between the compelling interest/narrowly tailored 
slGomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir. 2006) (reciting parents' fundamental 
right to "care, custody and control of their children" in removal context). 
nSee, e.g., Griffen v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying "undue 
burden" balancing test to substantive due process claim based on right of familial association 
between husband and wife); Suasnavas v. Stover, 196 Fed. Appx. 647, 656 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(applying Griffen undue burden test) (unpublished decision). 
83Gn#ferc,983F.2datl547. 




and undue burden standards. As the Seegmiller decision had no occasion to specifically consider 
the right to familial association in the child-welfare context or the long line of Tenth Circuit 
cases applying the undue burden test, the Court will continue to apply the Griffen standard to the 
Jensens' familial association claims. 
Clearly, "the right to associate with one's family is a very substantial right."86 However, 
this right "has never been deemed absolute or unqualified."87 It is clear that the state may 
interfere with the right to familial association, even without prior notice and an opportunity to be 
heard, where such action is needed to ensure the safety of a child.88 Thus, the Court must weigh 
the State's interest in protecting children against the Jensens' interest in familial association, 
given the factual record presented, to determine whether the State's interference constituted an 
undue burden on the Jensens' right to familial association. 
With this framework in mind, the Jensens' substantive due process claims against Dr. 
Wagner, Ms. Cunningham, and Mr. Anderson are considered below.89 
Dr. Wagner. The Jensens claim that Dr. Wagner violated their substantive due process 
rights based on the following allegations: (1) Dr. Wagner refused to perform genetic and 
molecular testing despite the Jensens' requests; (2) Dr. Wagner made this decision because of his 
desire to enroll P.J. in a clinical trial, which he did not disclose to the Jensens; (3) Dr. Wagner 
discouraged the Jensens from seeking a second opinion and then attempted to influence that 
%1
 Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 F.3d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir. 1994). 
™Gomes, 451 F.3d at 1128-29. 
89As discussed above, Ms. Eisenman and Dr. Albritton are entitled to absolute immunity 
on all of the Jensens' § 1983 claims. 
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opinion; (4) Dr. Wagner did not inform Dr. Lemons, Dr. Albritton, Dr. Coffin, Dr. Lowichik, Dr. 
Corwin, Ms. Cunningham, Ms. Eisenman, or the Juvenile Court of his refusal to order genetic 
and/or molecular testing; and (5) Dr. Wagner told Ms. Cunningham that P.J. could be dead in 
five days in order to persuade her to skip the normal investigative process. 
Having closely examined the record, the Court finds the Jensens have not established that 
Dr. Wagner violated their substantive due process rights. It is undisputed that Drs. Lowichik and 
Coffin diagnosed P.J. with Ewing's Sarcoma after performing immunohistochemical testing. 
According to Dr. Coffin, this diagnosis was rendered with near certainty. Dr. Lowichik 
estimated her level of certainty "in the high 90 percent."90 Dr. Coffin told Dr. Wagner that she 
was confident in the diagnosis and that no further testing was needed. This, according to Dr. 
Wagner, coupled with the need for immediate treatment, was the reason he did not order 
additional testing. When the Jensens would not agree to begin treatment that he believed was 
necessary to save P.J.'s life, Dr. Wagner referred P.J.'s case to DCFS. The Jensens offer no 
competent evidence to place these facts in dispute. Rather, the Jensens ask the Court to draw a 
number of unreasonable inferences, which the record plainly will not support, in order to 
attribute a more dubious purpose to Dr. Wagner's actions. 
First, the Jensens point to the fact that Dr. Wagner was an administrator of a clinical trial 
for which P.J. might have been eligible, arguing that this was the reason behind Dr. Wagner's 
refusal to order more testing and his insisting on immediate chemotherapy treatment. Even 
assuming that it was inappropriate to refuse further testing and that Dr. Wagner did refuse the 
testing with the study in mind, the Jensens were free, at that point, to take P.J. to another facility 
'Docket No. 345, Ex. 16, at 31. 
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and another doctor for further testing. Thus, Dr. Wagner's refusal to order further testing did not, 
of itself, violate the Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s medical care free from unreasonable state 
interference. 
Moreover, outside of P.J.'s possible eligibility to participate in the trial, the Jensens have 
produced no evidence that Dr. Wagner's decisions were motivated based on a desire to enroll P.J. 
in the trial. Indeed, the record would not permit such an inference. It is undisputed that the trial 
required enrollment within 30 days of the diagnostic biopsy—which, in P.J.'s case, occurred on 
May 2, 2003. Thus, on June 2, 2003, P.J. was no longer eligible to participate in the trial. If Dr. 
Wagner's refusal to order the tests and his push to immediately begin chemotherapy were 
motivated by a desire to enroll P.J. in the clinical trail, surely his efforts would have ceased or 
changed course after June 2, 2003. However, it is undisputed that Dr. Wagner's efforts to ensure 
that P.J. received chemotherapy continued after this date. It was not until after June 2, 2003, that 
Dr. Wagner involved Dr. Corwin. At the June 9, 2003 meeting at PCMC, Dr. Wagner again 
emphasized the need for P.J.'s chemotherapy to begin immediately before the cancer spread 
throughout his body. Finally, it was not until June 16, 2003, that Dr. Wagner referred P.J.'s case 
to DCFS. In light of these undisputed facts, it is entirely unreasonable to infer that Dr. Wagner's 
motivation for not ordering further testing and seeking immediate treatment was to enroll P.J. in 
the clinical trial. 
The Jensens next contend that Dr. Wagner discouraged them from seeking a second 
opinion and then attempted to interfere with that opinion. In support of this claim, the Jensens 
testified that Dr. Wagner told them that insurance companies would often not pay for a second 
opinion, which would require the Jensens to pay for it. The Jensens also cite an email sent by Dr. 
Wagner to the oncologist who was to perform the second opinion, in which he stated, 
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Dear Dr. Grier, 
I am a pediatric oncologist sat [sic] the University of Utah, and I was wondering if 
you could provide consultation for a patient being followed in our clinic. This 12-
year-old boy underwent excision of a dome-shaped lesion at the floor of the 
mouth. After careful review by Cheryl Coffin and other pathologists here in Salt 
Lake, the diagnosis of Ewing's sarcoma has been made. Supporting this 
diagnosis are the presence of small round blue cells which stain for 013, FLI-1, 
andvimentin. There is a weak positivity of S-100. Desmin and actin are 
negative, as are epithelial markers, CD3, and CD45. There was no fresh or frozen 
tissue to send for RT-PCR for Ewing's translocations, although this possibly 
could be done on archival paraffin-embedded tissue. If there is significant 
diagnostic uncertainty, additional fresh tissue could likely be obtained by re-
excision, as the margins were clearly positive. 
I have discussed these results with the family, and expressed my confidence in the 
thorough histologic work-up that has been done by expert personnel. However, 
the family is interested in pursuing a second opinion, and has requested that we 
sed [sic] the tslides [sic] and tissue block to you for further review. I have 
explained that you are an oncologist and not a pathologist, etc., and that further 
consultations will delay the start of therapy (the child is now 19 days post-
resection, as the tissue was initially sent to a pathologist in Washington who made 
a diagnosis of "poorly differentiated malignancy" after performing a limited 
immunihistovemocal [sic] work-up). Nevertheless, at their request, I am sending 
by FedEX the tissue to your institution addressed to you. I would greatly 
appreciate your help in expediting pathologic review so we can commence with 
treatment for this young man.91 
This evidence does not rise to the level of a unconstitutional infringement of the Jensens' 
right to direct P.J.'s medical care. Whatever his motivations, the Jensens have offered no 
evidence that Dr. Wagner's statement regarding the likelihood of insurance coverage was false. 
Although Dr. Wagner clearly expressed confidence in the Ewing's Sarcoma diagnosis, along 
with his desire to quickly begin treatment, the above email does not support a reasonable 
inference that Dr. Wagner attempted to interfere with the second opinion sought by the Jensens. 
Docket No. 345, Ex. 41, at LMW 8. 
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Finally, and most important to their substantive due process claims, the Jensens claim 
that Dr. Wagner did not tell others involved in P.J.'s case—including Ms. Cunningham, Ms. 
Eisenman, and the Juvenile Court—of his refusal to order further diagnostic tests despite the 
Jensens' requests and that he falsely told Ms. Cunningham that P.J. would be dead within five 
days. With respect to the former, even assuming that Dr. Wagner did in fact fail to tell others 
about his refusal to order the genetic and/or molecular tests, there is no evidence that he did so 
deliberately. Rather, as outlined above, the record demonstrates that Dr. Wagner believed that 
those tests were unnecessary and would delay needed treatment based on the diagnosis of Drs. 
Coffin and Lowichik. To the extent the Jensens claim substantive due process rights that would 
impose liability on Dr. Wagner for failing to disclose seemingly irrelevant facts, such rights are 
not implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and, therefore, do not merit protection under the 
compelling interest/narrowly tailored standard. 
With respect to the latter, it is undisputed that Dr. Wagner communicated the emergency 
nature of P.J.'s medical situation to DCFS. The Jensens have not provided any evidence that Dr. 
Wagner did not actually believe this to be true. Instead, they contend that Dr. Wagner convinced 
Ms. Cunningham to forgo normal investigatory procedures by overstating the immediacy of 
P.J.'s medical needs, telling her that P.J. would be dead within five days. The Jensens base this 
assertion entirely on Mr. Anderson's deposition testimony. However, Mr. Anderson did not 
testify that Dr. Wagner made this statement, but that someone told Ms. Cunningham that P.J. 
would die within five days. Although Mr. Anderson agreed that it was likely the referring 
doctors, he "never verified who . . . made the statement."92 More important, Mr. Anderson's 
:DocketNo.345,Ex.2,at321. 
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testimony on this point is inadmissible hearsay and, therefore, must be disregarded. 
Accordingly, the record merely shows that Dr. Wagner communicated his belief to Ms. 
Cunningham that P.J. required immediate medical treatment to give him the best chance possible 
of surviving Ewing's Sarcoma, as diagnosed by the pathologists at PCMC. 
In summary, the Jensens ask the Court to find that Dr. Wagner violated their substantive 
due process rights to familial association and to direct P.J.'s medical care based on unreasonable 
inferences that stretch the record far beyond its actual content. This does not satisfy their burden 
of establishing a violation of their constitutional rights. 
The Court finds that Dr. Wagner's conduct in providing medical care for P.J. and 
referring his case to DCFS after the Jensens would not consent to P.J.'s treatment were narrowly 
tailored to serve the State's compelling interest in protecting children. The record demonstrates 
that Dr. Wagner referred P.J.'s case to DCFS after the Jensens refused to consent to 
chemotherapy treatment which Dr. Wagner reasonably believed was necessary to save P.J.'s life. 
There were, perhaps, additional measures that Dr. Wagner could have taken that might have 
avoided the need to involve DCFS. For example, he might have ordered the additional tests 
despite his belief that they were unnecessary and would delay needed treatment. However, the 
constitution does not place an affirmative duty on him to do so where he reasonably believed 
PJ.'s life was in danger. To the extent the Jensens claim to the contrary, their substantive due 
process rights are no longer within the boundaries of fundamental rights and, therefore, are only 
entitled to protection under the shocks the conscience standard—which Dr. Wagner's conduct 
does not do. 
lArgo v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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In reaching this conclusion, the Court finds it important that any actual interference with 
the Jensens' substantive due process rights was accomplished by referring the case to DCFS, 
filing the Verified Petition, and presenting P.J.'s case to a neutral judge—not by simply 
removing PJ. from his parents and forcing him to undergo chemotherapy. Indeed, the Jensens 
received ample opportunities to present their side of the story to the Juvenile Court. They were 
represented by counsel throughout the Juvenile Court proceedings. The Jensens correctly 
contend that the Constitution would not permit interference with their substantive due process 
rights by means of intentional misrepresentations to the Juvenile Court. However, as outlined 
above, the Jensens have simply not submitted evidence from which the Court can conclude that 
Dr. Wagner deliberately misrepresented the events and circumstances surrounding P.J.'s medical 
care to either the Juvenile Court or others involved in P.J.'s case. 
For these same reasons, the Court finds that Dr. Wagner's conduct did not unduly burden 
the familial association rights of the Jensens and P.J. Dr. Wagner's decision to refer P.J. to 
DCFS minimally infringed the Jensens' familial association rights, preserving ample opportunity 
for the Jensens to present their interests to the Juvenile Court. Perhaps further discussion might 
have led to a more amiable solution, but in light of the perceived need for immediate treatment, it 
was entirely reasonable to submit P.J.'s medical situation to DCFS authorities. Again, the 
Jensens are correct that intentional and material factual misrepresentations and omissions on the 
part of Dr. Wagner to either DCFS representatives or the Juvenile Court would surely have 
interfered with their associational rights on a much grander scale. However, the record simply 
does not sustain these allegations. Accordingly, the Court will grant Dr. Wagner's Motion for 
Summary Judgment with respect to the Jensens' substantive due process claims. 
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Ms. Cunningham. The Jensens claim that Ms. Cunningham violated their substantive due 
process rights in two ways: (1) by failing to properly investigate P.J.'s referral; and (2) by 
making deliberate factual misrepresentations and omissions to the Juvenile Court. 
The Court finds that Ms. Cunningham did not violate the Jensens' constitutional rights by 
failing to investigate the representations of Drs. Wagner and Corwin. The Jensens' claims have 
important similarities to the Eighth Circuit case of Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Services, Inc9A 
The plaintiff in Thomason brought a substantive due process claim against a state social worker 
for violation of her right to "the care, custody and management" of her infant child.95 The social 
worker received a report from a doctor who was treating the plaintiffs child, including two 
letters and an article from the Journal of Pediatrics, which stated his concern that the plaintiff 
might be suffering from a psychological disorder that causes her to partially suffocate her child 
in order to garner the attention of health care professionals.96 Without investigating the 
allegations, the social worker removed the child from the plaintiffs custody and "arguably 
mischaracterized" the doctor's report in an affidavit to the juvenile court.97 The Eighth Circuit 
held that the social worker's failure to investigate did not violate the parent plaintiffs 
constitutional rights where she relied on the doctor's "reasonable suspicion that life-threatening 
abuse [was] occurring in the home."98 
*85 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir. 1996). 
5/J. atl370. 
sId. at 1368. 
7A/.atl372. 
lId. at 1373. 
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Similar to the social worker in Thomason, Ms. Cunningham relied on the information 
provided to her by P.J.'s treating physician in filing the Verified Petition. The Jensens have 
produced no evidence that Ms. Cunningham had reason to suspect the information and opinions 
given to her by Drs. Wagner and Corwin were misleading. Rather, the Jensens contend that if 
Ms. Cunningham would have fulfilled her duties under Utah law to investigate P.J.'s referral, she 
would have discovered the misrepresentations and omissions allegedly made to her by the 
doctors. However, any duty to investigate that Ms. Cunningham may have had under State law 
cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim for violation of substantive due process." 
In this emergency situation, like the one in Thomason, Ms. Cunningham was reasonable 
in relying on the information provided to her by the doctors, even in the absence of any further 
investigation. Dr. Wagner communicated to Ms. Cunningham that P.J.'s situation was a medical 
emergency and that P.J.'s life was in danger, thus implicating the State's compelling interest in 
P.J.'s safety. The means used by Ms. Cunningham to address the State's compelling interest in 
the emergency medical situation were narrowly tailored. Ms. Cunningham did not seek to 
immediately remove P.J. from the home. Rather, she filed the Verified Petition, thus instituting a 
state court proceeding where the Jensens would have an opportunity to rebut the doctor's 
allegations. If the situation had been represented to Ms. Cunningham as something less than an 
urgent medical emergency, perhaps a duty to investigate could be constitutionally required. Such 
a duty may be needed in non-emergency situations in order to curb "overzealous suspicion and 
intervention on the part of health care professionals and government officials," which "may have 
"See Jones v. City and County of Denver, 854 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 1988) 
("Section 1983 does not, however, provide a basis for redressing violations of state law, but only 
for those violations of federal law done under color of state law."). 
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the effect of discouraging parents and care takers from communicating with doctors or seeking 
appropriate medical attention for children with real or potentially life-threatening conditions."100 
However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Ms. Cunningham did not reasonably 
believe the doctors' contentions that PJ. 's life was in danger and immediate action was 
necessary to ensure his welfare. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Jensens have not 
established a constitutional violation of either their right to familial association or their right to 
direct PJ.'s medical care with respect to Ms. Cunningham's actions in failing to investigate 
PJ.'s referral and in filing the Verified Petition. 
The Court also finds that the Jensens have not established a constitutional violation based 
on Ms. Cunningham's alleged misrepresentations and omissions to the Juvenile Court. As an 
initial matter, the Court notes that the Jensens have failed in their opposition memorandum to 
point out the specific factual misrepresentations and omissions on which they base their claim 
against Ms. Cunningham. As the Jensens bear the burden of establishing a constitutional 
violation of the their substantive due process rights, this failure alone entitles Ms. Cunningham to 
qualified immunity.101 
Nonetheless, having carefully reviewed their opposition memorandum, the Jensens 
appear to base their substantive due process claims on three instances in which they contend Ms. 
Cunningham made factual misrepresentations and omissions to the Juvenile Court: (1) the 
Verified Petition; and (2) an August 8, 2003 affidavit; and (3) an August 18, 2003 affidavit. The 
mThomason,S5F3datl373. 
101
"Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs." U.S. v. Griebel, 2008 
WL 1741503, * 4 (10th Cir. Apr. 14, 2008) (quoting Gross v. Burggrqf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 
1531, 1546 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
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Jensens have not brought forth any evidence that Ms. Cunningham knew that the information 
contained in the Verified Petition was misleading or deficient. As outlined above, Ms. 
Cunningham had no constitutional duty to investigate the information provided her by PCMC 
doctors before filing it. Thus, Ms. Cunningham's statements in the Verified Petition do not 
establish a violation of the Jensens' substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the Jensens' 
substantive due process claims depend entirely on the misrepresentations and omissions 
allegedly made by Ms. Cunningham in her August 2003 affidavits. 
Assuming the Jensens' version of the facts, the "misrepresentations and omissions" made 
by Ms. Cunningham in her August 2003 affidavits do not establish a constitutional violation. 
The Jensens claim that Ms. Cunningham made the following misrepresentations and omissions 
in both her August 8 and August 18 affidavits: (1) stating that a sample of P.J.'s tumor was sent 
to Dana-Farber for a second opinion without stating that the second opinion was never given; (2) 
stating that P.J. underwent a CT and Bone Scan without stating that these tests were normal; (3) 
stating that the Jensens wanted to use IPT to treat P.J. when they were actually no longer 
interested; (4) omitting to state that the "controlling" genetic tests were not yet complete; (5) 
omitting to state that she had not actually spoken with Dr. Coffin; (6) referring to Dr Birkmayer 
as a man rather than as a doctor; and (7) stating that Dr. Tishler recommended in the July 28, 
2003 hearing that P.J. should begin chemotherapy when Dr. Tishler had actually reserved his 
final opinion until all the testing was complete. 
Upon close inspection of the circumstances in which Ms. Cunningham submitted her 
August 2003 affidavits, the alleged misrepresentations and omissions were of little, if any, 
consequence. Of the alleged misrepresentations and omissions listed above, only numbers 4 and 
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7 have any potential significance. However, the record clearly reveals that they cannot support 
the Jensens' claims. 
In the hearing held on July 28, 2003, the Juvenile Court clearly ordered that P.J. begin 
chemotherapy by August 8, 2003. The Jensens did not begin PJ.'s chemotherapy by that date. 
Ms. Cunningham's August 2003 affidavits were submitted with the State's application to take 
PJ. into protective custody as a result of the Jensens' failure to begin PJ.'s chemotherapy. 
The hearing transcript shows that Dr. Tishler did in fact recommend that P.J. begin 
chemotherapy at the July 28 hearing and that any burden to place further test results before the 
Juvenile Court was on the Jensens. At the July 28 hearing, Mr. Nakamura clearly advocated the 
Jensens' concern that some of the testing was not yet completed. Dr. Tishler indicated that there 
was no question that P J. had a malignant tumor that would require chemotherapy and that the 
remaining pathological and radiological tests would merely serve to clarify what type of tumor 
he had. Upon hearing and accepting this, the Juvenile Court ordered that PJ.'s chemotherapy be 
commenced before August 8, 2003, without regard to the test results. The Juvenile Court also 
stated in the July 28 hearing that should the test results indicate that chemotherapy was not 
needed, the Jensens were free to bring that to the court's attention. Thus, numbers 4 and 7 were 
not misrepresentations or omissions at all, as demonstrated by the hearing transcript itself. 
The other alleged misrepresentations and omissions were plainly immaterial. Numbers 
one, two, and three are listed in Ms. Cunningham's August 18 affidavit as information provided 
to her by Dr. Wagner around June 16, 2003. Although this information provided useful 
background information, it was clearly not material to the issues before the Juvenile Court in 
mid-August 2003. Those issues centered on the Jensens' failure to comply with the Juvenile 
Court's order that P J. begin chemotherapy by August 8, 2003. With respect to number 5, Ms. 
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Cunningham did not state that she spoke with Dr. Coffin. Rather, she merely states that 
according to Dr. Coffin, the Jensens had Dr. Christensen do a second oral surgery on P.J.'s 
mouth resulting in an additional sample that was sent to the University of Washington—a fact 
that the parties do not dispute. Finally, and exemplary of the "misrepresentations and omissions" 
the Jensens allege Ms. Cunningham made, Ms. Cunningham's reference to Dr. Birkmayer as a 
man rather than a doctor was not material to the matters before the Juvenile Court at that time. 
The Court finds that the misrepresentations and omissions allegedly made by Ms. 
Cunningham were completely immaterial to the issues before the Juvenile Court and, therefore, 
did not interfere with the Jensens' substantive due process rights, even under the compelling 
interest/narrowly tailored standard.102 As outlined above, Ms. Cunningham instituted process 
before a State court of competent jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim of medical neglect against 
the Jensens. In this proceeding, the Jensens' fundamental rights to direct the custody, care, and 
control of their son were carefully balanced by a neutral judge. There is simply insufficient 
evidence that Ms. Cunningham deliberately misrepresented or omitted material facts to the 
Juvenile Court. 
Mr. Anderson. The Jensens allege that Mr. Anderson violated their rights to familial 
association and to direct P.J.'s medical care by (1) interfering with their ability to select their 
doctors; (2) refusing to withdraw the Verified Petition; (3) intentionally failing to disclose 
material facts to the Juvenile Court; and (4) failing to properly train and supervise DCFS case 
workers. The Court finds the Jensens have not established that Mr. Anderson violated their 
substantive due process rights. 
102Accordingly, the Court also finds that Ms. Cunningham's actions did not violate the 
Jensens' substantive due process rights under the undue burden and shocks the conscience tests. 
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First, the Jensens claim that Ms. Anderson violated their right to direct P.J.'s medical 
care by insisting that the State select the doctor who would treat P.J. According to the Jensens, a 
parent is entitled to choose the doctor who will provide medical treatment to their child as long 
as the alternatives are reasonable. They contend that Mr. Anderson "took the position that the 
State could force the parents to go to the court and let the court decide which physician was 
'better,'"103 thus preventing the Jensens from placing P.J. under the care of either Dr. Birkmayer 
or Dr. Simone. 
The Court finds, based on the circumstances of the case, that this does not amount to a 
constitutional violation of the Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s medical care. Mr. Anderson's 
involvement with P.J.'s case did not begin until late August 2003. By this time, the Juvenile 
Court had already held a number of hearings to determine the medical care that was in P.J.'s best 
interest. To that end, the Juvenile Court ordered P.J. to begin chemotherapy administered by a 
board-certified pediatric oncologist by August 8, 2003. The Jensens did not meet this deadline 
and the Juvenile Court granted protective custody of P. J. to the State. It was at this point that Mr. 
Anderson become involved in the case, attempting to negotiate a mutually agreeable solution. In 
his negotiations, Mr. Anderson took the position that P.J. must be treated with chemotherapy by 
a board-certified pediatric oncologist. This position was in accord with both the Juvenile Court's 
order and the opinion of Dr. Tishler who had evaluated PJ. Most important, as even the Jensens' 
acknowledge, Mr. Anderson's position was that if the Jensens wanted a different doctor, they 
could make their request to the Juvenile Court. The Juvenile Court was readily available to hear 
and determine whether the Jensens' desire to have a different doctor treat P.J. was in his best 
'Docket No. 340, at 9. 
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interest. In light of these undisputed facts—particularly the fact that the negotiations were 
conducted during the course of the Juvenile Court proceedings, which provided ample 
process—Mr. Anderson's "position" that having a board-certified pediatric oncologist treat P.J. 
was in his best interest was narrowly tailored to serve the State's compelling interest in 
protecting P.J. Accordingly, such does not amount to a constitutional violation. 
The Jensens also allege that Mr. Anderson violated their constitutional rights by refusing 
to withdraw the medical neglect allegations despite his admission that the Jensens were not 
neglectful parents. The Jensens base this assertion on their depositions, in which they testified 
that during negotiations with Mr. Anderson in late August 2003, Mr. Anderson said, "I 
understand you're a great parent. I can see that, but we can't let you go. We can't have it over. 
It's gone too far."104 The Jensens ask the Court to infer from this that Mr. Anderson knew the 
Jensens were not guilty of medical neglect but chose to maintain the Verified Petition anyway for 
political reasons. 
These statements do not establish a violation of the Jensens' substantive due process 
rights. The negotiations between the Jensens and Mr. Anderson began in late August 2003, after 
the Juvenile Court had already granted protective custody of P.J. to the State and ordered that he 
undergo chemotherapy to treat the cancer that multiple medical professionals indicated he had. 
Mr. Anderson traveled to Idaho in an attempt to negotiate an amiable resolution with the Jensens. 
The above statements were allegedly made during the course of these negotiations. Upon this 
background of undisputed facts, the Court cannot reasonably infer from Mr. Anderson's alleged 
statements that the medical neglect allegations were baseless, that Mr. Anderson knew it, and 
Docket No. 345, at U 382. 
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that he admitted as much to the Jensens. Mr. Anderson's attempt to negotiate a workable 
solution to the out-of-hand situation in no way interfered with the Jensens' right to familial 
association or their right to direct P.J.'s medical care. 
The Jensens also allege that Mr. Anderson violated their substantive due process rights by 
intentionally failing to inform the Juvenile Court of the following: (1) definitive testing had 
never been performed on P.J.'s tissue; and (2) Dr. Johnston had materially breached his 
agreement to refrain from rendering a diagnosis before completing the independent testing. 
These allegations provide neither a factual nor legal basis to find that Mr. Anderson 
violated the Jensens' substantive due process rights. With regard to first alleged omission, the 
Jensens have not directed the Court to evidence that Mr. Anderson knew the Juvenile Court was 
unaware of the possibility for genetic testing or that genetic tests were "definitive." Rather, they 
cite to the deposition testimony of P.J.'s guardian ad litem in which she indicates that she was 
unaware of the possibility for genetic testing until September 4, 2003. This does not show that 
Mr. Anderson intentionally withheld information about genetic testing from the Juvenile Court. 
Moreover, the Jensens repeatedly stated their desire for further testing during the Juvenile Court 
proceedings. 
With respect to the second alleged omission, the Jensens contend that Mr. Anderson was 
aware that Dr. Johnston had determined to recommend chemotherapy before receiving the results 
of the genetic tests in violation of the September 5, 2003 stipulation and that Mr. Anderson failed 
to inform the Juvenile Court of this fact. Mr. Anderson testified that he understood Dr. Johnston 
would perform an independent evaluation of P.J.'s medical condition, including independent 
testing, before rendering a final treatment recommendation. Mr. Anderson also testified that he 
was aware the genetic tests were not finished when Dr. Johnston determined to recommend 
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chemotherapy. However, there is no evidence that Mr. Anderson understood that rendering a 
diagnosis before completion of the genetic testing breached the September 5 stipulation. The 
deposition testimony cited by the Jensens only refers to "independent testing."105 There is no 
indication in either Mr. Anderson's testimony, or in the written stipulation, that Dr. Johnston 
could not have sufficiently confirmed the diagnosis through independent testing, like the 
pathological testing conducted by Dr. Coffin, even though the genetic testing was not complete. 
Moreover, there is no evidence showing that Mr. Anderson intentionally withheld the fact that 
the genetic testing was incomplete from the Juvenile Court. The Court cannot find that Mr. 
Anderson was deliberately withholding information from the Juvenile Court based merely on the 
fact that he knew the genetic tests—which Dr. Johnston testified were immaterial to his treatment 
recommendation—were not yet complete. Most important, the Jensens have failed to show how 
Mr. Anderson's alleged failure to disclose this information interfered with their right to direct 
PJ. 's medical care. The Jensens refused to follow Dr. Johnston's treatment recommendations, 
which lead to DCFS's decision to dismiss the case shortly thereafter. The only action taken by 
the Juvenile Court subsequent to Dr. Johnston's recommendation was to dismiss the case. 
Finally, the Jensens argue that Mr. Anderson should be liable for failure to adequately 
train and supervise DCFS case workers. Presumably, although it is far than clear, the Jensens 
claim that Mr. Anderson is liable for the injuries resulting from Ms. Cunningham's actions in 
failing to properly investigate PJ. 's referral because he failed to train her. The Jensens cite to the 
case of City of Canton v. Harris106 for the proposition that a supervisor who acts with deliberate 
Docket No. 345, Ex. 2, at 249. 
*489 U.S. 378 (1989). 
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indifference in failing to train and supervise subordinates is subject to liability under section 
1983. 
The Jensens' failure to train and supervise claim fails for two reasons. First, the Jensens 
have not brought any evidence to the Court's attention that could show Mr. Anderson acted with 
"deliberate indifference"107 to the rights of others in failing to train Ms. Cunningham. Second, 
the Jensens have not established that Ms. Cunningham's conduct violated their constitutional 
rights, a prerequisite to Mr. Anderson's liability for failure to train her.108 
In sum, the Court finds that none of Mr. Anderson's actions during his involvement with 
PJ.'s case interfered with the Jensens' substantive due process rights. 
2. Procedural Due Process 
The Jensens claim that each of the Defendants violated their procedural due process 
rights. Ms. Cunningham, Ms. Eisenman, and Mr. Anderson present argument on these claims. 
Dr. Wagner incorporates these arguments by reference. However, as Ms. Eisenman and Dr. 
Albritton enjoy absolute immunity, the Jensens' procedural due process claims against them are 
not discussed. 
Ms. Cunningham. The Jensens claim that Ms. Cunningham violated their procedural due 
process rights by failing to properly investigate PJ.'s referral and by intentionally 
misrepresenting facts to the Juvenile Court. 
At its most basic level, due process ensures that a person may not be deprived of an 
interest in life, liberty, or property without "the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and 
'id. at 388. 
*/</.at 391. 
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in a meaningful manner." As noted by the Court in its June 2006 Decision, the Due Process 
Clause also requires that "the notice and hearing . . . be fair."110 Accordingly, in considering the 
Defendants' motions to dismiss in June 2006, the Court found that the Jensens' allegation that 
"[Ms. Cunningham] intentionally misrepresented or omitted facts in the Jensens' case, including 
the status of allegedly confirmatory tests, to the Utah juvenile court" was sufficient to state a 
claim for violation of their rights to procedural due process.111 
However, as set forth above, the Jensens have failed to submit evidence that Ms. 
Cunningham deliberately made material misrepresentations and omissions to the Juvenile Court. 
Rather, the Jensens merely nitpick Ms. Cunningham's August 2003 affidavits. These alleged 
misstatements are not the type of intentional falsities that would render an otherwise procedurally 
sound judicial proceeding "unfair."112 Rather, these misrepresentations, which dealt with facts 
known to the Jensens, were more properly addressed by the Jensens' counsel at the August 8, 
2003 hearing before the Juvenile Court. For example, the Jensens' counsel could, if desired, 
easily have pointed out to the Juvenile Court that Dr. Birkmayer was more than just a "man." 
Thus, the Jensens have not established a violation of their procedural due process rights with 
regard to the alleged factual misrepresentations and omissions. 
l09Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 
545, 552 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
110Docket No. 52, at 23 ("[T]he Due Process Clause also encompasses . . . a guarantee of 
fair procedure.") (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
xxlSee, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959) (finding due process violation 
where witness gave perjured testimony that he had received no promise in return for his 
testimony when in reality he had). 
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Additionally, the Court finds that the Jensens' had no liberty interest in the investigation 
of child abuse claims required of DCFS case workers under Utah law and, therefore, cannot 
establish a violation of their procedural due process rights by virtue of Ms. Cunningham's failure 
to carry out that investigation. "Protected liberty interests may arise from two sources—the Due 
Process Clause itself and the laws of the States."113 A State may create a liberty interest "by 
establishing substantive predicates to govern official decision-making . . . and by mandating the 
outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met."114 Both of these 
elements are necessary for the creation of a liberty interest. Thus, where state law requires the 
fulfilment of specified substantive predicates but does not mandate a certain outcome, there is no 
liberty interest.115 
"State-created procedures . . . do not create such an entitlement where none would 
otherwise exist."116 As stated by the Supreme Court: "Process is not an end in itself. Its 
constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate 
claim of entitlement."117 For example, in Pierce v. Delta County Department of Social Services, 
the plaintiffs argued that Colorado's Child Protection Act created a liberty interest by mandating 
n3Ky. Dept. ofCorr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 
459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
U4Id. at 462 (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
115Id. at 464-465. 
n6Piercev. Delta County Dept. ofSoc. Servs., 119F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1152-53 (D. Colo. 
2000). 
1170//m v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983). 
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that acts of child abuse be reported and properly investigated.118 The court rejected this 
contention, finding that the Colorado statutes at issue merely mandated procedure without 
dictating "a particular substantive outcome or guarantee."119 
The Jensens contend that Utah law, by statue, imposes mandatory duties to perform 
specific investigative actions before doing anything that might affect parental rights. Even 
assuming that this is the case, the Jensens merely assert a liberty interest in process, not in 
substantive outcomes. The Jensens do not point to any section of the Utah Code that sets forth a 
specific substantive predicate that, when fulfilled, dictates a specific substantive outcome. This 
does not create the sort of entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause. 
Thus, the Jensens have failed to establish that Ms. Cunningham violated their procedural 
due process rights. 
Mr. Anderson. The Jensens claim that Mr. Anderson implemented a policy whereby case 
workers would not investigate allegations of medical neglect when made by doctors from PCMC 
and that this policy violated their due process rights.120 The Jensens also claim that this policy 
violated their right to equal protection. However, because they did not plead an equal protection 
claim, and apparently asserted it for the first time in the summary judgment briefing, the Court 
will not consider this argument. 
mPierce, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1153. 
U9Id. 
120At some point, the Jensens also claimed that Mr. Anderson made factual 
misrepresentations and omissions to the state courts. However, the Jensens have not pursued this 
theory in their summary judgment briefing and have submitted no evidence to support it. 
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The Jensens have failed to submit any evidence that DCFS actually had a policy of not 
investigating medical neglect allegations if they were made by PCMC doctors. Rather, the 
Jensens ask the Court to infer that such a policy was instituted by Mr. Anderson based on the 
following: (1) Ms. Cunningham did not investigate P.J.'s referral; (2) Ms. Cunningham testified 
that she believed her actions were consistent with DCFS policy; and (3) Ms. Cunningham 
testified that Mr. Anderson told her she handled P.J.'s case appropriately. This evidence is 
simply not enough to show that DCFS had a policy of never investigating medical neglect 
allegations made by PCMC doctors. Ms. Cunningham's alleged failure to investigate P.J.'s 
referral took place in a situation that was represented to her by Dr. Wagner as a medical 
emergency requiring prompt action. To the extent that her alleged failure to investigate did 
represent DCFS policy, it merely shows that DCFS policy allowed case workers to file a custody 
petition with a juvenile court of competent jurisdiction without further investigation when 
presented with objectively reasonable allegations of emergency medical neglect made by a 
doctor charged with the child's medical care. As explained in detail above, such a policy would 
not violate a parent's rights under the Due Process Clause. Moreover, even if DCFS did have a 
policy of never investigating referrals submitted by PCMC doctors, such a policy did not harm 
the Jensens in P.J.'s emergency case. Thus, the Court finds the Jensens have failed to establish 
that Mr. Anderson violated their procedural due process rights. 
Dr. Wagner. As the Jensens received ample notice and an opportunity to be heard, any 
procedural due process claims against Dr. Wagner must be based on his alleged 
misrepresentations and omissions. However, as set forth above, the Jensens have not submitted 
competent evidence that Dr. Wagner deliberately misrepresented or omitted material facts to the 
Juvenile Court or others involved in the case. Moreover, any misrepresentations and omissions 
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allegedly made by Dr. Wagner did not make the Juvenile Court proceedings unfair. The record 
demonstrates that the Jensens received ample opportunity to present their desire for further 
testing in the Juvenile Court. In fact, these desires were heard and decided upon by that court. 
The Jensens have not established that Dr. Wagner violated their procedural due process rights. 
3. Malicious Prosecution 
In their third cause of action, the Jensens121 allege that each of the Defendants122 violated 
their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures by instituting and 
continuing a "malicious prosecution." Each of the Defendants has moved for summary judgment 
on this claim. Notably, the Jensens have failed to respond to Mr. Anderson's motion on this 
point. Accordingly, the Court will grant his motion with respect to the Fourth Amendment 
claim. 
Under Tenth Circuit law, analysis of a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment is guided by the elements of the common law tort of 
malicious prosecution.123 However, "the ultimate question in such a case is whether plaintiff has 
proven the deprivation of a constitutional right."124 As recently stated by the Tenth Circuit in 
Wilkins v. DeReyes, 
121
 As the Court dismissed P.J.'s Fourth Amendment claim in its June 2006 Order, Mr. and 
Ms. Jensen proceed without him on this claim. 
122The Jensens' malicious prosecution claims against Ms. Eisenman and Dr. Albritton are 
not discussed in light of their absolute immunity. 
mBecker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 913-14 (10th Cir. 2007). 
mWilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 797 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Novitsky v. City of 
Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Under our cases, a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim includes the 
following elements: (1) the defendant caused the plaintiffs continued 
confinement or prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in favor of the 
plaintiff; (3) no probable cause supported the original arrest, continued 
confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant acted with malice; and (5) the 
plaintiff sustained damages.125 
The Jensens seek damages for malicious prosecution arising from both the Juvenile Court 
proceedings and the criminal case. 
a. Juvenile Court Proceedings. 
To establish a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, the 
plaintiff must show that a seizure actually occurred.126 In Becker v. Kroll, the Tenth Circuit 
considered a § 1983 plaintiffs claim that she was seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment even though she "was never arrested, incarcerated, or otherwise placed under the 
direct physical control of the state."127 The plaintiff—who was charged with a felony offense in 
a state court—argued that investigation into her alleged criminal activity "imposed burdens on 
her time, finances, and reputation by requiring her to travel to and attend meetings, pay legal 
costs, and eventually, face criminal charges" and, therefore, constituted a seizure for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.128 The court declined "to expand Fourth Amendment liability in cases 
where the plaintiff has not been arrested or incarcerated."129 Specifically, the court noted that 
were it to impose Fourth Amendment liability in cases that lacked a traditional seizure, "every 
125Id. at 799. 
126£edter,494F.3dat914. 
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charging decision would support a § 1983 malicious prosecution-type claim no matter the 
context."130 
It is undisputed that neither Mr. Jensen nor Ms. Jensen was arrested, incarcerated, or 
otherwise placed under the direct physical control of the State as a result of the proceedings in 
the Juvenile Court. Recognizing this, the Jensens argue that the Court should expand the Fourth 
Amendment concept of "seizure" to accord with that proposed in Justice Ginsberg's concurrence 
in Albright v. Oliver.131 The Jensens contend that they suffered "significant, ongoing 
deprivations] of liberty as a result of the Juvenile Court proceedings," which constitute a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment, as follows: 
The Jensens were unable to return to the state of Utah (their home) without the 
threat of arrest and removal of their child. They were unable to take their child for 
an evaluation in Houston, and to other physicians of their choosing, because the 
State forbid it. They were subjected to mandatory court appearances. They were 
ordered to give up their passports. [Mr. Jensen] lost his job, and was exposed to 
serious diminishment of other employment prospects, both because he was 
terminated from his previous job, and because he had to devote his time, finances, 
energy and efforts to attempting to protect his and his family's rights. The 
Jensens were subjected to close media scrutiny and held up to public ridicule and 
contempt. Finally, the Jensens endured the horrible financial and emotional strain 
of defending their family from neglect proceedings that were based entirely upon 
misrepresentations and deceit.132 
Although acknowledging the burdens experienced by the Jensens in defending 
themselves, the Court simply cannot find that they experienced a Fourth Amendment seizure as a 
result of the Juvenile Court proceedings. Tenth Circuit precedent clearly mandates the contrary. 
I31510 U.S. 266 (1994). 
132DocketNo.342,atl5-16. 
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Accordingly, the Court finds that the Jensens have failed to establish a Fourth Amendment 
violation related to the Juvenile Court proceedings, 
b. Criminal Case 
With regard to the criminal case, the Defendants focus their challenges on the first and 
third prongs above: causation and probable cause. Because it is clear that neither Dr. Wagner nor 
Ms. Cunningham caused the prosecution of the criminal action against the Jensens, analysis of 
probable cause is unnecessary. 
In order to establish a constitutional violation, the Jensens must show that Dr. Wagner 
and Ms. Cunningham "caused the plaintiffs continued confinement or prosecution."133 In 
Pierce, the Tenth Circuit held that this element reaches more than just those who actually initiate 
a criminal action.134 Surveying both the common law and cases interpreting the reach of the 
Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that a forensic analyst who fabricated inculpatory 
evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence, thereby leading prosecutors to indict and 
prosecute" the plaintiff, sufficiently caused the plaintiffs continued prosecution for purposes of 
the plaintiffs § 1983 claim, even though she did not formally initiate the charges.135 In each of 
the examples used by the Pierce court to reach this conclusion, the state actor's conduct was 
closely connected to either the initiation or continuation of the prosecution.136 Notably, the 
13V//yh>zs,528F.3dat799. 
U4Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1291-92. 
135Id. at 1291-94. 
l36Id. at 1292 ("[A] private person who takes an active part in continuing or procuring the 
continuation of criminal proceedings initiated by himself or by another is subject to the same 
liability for malicious prosecution as if he had initiated the proceedings.") (citing Restatement 
(Second) Torts § 655); id. (citing Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649, 655-56 (10th Cir. 1990) 
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principles described by the Pierce court closely resemble the definition of a complaining witness 
provided in Anthony v. Baker131 for purposes of determining the applicability of prosecutorial 
immunity: "The term 'complaining witness' describes the person (or persons) who actively 
instigated or encouraged the prosecution of the plaintiff."138 
The Court finds that Dr. Wagner did not cause the initiation or continued prosecution of 
the criminal case. The Jensens' claims with regard to Dr. Wagner relate entirely to information 
provided to DCFS, its representatives, Ms. Eisenman, and the Juvenile Court. In fact, Dr. 
Wagner moved to Ohio in late June 2003 during the pendency of the Juvenile Court proceedings 
and before any change in P.J.'s legal custody. Dr. Wagner's final involvement with the Juvenile 
Court proceedings was his execution of an affidavit dated July 22, 2003, outlining basically the 
same information provided previously to DCFS in his case summary. Dr. Wagner executed the 
affidavit at Ms. Eisenman's request. The affidavit was to be used in connection with the Juvenile 
Court proceedings. There is no evidence that Dr. Wagner ever had contact with anyone from the 
District Attorney's Office. Initiation and continuation of the criminal case were dependant on 
multiple intervening events, including, most notably, the Jensens failure to comply with the 
Juvenile Court's orders. Thus, Dr. Wagner did not cause the initiation or continuation of the 
(finding "sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the [defendant police officers] purposefully 
concealed and misrepresented material facts to the district attorney which may have influenced 
his decision to prosecute [the plaintiff]")); id. ("If police officers have been instrumental in the 
plaintiffs continued confinement or prosecutions, they cannot escape liability by pointing to the 
decisions of prosecutors or grand jurors, or magistrates to confine or prosecute him.") (quoting 
Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988)). 




criminal case based solely on his referral of P.J.'s case to DCFS and his limited participation in 
the Juvenile Court proceedings. 
The Court likewise finds that Ms. Cunningham did not cause the initiation or continued 
prosecution of the criminal case. The Jensens argue that Ms. Cunningham's participation in the 
criminal case is shown by the fact that her name appears on the probable cause statement on 
which the criminal charges were based and that Ms. Eisenman testified that Ms. Cunningham 
provided information to Officer Peterson, who authored that statement. Even if this were true,139 
it does not provide an evidentiary basis on which the Court could conclude that Ms. Cunningham 
caused the prosecution of the criminal case. The Jensens do not indicate what information Ms. 
Cunningham may have provided nor its relevance to the criminal charges—nor do they indicate 
the circumstances in which Ms. Cunningham provided the information. Accordingly, the Court 
finds the Jensens have failed to establish that Ms. Cunningham caused the initiation or 
continuation of the criminal prosecution. 
The Jensens argue that the Court should apply principles of concurrent causation to hold 
all of the Defendants liable for the malicious prosecution. In the § 1983 context, "[w]here 
multiple forces are actively operating . . . plaintiffs may demonstrate that each defendant is a 
concurrent cause by showing that his or her conduct was a substantial factor in bringing [the 
injury] about."140 Where concurrent causation is established, the burden of proof shifts to each 
139In reality, the Court cannot assume Ms. Eisenman so testified because the deposition 
pages cited by the Jensens were left out of their exhibits, despite receiving an opportunity to 
supplement the record. See Docket No. 375 (ordering the Jensens to provide any materials 
inadvertently omitted from their exhibits). 
l40Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Northington v. Marin, 
102 F.3d 1564,1568-69 (10th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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defendant to prove that his conduct was not the cause of the harm.141 Should a defendant fail to 
do so, he is liable for the whole injury under principles of joint and several liability.142 
The Jensens have not shown that principles of concurrent causation should apply to their 
Fourth Amendment claim. The Jensens have not submitted any evidence that Dr. Wagner or Ms. 
Cunningham provided information to the District Attorney's Office or that their involvement in 
the Juvenile Court case led to the initiation or continuation of the criminal charges. In fact, this 
is not even consistent with the Jensens' version of the facts: "Eisenman was driving the criminal 
charges effort, not McDonald or Cunningham."143 Accordingly, there is no evidentiary basis on 
which to apply principles of concurrent causation and joint and several liability to the Jensens' 
claim for malicious prosecution of the criminal case. Therefore, the Court finds that the Jensens 
have not established that Dr. Wagner and Ms. Cunningham violated their Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
D. State Law Claims 
The Court does not have original jurisdiction over any of the Jensens' state law claims. 
As this Order disposes of all of the Jensens' federal claims, and as their Utah constitutional 
claims present important questions of state law, the Court declines to further exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and will remand them to the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, from which this case was removed.144 
l4lNorthington, 102 F.3d at 1568. 
142/J.atl569. 
143DocketNo.342,at20. 




For all of the reasons set forth above, it is hereby 
ORDERED that Defendant Richard Anderson's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 
No. 324], Defendant Kari Cunningham's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 326], 
Defendant Susan Eisenman's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 329], and Defendants 
Wagner and Albritton's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 332] are GRANTED IN 
PART with respect to Claims 1, 2, and 3 of the Complaint. It is further 
ORDERED that Defendant Susan Eisenman's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Consolidated 
Statement of Fact [Docket No. 349], Defendant Wagner's and Albritton's Motion to Strike 
References to P J.'s Current Condition [Docket No. 353], Defendants Wagner's and Albritton's 
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Hearsay [Docket No. 356], and Defendant Wagner's and Albritton's 
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Attempts to Rebut Medical Evidence Without Expert Testimony 
[Docket No. 358] are DENIED AS MOOT. It is further 
ORDERED that the Jensens' state law claims (Claims 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10) are 
REMANDED to the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. It is 
further 
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case forthwith. 
DATED September 22, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
TED STEWART 
Unilseraates District Judge 
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Ifiiited S t a t e District Court 
District of Utah 
D. Mark Jones FT)p^Jj Louise S. York 
Clerk of Court \ % ^ V Chief Deputy Clerk 
September 22, 2008 
Clerk of Court 
Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County - Salt Lake City District Court 
450 South State 
P.O. Box 1860 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-1860 
Re: Jensen et al v. State of Utah et al 
US District Court Case Number: 2:05-cv-00739-TS-PMW 
State Case Number: 050912502 
Dear Clerk of Court: 
Pursuant to Order Remanding Case to State Court signed by the Honorable Ted Stewart 
and dated 9/22/2008,1 am forwarding a certified copy of the remand order. None of the 
documents contained in the federal file will be forwarded to the State Court (see FRCP 28:1447). 
I am also returning your original record received by the federal court on 09/29/2005 
Please return a signed copy of this letter in the enclosed self-addressed envelope. 
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.SE NUMBER 050912502 Civiu. Rights 
Defendant - SUSAN EISENMAN 
PO BOX 140811 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114 
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-05 Case filed by teressah 
-05 Judge LEWIS assigned. 
-05 Filed: Complaint No Amount 
-05 Filed: Demand Civil Jury 
-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 155.00 
-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 75.00 
-05 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S, 
- CIVIL 
05 JURY DEMAND - CIVIL 
05 Bond Account created 
05 Bond Posted 
05 Fee Account created 
05 COPY FEE 
05 Fee Account created 
05 COPY FEE 
05 Fee Account created 
05 COPY FEE 
155.00 
JURY DEMAND 
75.00 Payment Received: 
Total Due: 3 0 0.00 
Payment Received: 3 00.00 
Total Due: 17.50 
Payment Received: 17.50 
Total Due: 16.00 
Payment Received: 16.00 
Total Due: 16.00 






05 Filed return: Affidavit of Service. To: Intermountain Health 
Care, INC. 
Party Served: Julie Swenson - Legal Assistant 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: August 08, 2005 
05 Filed: Defendant Susan Eisenman's Waiver of Service of Summons 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f). 
05 Filed: Defendant Richard Anderson's Waiver of Service of 
Summons Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4 (f). 
05 Filed: Defendant Richard Anderson's Waiver of Service of 
Summons Pursant toUtah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f). 
05 Filed: Defendant Kari Cunningham's Waiver of Service of 
Summons Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil procedure 4(f) 






















inted: 09/29/05 08:51:38 Page 3 
1 < ^ 
LSE NUMBER 050912502 Civi_L Rights 
pursuant to Utah rule of civil procedure 4(f) salomet 
>-02-05 Filed: Defendant State of Utah's waiver of service of summons 
pursuant Utah rule of civil procedure 4(f) salomet 
>-02-05 Filed: Defendant State of Utah's Waiver of service of summons 
pursuant Utah Rule of Civil prodedure 4(f). salomet 
)-02-05 Filed: Defendant Susan Eisenman's waiver of servcie of summons 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil procedure 4(f). salomet 
)-02-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 16.00 teressah 
J-02-05 COPY FEE Payment Received: 16.00 teressah 
3-06-05 Filed: Notice of Removal to Federal Court. salomet 
3-09-05 Filed: Waiver and Acceptance of Service wendyd 
3-09-05 Filed: Waiver and Acceptance of Service wendyd 
3-09-05 Filed: Waiver and Acceptance of Service wendyd 
3-09-05 Filed: Waiver and Acceptance of Service wendyd 
3-19-05 Case Disposition is Transferred chells 
Disposition Judge is LESLIE A LEWIS chells 
3-19-05 Note: Case sent to Federal Court chells 
rinted: 09/29/05 08:51:38 Page 4 (last) 
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PEGGY E. STONE (6658) • v <jrf~ 
PETER L.ROGNLEE (4131) J 
REED M. STRINGHAM (4679) 
Office of the Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant Richard Anderson 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER JENSEN, a minor, by and 
through his parents and natural guardians, 
BARBARA and DAREN JENSEN; 
BARBARA JENSEN, individually; and NOTICE OF REMOVAL TO 
DAREN JENSEN, individually, FEDERAL COURT 
Plaintiffs, 
v. Civil No. 050912502 
STATE OF UTAH; INTERMOUNTAIN Judge Leslie Lewis 
HEALTH CARE, INC.; KARI 
CUNNINGHAM, in her individual 
capacity; RICHARD ANDERSON, in his 
individual and official capacities; LARS M. 
WAGNER, in his individual capacity; 
DAVID L. CORWIN, in his individual 
capacity; CHERYL M. COFFIN, in her 
individual capacity; KAREN H. 
ALBRrfTON, in her individual capacity; 
SUSAN EISENMAN, in her individual ' 
capacity; and JANE and JOHN DOE, in 
their individual capacities, 
Defendants. 
Please take notice that on the day of September, 2005, defendant Richard 
Anderson, by and through his counsel, Peter L. Rognlie, Peggy E. Stone and Reed M. Stringham, 
Assistant Utah Attorneys General, filed a Notice of Removal of a Civil Action From State Court 
to Federal Court in the above-captioned case to the United States District Court for the District 
of Utah, Central Division. A copy of said Notice of Removal of a Civil Action From State Court 
to Federal Court is attached hereto. 
DATED this day of September, 2005. 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
PEGGY E. STONE ~^ 
PETER L. ROGNLIE 
REED M. STRINGHAM 
Assistant Utah Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Richard Anderson 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF REMOVAL 
TO FEDERAL COURT was sent by United States mail, postage prepaid, this day of 
September, 2005, to the following: 
Roger P. Christensen 
Karra J. Porter 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
David G. Williams 
10 Exchange Place, 11 Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Charles W. Dahlquist 
60 E. South Temple #1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84070 
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